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 The increasing pressure from the world’s population on limited natural resources has 
reached an urgent level. The global demand for water, food, and energy is unsustainable, and 
poses a threat to human health, political stability, and environmental well-being. The poor in 
developing countries are most vulnerable to the negative effects of the exploitation of constrained 
resources, and the segregation of development programs by sector means that policy 
interventions do little to help. Currently, development policies are created in isolation from one 
another, within their own sectoral realms, and inter-sector coordination is rare. Policy 
interventions that affect more than one sector are key to holistic, sustainable development, but 
because they face an ownership issue, not falling under any one sector’s jurisdiction, they often go 
unaddressed. The alternative to the status quo is the use of a nexus perspective, which emphasizes 
the interconnectedness of sectors and seeks to implement policy interventions with the best net 
outcomes. Policy makers are encouraged to adopt “systems thinking”, to resist over-focused 
investments and interventions, and to seek regulatory cooperation.  
 The body of nexus literature is growing mainly with the establishment of theoretical 
frameworks and macroeconomic studies that model outcomes of nexus interventions. This thesis 
contributes to the pool of nexus literature with microeconomic studies that are evaluated from the 
perspective of the food-energy-water (FEW) nexus. Microeconomic analysis is valuable to the 
nexus perspective not only because it informs macroeconomic models, but also because it provides 
empirical evidence of nexus forces at work.  
 The subjects of the three studies contained in this thesis are smallholder farmers in Dedza, 
Malawi. The first study investigates the farmers’ willingness to invest in communally-owned 
irrigation schemes and the household socioeconomic characteristics that determine that 
willingness. The study is intended to inform Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) programs, to 
help smooth the process of the transfer of irrigation scheme ownership from the government to 
local stakeholders. The promotion of IMT programs is considered a FEW nexus intervention 
because irrigation affects not only the water sector, but also the energy and food sectors. While 
widespread irrigation adoption may negatively impact the water sector and reduce the potential 
for hydropower in the energy sector, it can also be expected to improve yields and thus security in 
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the food sector. The study found that farmers are willing to invest unpaid labor in addition to, or 
instead of capital, suggesting that investment packages should be tailored to stakeholders’ 
endowments. Inclusive dialogue and clear investment expectations for stakeholders are key to the 
long-term success of IMT projects.  
 The second study in this thesis elicits smallholder farmers’ preferences for a conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) over a fertilizer subsidy coupon, with the intent of presenting policy makers 
with an alternative to Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP). The narrow focus of the FISP, 
combined with its astronomical budget and disputed impact, indicate that it is time for an 
alternative, nexus-oriented intervention. The conditionality of a CCT means it can be targeted 
directly at certain sectors, and because beneficiaries are free to spend the cash as they choose, 
the impact will be spread over all three sectors. The study found that as a group, the farmers are 
reluctant to accept the CCT over a fertilizer subsidy. However, the most vulnerable respondents, 
those households with the lowest incomes, with female main decision makers, and located in 
remote villages, are more likely to prefer the CCT. A well-targeted, transparent CCT program has 
the potential to reach the most at-risk households and bring positive developments to the FEW 
nexus in a way the FISP cannot.   
 The third study in this thesis explores smallholder farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for 
improved cookstoves (ICS) and the socioeconomic characteristics that determine their WTP, to 
assist ICS promoting programs with pricing and targeting. Widespread sustained ICS adoption and 
the resulting fuel savings would directly affect the food and energy sectors, and indirectly affect 
the water sector. The high morbidity rates caused by reliance on biomass fuels for cooking would 
decline with sustained ICS adoption and proper use, resulting in human health improvements that 
would affect all three nodes of the nexus. There would be further indirect effects on all three 
sectors resulting from advancements in gender equality and climate change mitigation. The study 
found household dietary diversity and annual net income per capita to be positively correlated 
with WTP, while fuel expenditures and the presence of cooking-related ailments are negatively 
correlated with WTP, highlighting the need for strategic stove promotion programs. 
 While the findings of these studies have interesting implications for the FEW nexus, the 
interventions in question should be applied in an economy-wide model to determine the nexus 
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effects. Such coordination of micro- and macroeconomic research, coupled with the inter-sector 
perspective, characterize the nexus approach and the future of development policy.




 Der zunehmende Bevölkerungsdruck auf begrenzte natürliche Ressourcen hat ein kritisches 
Niveau erreicht. Der globale Bedarf an Wasser, Nahrungsmitteln und Energie ist nicht nachhaltig 
und stellt eine Bedrohung für die menschliche Gesundheit, die politische Stabilität und die Umwelt 
dar. Arme in Entwicklungsländern sind am stärksten von negativen Auswirkungen der Ausbeutung 
von begrenzten Ressourcen betroffen. Die Trennung von Entwicklungsprogrammen nach Sektoren 
führt dazu, dass politische Interventionen wenig zur Lösung dieses Problems beitragen. Derzeit 
werden entwicklungspolitische Maßnahmen isoliert voneinander, innerhalb ihrer eigenen 
Sektoren geschaffen, und es gibt wenig Koordination zwischen den Sektoren. Sektorübergreifende 
politische Maßnahmen sind unablässig für eine ganzheitliche, nachhaltige Entwicklung, doch weil 
sie nicht unter die Zuständigkeit eines einzelnen Sektors fallen und Verantwortlichkeiten nicht klar 
sind, werden sie oft nicht durchgeführt. Die Alternative zum Status Quo ist die Verwendung einer 
Nexus-Perspektive, die die Vernetzung von Sektoren unterstreicht und politische Interventionen 
mit den besten Nettowirkungen umsetzt. Politische Entscheidungsträger werden dazu 
aufgefordert "systemisch“ zu denken, thematisch zu sehr fokussierten Investitionen und 
Interventionen zu widerstehen und regulatorische Zusammenarbeit zu suchen. 
Die Literatur zum Nexus wächst vor allem mit der Etablierung von theoretischen 
Bezugsrahmen sowie makroökonomische Studien, die Ergebnisse von Nexus-Interventionen 
modellieren. Die vorliegende Arbeit leistet einen Beitrag zur Nexus-Literatur mit 
mikroökonomischen Studien, die aus der Perspektive des Nexus Nahrung-Energie-Wasser (FEW) 
ausgewertet werden. Eine mikroökonomische Analyse ist für die Nexusperspektive nicht nur 
deshalb wertvoll, weil sie Daten für makroökonomische Modelle, sondern auch, weil sie empirische 
Beweise für Nexus-Kräfte liefert. 
Gegenstand der drei Studien in der vorliegenden Arbeit sind Kleinbauern in Dedza, Malawi. 
Die erste Studie untersucht die Bereitschaft der Landwirte, in gemeinschaftlich genutzte 
Bewässerungsprogramme zu investieren sowie die sozioökonomischen Charakteristiken der 
Haushalte, die diese Bereitschaft bestimmen. Die Studie soll den Prozess der Übertragung von 
Projektverantwortung für das Bewässerungsmanagement-Transferprogramm (IMT) von der 
Regierung zu lokalen Stakeholdern erleichtern. Die Förderung von IMT-Programmen gilt als FEW-
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Nexus-Intervention, da Bewässerung nicht nur den Wasser-, sondern auch den Energie- und 
Nahrungsmittelsektor betrifft. Während Bewässerung in der Landwirtschaft den Wassersektor 
negativ beeinflussen und das Wasserkraftpotenzial im Energiesektor verringern kann, kann mit 
einer weiteren Übernahme von Bewässerung gerechnet werden, die Erträge und somit 
Ernährungssicherheit verbessert. Die Studie stellt fest, dass Landwirte bereit sind, unbezahlte 
Arbeit statt oder zusätzlich zu Kapital zu investieren, was darauf hindeutet, dass die Investitionen 
auf die Stakeholder zugeschnitten sind. Inklusiver Dialog und klare Investitionserwartungen für 
Stakeholder sind Schlüsselelemente für den langfristigen Erfolg von IMT-Projekten. 
Die zweite Studie in dieser Arbeit untersucht die Präferenzen von Kleinbauern für ein 
Geldtransferprogramm (CCT) sowie Düngergutscheinen. Ziel dieser Studie ist es, politischen 
Entscheidungsträgern in Malawi eine Alternative zum Düngersubventionsprogramm (FISP) zu 
präsentieren. Der enge Fokus des FISP, das beträchtliche Budget und umstrittene Auswirkungen 
deuten auf die Notwendigkeit einer alternativen, nexusorientierten Intervention hin. Die 
Konditionalität eines CCT bedeutet, dass es direkt auf bestimmte Sektoren ausgerichtet werden 
kann und weil die Begünstigten frei entscheiden, wofür sie das Geld ausgeben, werden die 
Auswirkungen auf alle Sektoren verteilt. Die Studie stellt fest, dass die Mehrheit der Landwirte den 
Düngerzuschuss vor dem CCT den Vorzug gibt. Allerdings wird das CCT von Haushalten in 
abgelegenen Dörfern, denjenigen mit den niedrigsten Einkommen und denjenigen bei denen eine 
Frau wichtigster Entscheidungsträger ist, bevorzugt. Ein zielgerichtetes, transparentes CCT-
Programm hat im Gegensatz zum FISP das Potenzial, diese am meisten gefährdeten Haushalte zu 
erreichen und positive Entwicklungen zum FEW-Nexus beizutragen. 
Die dritte Studie untersucht die Zahlungsbereitschaft(WTP) von Kleinbauern für 
verbesserte Kochherde (ICS) und die sozioökonomischen Merkmale, die die WTP bestimmen, mit 
dem Ziel, die Förderung von ICS-Programmen mit Preisgestaltung und Targeting zu unterstützen. 
Eine nachhaltige Verbreitung von verbesserten Kochherden und die daraus resultierenden 
Treibstoffeinsparungen würden Nahrungsmittel- und Energiesektor direkt und den Wassersektor 
indirekt beeinflussen. Die hohen Morbiditätsraten, die durch die Abhängigkeit von Biomasse zum 
Kochen verursacht werden, würden mit anhaltender ICS-Übernahme und korrektem Gebrauch 
sinken, was zu Verbesserungen der menschlichen Gesundheit führt, die alle drei Nexusknoten 
betreffen. Es gibt weitere indirekte Auswirkungen auf alle drei Sektoren, die sich aus Fortschritten 
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bei der Gleichstellung der Geschlechter und dem Klimaschutz ergeben. Die Studie ergab, dass die 
Ernährungsvielfalt der Haushalte und das jährliche Nettoprokopfeinkommen positiv mit der 
Zahlungsbereitschaft korrelieren, während Treibstoffverbrauch sowie kochbedingte Erkrankungen 
negativ mit der Zahlungsbereitschaft korrelieren, was die Notwendigkeit von strategischen 
Herdförderungsprogrammen hervorhebt. 
Während die Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchungen interessante Implikationen für den FEW-
Nexus haben, sollten die betreffenden Interventionen in einem gesamtwirtschaftlichen Modell 
angewendet werden, um die Nexus-Effekte zu bestimmen. Diese Koordination mikro- und 
makroökonomischer Forschung gepaart mit einer sektorübergreifenden Perspektive kennzeichnet 
den Nexusansatz sowie die Zukunft von Entwicklungspolitik. 
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1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 This section introduces the country of study, the Republic of Malawi, and provides a 
conceptual framework for the thesis. The topics and objectives of the three studies contained 
within this thesis are described. At the end of this introduction is an outline of the thesis.  
1.1 Introduction to Malawi 
 A former British colony and relatively newly established democratic nation, Malawi faces 
many of same challenges as other Sub-Saharan countries, including rapid population growth, 
scarcity of arable land, corruption, and an HIV/AIDS epidemic (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016). 
The country’s economy is further constrained by poor infrastructure, limited market access, and a 
labor force weakened by health issues and lack of education, putting the GDP growth rate at 3% 
(2015 estimate) (Central Intelligence Agency, 2016; International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, 2016) and placing Malawi at position number 160 of 182 on the Human 
Development Index (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2016; United Nations 
Development Programme, 2009).  
 Among Malawi’s population of 16.8 million, 74% live below the 1.25 USD per day income 
poverty line and 90% live below the 2 USD (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2016; 
The World Bank, 2016; United Nations Development Programme, 2009). About 85% of Malawians 
live in rural areas, of whom 90% are smallholder farmers; they are often trapped in poverty by 
recurring environmental shocks, like droughts and floods, that harm crop yields and cause food 
price hikes (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2016; The World Bank, 2016). 
Agricultural production is low, and smallholders are generally stuck in subsistence farming 
(International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2016; The World Bank, 2016). Malawians’ low 
yield problems are compounded by both increasing population pressure on land resources and 
inadequate post-harvest technology (International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2016; The 
World Bank, 2016). Since 1968 average land holdings have decreased from 1.5 ha to 0.8 ha and 
post-harvest losses comprise about 40% of production (International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, 2016; The World Bank, 2016). 
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 Numerous factors contribute to Malawi’s stifling poverty levels. This thesis concentrates on 
three: the limited use of efficient irrigation technologies by smallholder farmers, the exhaustion of 
the agricultural budget by a poorly executed maize subsidy, and the rapid destruction of forest 
resources as a result of inefficient fuel use. Policy interventions that may improve these issues are 
the expansion of irrigation management transfer programs, the replacement of Malawi’s current 
fertilizer subsidy program with a conditional cash transfer program, and the promotion of 
sustained adoption of improved cookstoves, respectively. These three policy interventions are 
interrelated when viewed from a nexus perspective. 
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
1.2.1 Nexus Perspective 
In the development policy context, a nexus represents the interconnectedness of sectors. 
A nexus is best conceptualized with the aid of examples. In seeking improvements in one sector 
there may be trade-offs in another. For example, by increasing biofuel production for the benefit 
of the energy sector the water sector may suffer because of the expansion of irrigation needed for 
biofuel crop cultivation (Hussey & Pittock, 2012). Nexus policy relationships are not always 
characterized by trade-offs; they can be mutually beneficial. For example, an initiative to reduce 
the amount of water wasted by households would benefit both the water sector and the energy 
sector as the conveyance of less water through plumbing networks would require less energy 
(Hussey & Pittock, 2012). The use of a nexus perspective in policy making is based in new 
institutional economics (Kherallah & Kirsten, 2002) and is a relatively new concept having first 
emerged on the development policy stage in 2011 at the Bonn Nexus Conference and the World 
Economic Forum in Davos (Bizikova, Roy, Swanson, Venema, & McCandless, 2013; Gulati, Jacobs, 
Jooste, Naidoo, & Fakir, 2013; World Economic Forum, 2011). 
The indispensability of the food, water, and energy sectors have made them the sectors of 
focus in much of the nexus literature (Bazilian et al., 2011; Bizikova et al., 2013; Gulati et al., 2013; 
Hellegers, Zilberman, Steduto, & McCornick, 2008; Hoff, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2015; Rasul, 2014; 
Villarroel Walker, Beck, Hall, Dawson, & Heidrich, 2014). Many trade-offs and synergies, in addition 
to those mentioned above, are described in the literature, which varyingly refers to the food-
energy-water security nexus as the FEW nexus, the EWF nexus, or the WEF nexus. Figure 1.1 
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depicts the interconnectedness of the three sectors in the FEW nexus. The energy sector faces 
trade-offs from water sector developments including the operation of desalination plants, the 
inter-basin transfer of water, and the pumping of groundwater (Bazilian et al., 2011; Hussey & 
Pittock, 2012; Pittock, 2011; Shah, Scott, Kishore, & Sharma, 2003). The water sector faces trade-
offs from energy sector developments including the operation of hydropower plants and the 
cultivation of biofuels (Bazilian et al., 2011; Hellegers et al., 2008; Hussey & Pittock, 2012). The 
complexity of the mutual reliance of the energy sector and the water sector present a major 
challenge to policy makers (Hussey & Pittock, 2012). The water sector also faces trade-offs from 
food sector developments, particularly the increased use of irrigation (Bazilian et al., 2011). 
Sectoral trade-offs and synergies in the nexus can be at the regional or global level. At the regional 
level, for example, activities of upstream communities affect the ability of downstream 
communities to make use of water for irrigation, hydropower, and drinking (Rasul, 2014). At the 
global level, for example, the use of biomass fuels for cooking increases atmospheric warming 
(Rasul, 2014). 
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Figure 1.1: Food-Energy-Water Security Nexus 
 
Source: Adapted from Bazilian et al., 2011; Nielsen et al., 2015 
 
Currently, potential policy interventions that affect more than one sector face an ownership 
issue as they do not belong to one ministry or department, responsibility is disputed, and so they 
often go unaddressed (Ruiz-Mercado, Masera, Zamora, & Smith, 2011). Assuming a nexus 
perspective could turn the ownership problem into an advantage, as resources could be pooled 
from all involved sectors. Researchers encourage policy makers to adopt “systems thinking”, to 
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resist over-focused investments and interventions, and to seek regulatory cooperation (Bazilian et 
al., 2011; Bizikova et al., 2013; Hussey & Pittock, 2012; Scott et al., 2011). The urgency with which 
the nexus perspective is promoted is due to the world’s increasing population pressure on limited 
natural resources (Bizikova et al., 2013; World Economic Forum, 2011). By 2030, the global demand 
for water, food, and energy is expected to increase by up to 50%, possibly causing political 
instability and environmental harm (Bizikova et al., 2013; World Economic Forum, 2011). The poor 
in developing countries are the most susceptible to the negative effects of these pressures (Bazilian 
et al., 2011; Bizikova et al., 2013; Hoff, 2011; World Economic Forum, 2011). 
Because of government structuring and budget allocating, the links between sectors are 
largely ignored and policies are developed separately (Hussey & Pittock, 2012). In cases where 
sectors are considered simultaneously, concern for the environment is usually the unifying factor 
(Bazilian et al., 2011). Using the nexus perspective, the economy and sectoral security, which are 
stronger political impetuses than the environment, become the unifying factors (Bazilian et al., 
2011). The scopes of the resource sectors make the use of the nexus perspective in policy making 
a major challenge, and the complexity of their interrelatedness means that researchers have been 
slow to develop support tools (Bazilian et al., 2011).  
Several studies have now established quantitative frameworks for nexus perspectives (Mu 
& Khan, 2009; Schuenemann, Thurlow, & Zeller, 2017; Villarroel Walker et al., 2014; Zhu, Ringler, 
& Cai, 2007). The models, which discern sector linkages a priori, serve to assist policy makers in 
understanding the effects of interventions across sectors, providing much needed risk assessment 
(Bazilian et al., 2011; Hussey & Pittock, 2012). Apart from macroeconomic modelling, which can 
assess nexus relationships quantitatively at the country and sectoral level, the quantitative studies 
contained in this thesis are done at the microeconomic scale and not only help to provide empirical 
results for the calibration and validation of macroeconomic and sectoral models but also provide 
micro-level insights into the behavior of producers and consumers of food, energy and water.  
1.2.2 Nexus Policy Interventions 
This thesis and the three studies within it form a part of the International Food Policy 
Research Institute’s (IFPRI) project, “Policies and Institutions for Achieving the Virtuous Food-
Energy-Water Nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa”, which is funded under a research grant by the German 
Ministry of Development and Economic Cooperation (BMZ). The goal of IFPRI’s food-energy-water 
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security nexus (FEW nexus) project is to encourage policy makers to use the nexus perspective 
when creating interventions (Nielsen et al., 2015). IFPRI’s FEW nexus project uses Malawi and 
Mozambique as its case study countries, and includes both macroeconomic and microeconomic 
modelling. The IFPRI Discussion Paper titled, “The-Food-Energy-Water Security Nexus: Definitions, 
Policies, and Methods in an Application to Malawi and Mozambique” (Nielsen et al., 2015) explains 
in great detail the project’s components. It also provides its own unique definition of the FEW 
nexus:  
The food-energy-water security nexus encompasses synergies and trade-offs between food, 
energy, and water security that are impacted by endogenous and exogenous drivers and 
cannot be captured if these sectors are analyzed in isolation. (Nielsen et al., 2015) 
This thesis contributes findings from microeconomic studies on nexus interventions in Malawi.  
 The first study in this thesis investigates smallholder farmers’ willingness to invest in 
communally-owned irrigation schemes and the household socioeconomic characteristics that 
determine that willingness. The study is intended to inform Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT) 
programs, to smooth the process of the transfer of irrigation scheme ownership from state to local 
stakeholders. The promotion of IMT programs is considered a FEW nexus intervention because 
irrigation affects not only the water sector, but also the energy and food sectors. Irrigation may 
have negative impacts on water supplies, and the use of irrigation by upstream communities may 
affect the extent to which downstream communities can use water for irrigation, drinking, and 
hydropower (Rasul, 2014). There is, however, great potential for irrigation to make a positive 
impact on the food sector by increasing yields and extending growing seasons (Bazilian et al., 2011). 
 The second study in this thesis elicits smallholder farmers’ preferences for a conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) over a fertilizer subsidy coupon, with the intent of presenting policy makers 
with an alternative to Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP). As a FEW nexus intervention, 
the FISP affects the food sector, as well as the water and energy sectors. The subsidy makes 
fertilizer affordable to more smallholder farmers, and allows them to increase their maize yields, 
impacting the food sector. Increased cropping requires increased irrigation, which affects the 
water sector. The FISP is focused primarily on maize yields, a narrow focus that crowds out other 
food crops and biofuel crops, in terms of both land allocation and the national agricultural budget, 
which affects the food and energy sectors (Nielsen et al., 2015). The alternative to the FISP that is 
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presented, a CCT, is also a FEW nexus intervention. The conditionality of CCTs can be used to 
directly target certain sectors. In the case of this hypothetical CCT, the cash would be provided on 
the condition of adoption of agroforestry techniques, providing benefits to the food sector through 
crop diversity, as well as indirect effects on the water and energy sectors. Because CCT recipients 
are free to spend the cash any way they choose, the CCT would impact all three sectors. 
Beneficiaries may choose to make investments in their agricultural production, which would affect 
all three sectors directly, or they may choose to invest in non-agricultural business, transportation, 
or education, which would indirectly affect all three sectors.   
 The third study in this thesis explores smallholder farmers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for 
improved cookstoves (ICS) and the socioeconomic characteristics that determine their WTP, to 
assist ICS promoting programs with pricing and targeting. Widespread ICS adoption directly affects 
the food and energy sectors, and indirectly affects the water sector. The fuel efficiency of the 
stoves may allow users to consume a more diverse diet and decrease their fuel consumption 
(Nielsen et al., 2015). The lower demand for firewood and charcoal resulting from the fuel 
efficiency will slow deforestation and thus erosion, which in turn will improve water quality (García-
Frapolli et al., 2010). Further, the public health benefits from a reduction in use of biomass as fuel 
will affect all three sectors indirectly, as will the resulting climate change mitigation effects (Bensch 
& Peters, 2012; El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003; Fitzgerald et al., 2012; Hanna, Duflo, 
& Greenstone, 2012; Jan, 2012; Martin II, Glass, Balbus, & Collins, 2011). 
1.3 Studies and Objectives 
The three studies that constitute the body of this thesis are linked by their basis in the nexus 
intervention perspective. Below are the topics and objectives of each study. 
 
Research Topic 1: Willingness to invest in irrigation schemes and socioeconomic determinants 
thereof  
This study seeks to provide insight into smallholder farmers’ preferences for four different 
irrigation technologies, and the extent to which they are willing to invest in communally-owned 
irrigation schemes, as well as the socioeconomic traits and conditions that drive that willingness. 
The following five questions are explored:  
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(1) Which irrigation scheme technologies do farmers prefer? 
(2) To what extent are farmers willing to invest capital and unpaid labor in the 
construction/set-up of each type of irrigation scheme? 
(3) To what extent are farmers willing to invest capital and unpaid labor in the maintenance 
of each type of irrigation scheme? 
(4) To what extent are farmers willing to invest capital and unpaid labor in the 
management of each type of irrigation scheme? 
(5) Which socioeconomic factors affect farmers’ willingness to invest in irrigation schemes? 
 
Research Topic 2: Preferences for a conditional cash transfer over a fertilizer coupon and 
socioeconomic determinants thereof 
With the aim of exploring alternatives to Malawi’s current fertilizer subsidy, this study 
determines smallholder farmers’ preferences for a CCT over a fertilizer coupon. A choice 
experiment is used to elicit the preferences, survey questions investigate bias against the cash 
transfer as well as uses for the cash, and regression models provide insight into which socio-
economic characteristics influence the preferences. Four research questions are addressed:  
(1) Do farmers generally prefer the CCT or the fertilizer subsidy? 
(2) Among farmers who never prefer the CCT, why do they always prefer the fertilizer 
subsidy? 
(3) If farmers were to receive a CCT of 380 USD,1 how would they spend the money? How 
do responses differ between the main agricultural decision maker and their spouse? 
(4) Which socioeconomic factors affect preferences for the CCT or the fertilizer subsidy? 
 
Research Topic 3: Willingness to pay for improved cookstoves and socioeconomic determinants 
thereof 
                                                          
1 US dollar values in this thesis are converted from Malawian kwacha, and adjusted for purchasing power parity and 
inflation. Malawian kwacha, the local currency, was used during the survey. The average official exchange rate over 
the two-month period during which the survey took place (May and June, 2014) was 1 USD was equal to 387 MWK 
(OANDA, 2015). The average purchasing power parity adjusted for inflation was 1 USD was equal to 110.78 MWK 
during that same time (NSO, 2015; OANDA, 2015; The World Bank, 2015).  
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This study explores which socioeconomic traits influence consumers’ stated willingness to 
pay (WTP) for two types of ICS: a clay stove and a rocket stove. Findings are compared with those 
from studies done in other regions with different stoves (El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 
2003; Jan, 2012; Mobarak, Dwivedi, Bailis, Hildemann, & Miller, 2012; Pine et al., 2011; Takama, 
Tsephel, & Johnson, 2012). Given the study’s objectives, four research questions emerge:  
(1) What is the average WTP for the clay stove? 
(2) What is the average WTP for the rocket stove? 
(3) Which socioeconomic characteristics influence a households’ WTP for the clay stove? 
(4) Which socioeconomic characteristics influence a households’ WTP for the rocket stove? 
1.4 Outline of Thesis 
 This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 covers Research Topic 1, exploring smallholder 
farmers’ willingness to invest in terms of time and money to different irrigation schemes. Chapter 
3 covers Research Topic 2, examining the stated preferences for a CCT over a fertilizer coupon as 
elicited by a choice experiment. Chapter 4 covers Research Topic 3, assessing respondents’ WTP 
for two different ICS and the socioeconomic factors behind that willingness. Chapter 5 concludes 
the thesis by viewing the studies’ results through the nexus lens and providing policy 
recommendations.  
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As governments look to alleviate their budgets and encourage local management of natural 
resources, interest in irrigation management transfer (IMT) has grown. IMT is the handover of 
control and ownership of an irrigation system from a public sector entity to a private sector 
organization (Garces-Restrepo et al., 2007). With Malawi’s ineffective irrigation systems, 
burgeoning population density, and strained water resources, IMT is an attractive option for policy 
makers. Planners of upcoming IMT projects must thoroughly investigate the willingness of farmers 
to investigate in irrigation schemes, and use the findings to create realistic expectations for all IMT 
stakeholders. This paper analyzes the willingness of smallholder farmers to invest capital and 
unpaid labor in the construction, maintenance, and management of four types of irrigation 
schemes. These findings could be used as a basis for IMT budget estimates, but are not a substitute 
for in-depth research in particular areas where IMT is planned. A high willingness to invest in 
hypothetical irrigation schemes, in some cases, is explained by a greater household labor 
endowment, a higher education level, a higher elevation, a stronger social network, and the 
perception that irrigation is important to yield. Policy makers are encouraged to tailor IMT projects 
to individual households’ abilities to invest capital, unpaid labor, or a combination of the two.   
Over the past two decades, a trend of devolution of natural resource control from 
government agencies to user groups has occurred. Within the devolution trend are different types 
of programs with varying levels of handover, including: participatory management, wherein user 
involvement is encouraged as a complement to government control; joint- or co-management, 
wherein users handle certain responsibilities in conjunction with the state; and community-based 
resource management, wherein there is a total transfer of control (Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999). 
Along this spectrum is Irrigation Management Transfer (IMT), which is the transfer of ownership 
and management of irrigation schemes from the public to the private sector (Garces-Restrepo et 
al., 2007), for example in Malawi from the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water 
Development to a local water users’ association. IMT usually begins with a minor involvement of 
water users in a government-run scheme with the aim of a gradual complete handover of control 
of the irrigation scheme to the farming community.  
According to Meinzen-Dick and Knox (1999), devolution policies, including IMT, generally 
have three objectives in common. The first objective is to more effectively manage natural 
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resources and enforce resource use rules. Micromanaging natural resources is not easily done by 
national governments; local common property regimes hold the comparative advantage in 
knowledge of their own area and have stronger incentives than outsiders to safeguard the 
resources that provide their livelihood. The second objective is to increase democratization and 
thereby empower local people. The third objective, which is arguably most important to policy 
makers, is to alleviate financial strain on the national government. The costs associated with 
employing and transporting government staff to monitor natural resources of vast and remote 
areas are monumental and can be reduced by passing the responsibility to local residents. If 
governments do not come to this budgetary conclusion on their own, they are often pushed to do 
so by donor organizations (Meinzen-Dick & Knox, 1999).  
 With the acceleration of population growth and repeated droughts over the past few 
decades, Malawi is turning towards irrigation to increase incomes and improve food security 
(Ferguson & Mulwafu, 2005; Mulwafu & Nkhoma, 2002). Data on Malawi’s total irrigated land area 
is outdated, but shows a pattern of growth. There were an estimated 56,390 hectares of land 
equipped for irrigation in 2002, which was a significant increase from 24,048 hectares in 1994 
(FAO, 2006; Kaluwa et al., 1997). To alleviate the budgetary impact of this irrigation surge, the 
government has sought to transfer the management of state-owned schemes to farmer 
organizations. In addition to significant national budget relief, user participation in irrigation 
management is expected to encourage sustainable operations by inducing a sense of ownership 
and responsibility among farmers. IMT programs face a multitude of challenges and have not been 
entirely successful in Malawi thus far (Nkhoma & Mulwafu, 2004). 
IMT has been on Malawi’s policy agenda since the 1990s. The 1998 National Irrigation 
Policy and Development Strategy outlined procedures to repair rundown schemes, then transfer 
their ownership to farmer organizations (Malawi Government, 1998). Accordingly, the 
rehabilitation and handover of 16 schemes was attempted by the Technical Cooperation Project 
funded by the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) (Malawi Government, 1999). Due to the 
lack of funds for rehabilitation, lack of a detailed program for participating farmers, and the fact 
that the pilot process had not been well-documented, this project was a failure (Malawi 
Government, 2000). 
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A second attempt at IMT was made in 2002, when the Likangala irrigation scheme was 
selected for rehabilitation by the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development. 
According to Nkhoma and Mulwafu (2004), progress was slow because of: insecure funding; a lack 
of management training for farmers; a water users’ association or cooperative had not yet been 
established; the assumption that farmers would provide free labor in rehabilitation works; and 
rehabilitation work had to be scheduled around the wet season cultivation when farmers toil in 
their fields. Not only were there difficulties with funding, but building materials were stolen, 
farmers’ cultivation schedules were interrupted, and the transfer process was not clearly 
communicated. Another major obstacle to the transfer was the misunderstanding of who owned 
the scheme (Nkhoma & Mulwafu, 2004). This is a common struggle; Nkhoma and Mulwafu (2004) 
state that village heads, well-off farmers, and poor farmers all tend to see the handover as an 
opportunity to reclaim what they perceive as rightfully theirs. This climate of uncertainty 
demoralizes farmers and feeds conflict that, because of cultural precedence, ends up being 
resolved by village heads rather than the scheme committees (Nkhoma & Mulwafu, 2004).  
This paper elicits the willingness of smallholder farmers to invest capital and unpaid labor 
in the construction, maintenance, and management of four types of irrigation schemes, and 
explores determinants of the preferences. The specific objectives of the study are outlined in 
Section 2 and the study area is described in Section 3. Section 4 provides the methodologies of the 
survey and the econometric analysis. Section 5 gives results of the descriptive statistics, the 
willingness to invest questions, and the regression models. Finally, results are discussed and 
conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
2.2 Objectives 
This study forms a part of the International Food Policy Research Institute’s (IFPRI) project, 
“Policies and Institutions for Achieving the Virtuous Food-Energy-Water Nexus in Sub-Saharan 
Africa”, which is funded under a research grant by the German Ministry of Development and 
Economic Cooperation (BMZ). Smallholder irrigation reform policies, including IMT, are 
encompassed by the food-energy-water nexus framework as each part of the nexus has direct and 
indirect effects on the other nodes of the nexus (Nielsen et al., 2015). Support for this study, 
provided by IFPRI and the University of Hohenheim, is gratefully acknowledged.   
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This study seeks to provide insight into smallholder farmers’ preferences for different 
irrigation technologies, and the extent to which they are willing to invest in communally-owned 
irrigation schemes, as well as the traits and conditions that drive that willingness. The findings are 
intended for use by policy makers to improve budget estimates for irrigation projects and IMT 
programs, and to manage expectations when negotiating irrigation transfer contracts. In planning 
new irrigation infrastructure, it is paramount to investigate not only which technologies are 
physically feasible and which are preferred by future users, but also the cost-benefit analyses and 
the environmental impact of each system. Physical suitability, cost-benefit analyses, and 
environmental impact assessments are outside of the scope of this study. This study instead 
focuses on farmer preferences, aiming to answer the following five research questions:  
(1) Which irrigation scheme technologies do farmers prefer? 
(2) To what extent are farmers willing to invest capital and unpaid labor in the 
construction/set-up of each type of irrigation scheme? 
(3) To what extent are farmers willing to invest capital and unpaid labor in the maintenance 
of each type of irrigation scheme? 
(4) To what extent are farmers willing to invest capital and unpaid labor in the 
management of each type of irrigation scheme? 
(5) Which socioeconomic factors affect farmers’ willingness to invest in irrigation schemes? 
The inclusion of unpaid labor as a form of investment makes this study unique. No other studies 
could be found on non-financial investment options for IMT. Given the financial constraints of 
smallholder farmers, non-capital investments may improve the success rates of IMT.  
2.3 Study Area 
Dedza District lies between Lake Nyasa, the Mozambican border, and the national capital, 
Lilongwe, in Malawi’s Central Region. The Kirk Range is a watershed plateau that runs north-south 
through Dedza and provides the district with great biophysical variety. The eastern side of the 
plateau descends into the Rift Valley, where Lake Nyasa is located at about 500m.a.s.l. The warm 
climate of the lakeshore allows for the cultivation of paddy rice, tobacco, and cotton. The western 
side of the plateau is much higher in elevation; the capital of the district, Dedza Township, is 
located there at 1590m.a.s.l. The subtropical highland climate of the west is conducive to the 
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farming of potatoes and groundnuts. During the dry season, usually from May to October, there is 
almost no precipitation, but several perennial rivers provide water for home consumption and 
irrigation.   
 In Malawi, beneath the municipal level of a district are Traditional Authority Areas (TAs). 
Dedza District is divided into eight TAs, each of which are further divided into Sections and then 
villages. The agricultural extension service is not perfectly aligned with the municipal structure. 
Beneath the District Agricultural Development Officer are Extension Planning Area officers. 
Extension Planning Areas may contain more than one TA and a large TA may be handled by more 
than one Extension Planning Area. Extension Planning Areas are divided into sections, each of 
which has an officer. Section officers are responsible for providing agricultural extension services 
to the villages in their section. Section officers are on the frontlines and report back to their 
Extension Planning Area officer regularly.  
2.4 Methodology 
2.4.1 Survey Methodology 
The 300 smallholder farming households in Dedza District were sampled using stratification 
of randomization (Carletto, 1999). A list of Dedza District’s 2,840 villages was acquired from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Water Development. The statistical population was 242,519 
households. The eight TAs of the district were used as the strata; 30 villages were randomly 
sampled from the strata proportionate to TA population. Up-to-date lists of the sampled 
households were then obtained from the district agricultural extension office. From these lists, ten 
households were randomly selected per village. The households were interviewed in May and June 
of 2014. Sections of the survey instrument included: crop management; irrigation practices and 
preferences; non-crop income; a hypothetical cash transfer program; dietary diversity; fuel use 
and access; self-assessed risk preference; time labor allocation; intra-household decision making; 
cookstoves and health; social capital; and access to credit. Preferences for different cookstove 
attributes and for different forms of a conditional subsidy were elicited through choice 
experiments. Sections of the questionnaire that are relevant to this thesis can be found in Appendix 
E.  
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 Farmers were asked to contemplate the hypothetical construction by the government of a 
new irrigation scheme in their village. It was explained that the scheme would be for communal 
use and that they could invest in the scheme by: working without pay on its construction; covering 
a share of the construction costs; working without pay to maintain it once built; covering a share 
of the maintenance costs; working without pay to manage it; and covering a share of the 
management costs. They were asked to rank their preferences for which irrigation technology the 
hypothetical new scheme would be, then they were asked how much labor and capital they would 
be willing to invest in the construction, maintenance, and management of each technology. These 
investment types (labor and capital), technologies2 (treadle pump, motorized pump, canal, and 
bound basin), and stages (construction, maintenance, and management) combine to make 24 
investment categories. The enumeration team was trained to emphasize the fact that the irrigation 
scheme was purely hypothetical and that the farmers’ identities would remain confidential.  
 Given financial and temporal constraints, this contingent valuation methodology was used 
without the addition of “cheap talk” scripts, follow-up certainty questions, or other tools to control 
for hypothetical bias. Findings in the literature are inconclusive on which, if any, methods can 
reliably mitigate hypothetical bias (Blumenschein, Blomquist, Johannesson, Horn, & Freeman, 
2008; Damschroder, Ubel, Riis, & Smith, 2007; Hensher, 2010; Murphy, Allen, Stevens, & 
Wheatherhead, 2005). Furthermore, no studies could be found on the assessment of the 
willingness to invest in non-financial ways, as was done in this study. Choice experiments, which 
are less prone to hypothetical bias, are time consuming and the survey’s resources were not 
sufficient for the use of choice experiments for different irrigation systems.  
Individuals are known to report an inflated willingness to pay, especially when the good is 
a public one, such as an irrigation scheme (Murphy et al., 2005). Despite the emphasis given on 
the confidentiality of the survey’s results and the hypothetical nature of the questions, it is possible 
that respondents over-stated their willingness to invest, hoping that their village would be chosen 
for a government program. The government should be acutely aware of this bias when planning a 
real-world IMT program, as the success of IMT depends on accurate budget estimates and 
tempered expectations.  
                                                          
2 The four irrigation technologies are depicted in Figures A1-A4 of the Appendices. 
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2.4.2 Econometric Methods 
To investigate socio-economic determinants of respondents’ willingness to invest in 
hypothetical irrigation schemes, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were conducted. 
Statistical analyses were done using statistical software, STATA Version 13. Regressions were run 
for both types of investment (unpaid labor and capital) in each investment stage (construction, 
maintenance, and management) to each of the four types of irrigation schemes (treadle pump, 
motorized pump, canal, and bound basin). Two of the 24 investment categories, willingness to 
invest unpaid labor in the construction of treadle and motorized pumps, were not included 
because after the initial purchase of these technologies relatively little setup is required.  
Each of the 22 regression analyses contained 12 independent variables: percent of 
household members that are working age males, social network score, per capita household net 
income, per capita number of parcels operated, per capita hectares of land cultivated, average 
distance to market from parcels, elevation of the household, gender of the main agricultural 
decision maker, education level of the main agricultural decision maker, risk self-assessment score, 
average importance of irrigation to yield on parcels, and access to credit score.  
The 12 explanatory variables were chosen for the theoretical likelihood that they would 
impact farmers’ willingness to invest in an irrigation scheme. The percent of household members 
that are working age males (between the ages of 18 and 60) shows the labor endowment of the 
household; households with more available labor are expected to be willing to invest more toward 
irrigation scheme construction, maintenance, and management. The household social network 
score variable is a summation of organization membership and the ability to borrow from informal 
sources. The higher the social network score, the higher the household’s social capital. Households 
with strong social networks are hypothesized to be willing to invest more in an irrigation scheme 
given their community involvement and mutual trust. The per capita household net income 
variable represents income from all possible sources, including crops sold, livestock sold, forestry, 
hunting, wage labor, aid, retirement payments, and remittances. Households with a higher per 
capita net income may have an amount of disposable income that they would be willing to invest 
in an irrigation scheme. Those households with a higher per capita number of cultivated land 
parcels and those households with more hectares of cultivated land per capita are expected to be 
interested in more effective irrigation that would reduce the strain on their labor capital. 
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Households with a lower average distance from field to market are hypothesized to be willing to 
invest more in an irrigation scheme because improved irrigation would lead to higher yields that 
they could easily sell at a nearby market. Elevation is expected to negatively affect a household’s 
willingness to invest in an irrigation scheme, as farms at higher elevations experience lower 
average temperatures and more rainfall, lessening their need for improved irrigation. If the 
household’s main agricultural decision maker has completed a higher level of formal education, is 
female, or perceives themselves as willing to take more risks, this person is hypothesized to be 
willing to invest more. Women are responsible for bucket watering crops, an intensive, 
cumbersome task, so female respondents are expected to be interested in investing in a more 
efficient irrigation technology. Respondents who see irrigation as important to their yields are 
predicted to be willing to invest more. The access to credit score is a composite of responses about 
the ability to acquire loans of different amounts from formal and informal sources. Because 
investing in an irrigation scheme uses up savings, households with better access to loans are 
expected to be more willing to draw from their savings and invest in a scheme.  
Following each regression analysis, diagnostic tests were run. The distribution of residuals 
and the variance inflation factor of each model was checked. The average variance inflation factor 
of all models is 1.29, indicating multicollinearity is not an issue (Chatterjee, Hadi & Price, 2000). 
Model specification was checked with the Ramsey Regression Specification Error Test. After the 
models failed the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroscedasticity, the regressions were re-run using 
estimates of robust standard errors (Rogers, 1993; Williams, 2000).  
2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Given the size and the geographical range of the survey sample, the respondents can be 
considered representative of the rural population of Dedza District. The average household size of 
the sample is five, and the average age of all household members is 23 years.3 Household heads 
have an average age of 47 years, most are male (72%) and have a primary occupation as crop 
production (83%). The majority (52%) of household heads have not completed any level of formal 
                                                          
3 Unless otherwise stated, all statistical findings are for the agricultural year 2012/2013 (defined as November 2012 
to October 2013). 
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education, 27% have completed the first four years of primary school, and 15% have completed all 
eight years of primary school.  
In this study, a distinction is made between a household head and its main agricultural 
decision maker. For 89% of the respondent households, they are one and the same. The main 
agricultural decision makers in the other households are the wife (monogamous) of the household 
head (4%), the son of the household head (2%), the husband of the household head (2%), and the 
wife (first or second polygamous) of the household head (2%). Given the large percentage of 
household heads that are also main agricultural decision makers, the demographics of the two are 
almost identical.  
 All respondents are smallholder farmers; on average they operate 1.15 hectares of land. 
Farmers’ land is divided into three parcels on average with the majority (84%) dedicated to the 
cultivation of crops. Land has mostly been received as a gift or inherited (85%), though some 
respondents lease land for a fixed payment (7%) and others have been granted access to land by 
local leaders (5%).  
 In order to make inferences about the importance of infrastructure to farmers’ livelihoods, 
respondents were asked about the distance from their parcels to roads, markets, and irrigation 
sources. The results were positively skewed by the inclusion of extremely remote villages in the 
sample, therefore, in Table 2.1, both means and 50th percentiles are provided.  
Table 2.1:  
Average Distance from Cropland Parcel to Resource 
Nearest Mean (in walking minutes) 50th percentile (in walking minutes) 
All-weather road 29 15 
Seasonal road 27 10 
Crop market 95 70 
Dry season irrigation source 33 10 
Rainy season irrigation source 29 10 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
 Dedza District is renowned among Malawians for its production of Irish potatoes, 
groundnuts, and beans. This is reflected in the respondents’ reporting of their crop cultivation. 
Beans are grown by 49% of respondent households, groundnuts by 46%, soy by 39%, and Irish 
potatoes by 14%. However, as in the rest of Malawi, maize is the main crop in Dedza; 98% of 
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respondents grow maize. Malawians consider maize to be almost synonymous with food; a maize 
porridge called nsima dominates the national diet. Informal interviews repeatedly showed that 
Malawians without nsima would consider themselves to be food insecure, even if other food 
sources were abundant. This cultural belief has wide-reaching effects on nutrition security and 
agricultural policy. 
 Of the 300 households surveyed, 118 use some type of irrigation. Farmers reported that 
irrigation technology is either “important” or “very important” for obtaining output on 56% of all 
plots. However, irrigation is only used on about one-fifth of all plots, with bucket irrigation being 
the most-used technology (on 11% of all plots), followed by gravity-fed canal irrigation (5%), bound 
basin (2%), treadle pumps4 (1%), and motorized pumps (0.3%). Plots that are irrigated receive a 
watering an average of 14 times per month during the dry season and five times per month during 
the rainy season. Bucket irrigation, the most common type, is inexpensive but labor intensive and 
ineffective. Canal irrigation, the second most common type, entails costly infrastructure; those of 
the surveyed villages with canal irrigation are beneficiaries of government or donor projects that 
established the canal systems. 
2.5.2 Willingness to Invest 
When asked which technology they would prefer for the hypothetical scheme, the farmers’ 
ranking, from the most preferred to the least preferred, is: motorized pump (most preferred by 
41% of respondents), treadle pump (40%), gravity-fed canal (16%), and bound basin (3%). If a 
farmer deemed a type of technology unsuitable for their village’s topography it was omitted from 
their ranking. Next, farmers were asked how much they would be willing to invest, in terms of 
unpaid labor and capital, in the construction, maintenance, and management of each type of 
scheme. Those results are presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.  
  
                                                          
4 A treadle pump uses human-powered pistons to extract groundwater from depths of up to 7 meters. The pistons 
are attached to large levers that the operator steps on to activate the suction. 
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Table 2.2:  
Willingness to Invest Unpaid Labor 
  
To Construction      
(hours per week) 
To Maintenance 
(hours per year) 
To Management        
(hours per year) 
Motorized Pump N/A 36 24 
Treadle Pump N/A 28 24 
Canal 6 10 10 
Bound basin 2 0 0 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
 
Table 2.3:  













Motorized Pump 8.58 5.42 4.51 
Treadle Pump 9.03 6.32 4.51 
Canal 2.71 1.81 1.35 
Bound basin 0 0 0 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
In Tables 2.2 and 2.3, the median rather than the mean is given because it is closer to what 
the government could expect a village to invest, assuming all households would invest an equal 
share. The mean should not be used as it is positively skewed by a few farmers who are better-off, 
more eager, or possibly affected by hypothetical bias.  
As the most preferred technology, the motorized pump also scores highly in all willingness 
to invest categories. According to informal interviews, the motorized pump is a much sought-after 
status symbol among farmers and is advertised on the radio by local agricultural dealers. Farmers 
did, however, express concerns about the cost and difficulty of obtaining the fuel needed to 
operate a motorized pump, as well as the cost and difficulty of repairing the pump. Treadle pumps, 
which did similarly well in the investment categories, have also been brought to farmers’ attention 
                                                          
5 US dollar values in this paper are converted from Malawian kwacha, and adjusted for purchasing power parity and 
inflation. Malawian kwacha, the local currency, was used during the survey. The average official exchange rate over 
the two-month period during which the survey took place (May and June, 2014) was 1 USD was equal to 387 MWK 
(OANDA, 2015). The average purchasing power parity adjusted for inflation was 1 USD was equal to 110.78 MWK 
during that same time (NSO, 2015; OANDA, 2015; The World Bank, 2015).  
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on the radio as they have recently been promoted in the area by charitable groups. However, those 
farmers who are familiar with their use tend not to favor treadle pumps due to the physical 
exertion needed to operate them.  
The threat of hypothetical bias to the accuracy of these willingness to invest estimates 
seems minor given how reasonable the estimates are. Less than 10% of respondents reported 
being willing to invest unpaid labor in a capacity that could be considered full-time employment. 
The capital investment responses also seem realistic as the medians are not more than four days’ 
worth of wage labor.6   
2.5.3 Socio-Economic Determinants of the Willingness to Invest 
Regressions were run on the 22 models using estimates of robust standard errors. Thirteen 
of the models are as a whole statistically significant at the 10% level or better and 11 of the models 
pass regression diagnostics tests for multicollinearity and model specification. Both of the models 
that are statistically significant at the 10% level or better but do not pass the regression diagnostic 
tests, fail the Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (Ramsey RESET), indicating that 
variables are missing from the model. All of the models, despite the use of robust standard error 
estimates, have right-hand conical distribution of residuals; those farmers who are willing to invest 
the most are motivated to do so by unknown factors.   
The present explanatory variables in the models were selected for their importance to the 
theoretical framework, following extensive experimentation with different variable combinations. 
The missing explanatory variables are assumed to be unquantifiable or intangible, including 
possibly entrepreneurial spirit or generosity of respondents. A person’s level of risk tolerance was 
hypothesized to be an intangible variable that would strongly affect willingness to invest, so an 
effort was made to quantify it with a risk self-assessment scale (Dohmen et al., 2012; Nielsen et 
al., 2013). The risk self-assessment scale either does not apply in this willingness to invest context, 
or risk tolerance itself is irrelevant, because the risk variable was only significant in one of the valid 
models.   
The dependent variables of the 11 valid models and their significant explanatory variables 
are shown in Table 2.4. Full results from all of the regression analyses are shown in Tables A1-A22 
                                                          
6 At the time of the survey, a person in Dedza could expect to earn 3.61 USD for a full day of hard labor (such as 
clearing a field or digging a canal).  
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of the Appendices. The regression tables show low R-squared and adjusted R-squared values for 
the majority of the models, meaning that the independent variables in the models have little 
predictive power. It is important, therefore, to note that these models should be used for 
explanatory purposes only; there are small but reliable relationships between the independent and 
dependent variables. 
Table 2.4:  
Statistically Valid Regressions and their Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variable 
(Willingness to Invest) Explanatory Variable 
Beta 
Coefficient 
Unpaid labor in maintenance 
of treadle pump   
 Elevation*** .1125664 
 Percent male labor** .1730477 
 Per capita hectares of land** -.1483344 
Capital in maintenance of 
treadle pump   
  Social network score** .1391224 
  Percent male labor* .1102946 
  Importance of irrigation* .112307 
Capital in construction of 
motor pump   
 Per capita hectares of land** -.1027555 
 Per capita number of parcels** .1444672 
 Risk self-assessment score* .0925521 
Unpaid labor in maintenance 
of motor pump   
  Elevation*** .1437741 
  Credit access score* .1509102 
  Average distance to market* -.0748795 
  Gender of decision maker* .0950254 
Unpaid labor in management 
of motor pump   
 Elevation*** .1242597 
Capital in management of 
motor pump   
  Average distance to market** .1384289 
  Gender of decision maker* -.1043344 
Unpaid labor in construction 
of canal   
 Per capita hectares of land** -.1515848 
 Gender of decision maker** -.1624614 
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 Education level of decision maker** .142801 
 Importance of irrigation* .1303175 
Unpaid labor in maintenance 
of canal   
  Education level of decision maker*** .3388762 
  Percent male labor* .1517368 
  Per capita hectares of land* -.0907487 
  Gender of decision maker* .1224326 
Capital in maintenance of 
canal   
 Education level of decision maker** .2070039 
 Percent male labor** .1855371 
 Social network score** .1654136 
 Importance of irrigation** .1200562 
Unpaid labor in management 
of canal   
  Social network score** .17646 
  Per capita hectares of land** -.1143898 
  Average distance to market** -.1165058 
  Education level of decision maker** .1868732 
  Elevation* .114369 
Capital in management of 
canal   
 Social network score*** .2878016 
 Education level of decision maker*** .1694977 
 Credit access score* -.1290066 
 Percent male labor* .1253275 
  Importance of irrigation* .1104252 
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
Of the 12 explanatory variables included in each model, 11 are statistically significant in at 
least one of the models: percent of household members that are males of working age (statistically 
significant in five models), education level of the main agricultural decision maker (5), per capita 
number of hectares operated (5), social network score (4), perceived importance of irrigation to 
yield (4), elevation (4), gender of main agricultural decision maker (4), average distance to market 
from parcels (3), credit access score (2), per capita number of parcels operated (1), and risk self-
assessment score (1).  
As hypothesized, households with a higher percentage of working-age males are willing to 
invest more in several categories. It was expected that the impact of labor endowment would be 
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strongest in the investment of unpaid labor categories, but it was not clearly delineated in that 
way. This suggests that the value of extra labor affects willingness to invest indirectly through other 
factors like social network strength.  
The education level of the household’s main agricultural decision maker is a powerful 
explanatory variable in the willingness to invest in canals models, but not in the treadle or 
motorized pump models. This may be because canal irrigation is more complex; it is more difficult 
to set-up, maintain, and manage. Those who are better educated may be better prepared to take 
on the challenge of canal irrigation. More educated respondents may also be better informed of 
the drawbacks of treadle pump and motorized pump operation.  
Counter-intuitively, the per capita number of hectares of land cultivated is negatively 
correlated with willingness to invest in five of the models. It was originally assumed that 
households with thinly spread labor would be most interested in gaining access to efficient 
irrigation, thus relieving the stress on their labor endowment, and so would invest generously. 
Upon further inspection, the negative finding is logical given that four of the negative correlations 
are in willingness to invest unpaid labor categories. Those households with more land to operate 
per person will be less likely to spare labor to volunteer on an irrigation project; they would have 
to take the short-term view of the future, as the poor often must to survive, and satisfy their 
immediate needs.   
As expected, a household’s social network strength and its perception of the importance 
of irrigation to yields are powerful explanatory variables in the models. Both are statistically 
significant in four models. Because the use of public goods, such as an irrigation scheme, requires 
cooperation and inclusive planning, households with stronger social networks can be expected to 
be willing to invest more. Active participation in social networks both requires and fosters the same 
social skills needed to successfully operate a community-owned irrigation scheme.  
The elevation variable, however, has unexpected results. It was hypothesized that the 
higher a respondent’s elevation, the less they would be interested in irrigation, given their cooler 
microclimate and heavier precipitation. The regression results give positive coefficients for 
elevation in four of the models; many households that are located at high elevations are in fact 
willing to invest in irrigation projects. Villages at high elevations are generally more remote, so their 
occupants may be more eager to take on income-generating endeavors. 
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It was hypothesized that female main agricultural decision makers would invest more in 
irrigation schemes given their stronger social ties and need to innovate to support their household. 
It is generally women who irrigate the fields with watering buckets, so they were expected to be 
particularly eager to adopt more efficient irrigation technology. The results show this to be an 
oversimplification. Being female positively impacts willingness to invest unpaid labor in the 
maintenance of both motorized pumps and canal irrigation, whereas being male positively impacts 
willingness to invest capital in the management of motorized pumps, and unpaid labor in the 
construction of canals. Gender is not found to be a statistically significant explanatory variable in 
any other models.  
  Of the 12 independent variables, the one that is not found to be statistically significant in 
any of the models is per capita net household income. Although great pains were taken to collect 
accurate income levels, the data proved unreliable. The recall period of over one year was too long, 
and given the education level of respondents, innumeracy is suspected.  
If farmers did not think a certain technology was feasible in their village because of 
topography, their willingness to invest in any way to that technology was omitted. Bound basin, 
for example, was deemed unfeasible by 111 farmers, so there are only 189 observations for the 
respective models (see Tables A17-A22). Similarly, there are only 210 observations for canal 
models (see Tables A11-A16). Because of the low number of observations, none of the bound basin 
models are statistically significant.  
2.6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study aimed to shed light on whether smallholder farmers would be willing to invest 
unpaid labor in irrigation schemes. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to do so, 
opening up another dimension of IMT research. The results show that farmers are indeed willing 
to invest unpaid labor, instead of or in addition to capital. IMT planners may use this information 
to develop individually tailored investment packages for IMT stakeholders.  
Despite the lack of predictive power of the models, the explanatory value of the models is 
useful for policy recommendations. A larger household labor endowment, a higher education, a 
lesser amount of land operated, a stronger social network, a higher perceived importance of 
irrigation, and a higher elevation are all found to be characteristics of households that are willing 
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to invest more. These findings are important to future targeting and implementation of IMT 
programs. New IMT programs should target areas where interest is strong, such as villages at 
higher elevations where respondents were enthusiastic investors in several categories. The 
perception that irrigation is important to crop yields, as well as the strength of one’s social network 
are strong explanatory variables in several categories; both of these variables can also be expected 
to motivate farmers to stay involved in an IMT program and to honor their investment obligation. 
In view of the need for realistic investment agreements, households could be offered a 
combination of ways in which to invest, which would increase the likelihood that commitments 
would be filled. For example, a household with a thinly spread labor endowment, due to a small 
percentage of working age males or a high per capita amount of land cultivated, could be offered 
an investment package that requires more capital and less unpaid labor.  
Successful IMT requires clear communication of expectations among stakeholders. This 
study sought to create predictive models that would help ease the burden of communication by 
establishing safe assumptions that project leaders could use in their planning of irrigation systems. 
This study confirmed that the best path to having water resources effectively managed at the local 
level is through an open and inclusive dialogue. The existence of intangible independent variables 
caused the models to have little predictive value, but they are useful as explanatory models.  
The models could be improved with a larger sample size. Ideally, the expanded sample 
would include enough respondents in lowland areas, where bound basin schemes are feasible, for 
the models of willingness to invest in bound basin schemes to become statistically significant. In 
the interviews, respondents skipped willingness to invest questions for irrigation types they 
deemed infeasible in their village. This would not be an issue in a real irrigation project as the area 
would first be surveyed, then the appropriate irrigation technology would be proposed.  
This study was limited to the use of stated willingness to invest; because the irrigation 
schemes were hypothetical, actual investments could not be measured. It is one thing for a 
respondent to say how much they will invest in a scheme, and another for them to actually make 
the investment, so hypothetical bias may be an issue. However, the data shows reasonable and 
conservative willingness to invest levels, so hypothetical bias does not seem to be a factor. 
Irrespective of academic research findings, IMT managers must err on the conservative side when 
accounting for hypothetical bias in their planning of specific projects.  
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Poor smallholder farmers often must take the short-term view of the future, deferring long-
term goals to meet immediate needs. Meeting basic human needs for survival will always override 
honoring commitments to non-essential activities like IMT; program managers need to be 
understanding of this fact and make accommodations in their financial and temporal planning. 
Even the smallest investment in an irrigation scheme could be a hardship for a household, so future 
IMT programs may consider offering financial support, especially during the construction phase of 
IMT when the burden of investment will be the heaviest. Further, farmers’ cash flows and harvest 
seasons need to be accounted for in IMT planning. The investment levels reported in this study are 
from data collected immediately after harvest, when farmers had finished the bulk of their hard 
labor for the season, had full grain stores, and had cash on hand from crop sales. To manage 
stakeholder expectations, the seasonality of available labor and capital must be accommodated.  
The success of IMT depends on the establishment of accurate and attainable goals by all 
stakeholders. If all participants know what to expect from each other and what will be expected of 
them, then IMT will foster the effective management of water resources, the empowerment of 
local people, and the alleviation of financial strain on national government.  
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3. SHOULD MALAWI CONSIDER CHANGING ITS 
FERTILIZER SUBSIDY TO A CASH TRANSFER? STATED 
PREFERENCES AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Emily McNulty, Thea Nielsen and Manfred Zeller




Well-targeted fertilizer vouchers increase food production without crowding out 
commercial fertilizer. Unlike universal fertilizer subsidies, which lower fertilizer prices for all and 
thus harm the private sector, targeted programs give vouchers only to those who cannot afford 
market prices and would not otherwise be part of the fertilizer market (Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, & 
Chirwa, 2011). Demand grows, retailers accept coupons from their new customers, and then 
retailers exchange the coupons with the government for the outstanding amount (Ricker-Gilbert 
et al., 2011). Farmers gain access to fertilizer and use it to increase their yields, and national food 
security is improved. This is how Malawi’s Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP) is designed to work, 
but because of numerous implementation issues, its success in terms of pro-poor development is 
contested. Stakeholders are seeking out alternatives, including conditional cash transfer (CCT) 
programs. 
 The history of the FISP is summarized in a Future Agriculture’s policy brief by Blessings 
Chinsinga (2008). After a series of input support programs in the 1990s and early 2000s, the ruling 
United Democratic Front government launched the Extended Targeted Input Program (ETIP) in 
August of 2005, promising 26 kg of fertilizer and 5 kg of seeds to approximately 2.8 million farmers 
(Chinsinga, 2008). The announcement of the program was met with great expectation by 
stakeholders, but the delay in its implementation had a strong negative impact on yields from the 
2004/2005 agricultural year (Chinsinga, 2008). Because of the untimely placement of orders with 
the private sector, there was a lack of supply. The distribution of the inputs was so late that the 
crucial period for fertilizer application had already passed and the inputs were largely useless 
(Chinsinga, 2008). A severe drought compounded the yield problem, and the 2005 food crisis 
ensued. As the ETIP had failed, foreign donors withdrew their support for it, their main criticisms 
being that: the very poorest, who could not make full use of the subsidy, were targeted; 
administrative and targeting costs were too high; targeting was ineffective; and the input market 
was being distorted by the subsidy (Chinsinga, 2008). The creation of the FISP in 2005 did not 
resolve all of these issues, but it did improve targeting. Coupons were introduced as a means of 
limiting the cost of the program and ensuring equitable distribution among recipients (Chinsinga, 
2008). With a restricted number of coupons, households could only buy a certain amount of 
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fertilizer at the subsidized rate, any amount beyond that would have to be purchased at the 
prevailing market price.  
The level of success that the FISP has achieved has proven difficult to quantify in the 
literature, as the budget burden, the net impact, and the targeting efficacy are estimated and 
weighed against each other. The budget for the 2005/2006 FISP was set at about 35 million USD, 
but grew to approximately 53 million USD during implementation, despite the fact that the amount 
of fertilizer actually distributed was only equal to about 75% of all of the coupons issued, the 
remaining coupons were not exchanged (Chinsinga, 2008). In that 2005/2006 fiscal year, 
approximately 8.3% of the total national budget was taken up by the FISP (Chinsinga, 2008). The 
following agricultural year, when donor funding resumed, the total cost of the FISP grew to 91 
million USD (Dorward, Chirwa, Boughton, et al., 2008). From the beginning of the FISP, the program 
cost has been between 5% and 16% of Malawi’s GDP (Pauw, Ecker, & Mazunda, 2011). The benefit-
cost ratio of the 2006/2007 FISP is estimated between 0.76 and 1.36, not including secondary 
growth effects (Dorward, Chirwa, Boughton, et al., 2008), where a score greater than 1 indicates 
that the benefits outweigh the costs of the program. The wide spread in the benefit-cost ratio 
estimate is due to approximations in the following contributing factors: the sum of sales that would 
have been made at full price had farmers not received the subsidy; the extent of impact of other 
yield-affecting variables, including rainfall, timing of fertilizer application, and maize variety; 
accurate coupon targeting; and the extent to which additional maize yield lowers market prices 
and thus benefits maize purchasers, but may harm maize sellers (Dorward, Chirwa, Boughton, et 
al., 2008).  
Maize production estimates given by the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security seem to 
illustrate positive yield impacts resulting from the FISP: 1.2 million tonnes in 2004/2005 improved 
to 2.7 million tonnes in 2005/2006, and then to 3.4 million tonnes in 2006/2007 (Dorward, Chirwa, 
Boughton, et al., 2008). As the maize and tobacco sectors together make up about 15% of Malawi’s 
GDP, these yield increases have powerful economic effects (Pauw et al., 2011). Farmers who did 
self-assessments of their economic wellbeing in May/June 2007 reported being 8% better-off than 
they were in 2004 (Dorward, Chirwa, Boughton, et al., 2008; Dorward, Chirwa, Kelly, et al., 2008). 
In the same period, reports of households experiencing a severe food price shock decreased from 
79% to 20% (Dorward, Chirwa, Kelly, et al., 2008). However, if the failure of the FISP’s predecessor, 
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the ETIP, can be partly blamed on the drought of 2005, then it follows that the apparent success 
of the FISP can be partly attributed to good rains in subsequent years. The fortuitous coincidence 
of the FISP with favorable rains is cited in the literature as a reason to be skeptical of the true utility 
of the program (Dorward, Chirwa, Boughton, et al., 2008; Dorward, Chirwa, Kelly, et al., 2008).  
Although the poor and vulnerable are the intended targets of the FISP, several studies have 
found that they are not the primary beneficiaries (Chibwana, Fisher, Jumbe, Masters, & Shively, 
2010; Chibwana, Fisher, & Shively, 2012; Dorward, Chirwa, Kelly, et al., 2008; Holden & Lunduka, 
2010). Female-headed households are one of the vulnerable groups targeted by the FISP, but they 
are less likely to receive fertilizer coupons than male-headed households, and asset-poor 
households are less likely to receive fertilizer coupons than better-off households (Chibwana et al., 
2010; Dorward & Chirwa, 2013; Holden & Lunduka, 2010; Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011). Other groups 
who are less likely to receive coupons are the elderly (13% less likely) and those who consider 
themselves to be poor in a poverty self-assessment (8% less likely) (Chirwa, Matita, & Dorward, 
2011).  
In addition to ineffective targeting, the FISP’s impacts on land allocation and crop 
simplification are cause for concern. Recipients of improved maize seed and fertilizer were found 
to have dedicated 45% more farm area to improved maize than non-recipients, which is positive 
for improved maize yield, but negative for crop diversity, especially given that those same farmers 
planted 17% less land with non-maize crops (Chibwana et al., 2012). The newly excluded crops 
were mainly groundnut, soy, cassava, and sweet potato (Chibwana et al., 2012). Cassava and sweet 
potato are inferior staples used as an alternative or supplement in the traditionally maize-focused 
Malawian diet. Losing diversity in staple crops could lead to food insecurity if the main crop, maize, 
has a poor harvest. Groundnut and soy are nitrogen-fixing legumes that improve soil fertility and 
provide a source of protein, dietary fiber, and micronutrients, to consumers (Messina, 1999; 
Temperton et al., 2007). The exclusion of legumes from farming systems is detrimental to the yields 
of other crops (Temperton et al., 2007), and their exclusion from human diets is damaging to 
nutritional health (Messina, 1999).  
Modelling has shown the FISP to improve food security and caloric availability, but that 
improvements in calorie and micronutrient consumption slow down with broad-based economic 
growth (Ecker & Qaim, 2011; Pauw et al., 2011). Models for Malawi show that income 
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interventions, like cash transfers, are more effective than price interventions, like the FISP, at 
improving nutrition in terms of iron, zinc, vitamins A, B, and C, calories, and protein (Ecker & Qaim, 
2011). 
Crowding out of commercial goods is a threat when subsidies are implemented, and the 
case of the FISP is no exception. Fertilizer sales for the 2005/2006 agricultural year were 
significantly lower than in the previous year, and the private sector experienced serious losses, 
especially among small agricultural dealers (Dorward, Chirwa, Boughton, et al., 2008). Crowding 
out, or displacement, occurs when consumers who would ordinarily purchase a good at full market 
price instead purchase it at the subsidized price, and the value of the subsidy is essentially wasted. 
Displacement indicates a lack of effective targeting, and its existence subtracts from the net benefit 
of the subsidy. In the 2006/2007 agricultural year, full price fertilizer sales were crowded out by 
between 30% and 40% of fertilizer purchases with the FISP coupon (Dorward, Chirwa, Kelly, et al., 
2008). Each additional kilogram of FISP fertilizer was found to displace 0.22 kg of market price 
fertilizer (Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011). The displacement was, intuitively, lowest among the poorest 
recipients (0.18 kg), and highest among the better-off recipients (0.30 kg), reinforcing the 
knowledge that the subsidy’s net effect will be maximized if it is accurately targeted to the poor 
(Ricker-Gilbert et al., 2011).  
The full potential of the FISP is restricted by its untimely, opaque, and poorly-advertised 
implementation at all levels of the program (Holden & Lunduka, 2010). Farmers do not know how 
much fertilizer they can realistically expect to receive, so they are unable to properly plan their 
agricultural year, and they feel that the program is unfair. Agricultural extension agents and village 
development committees have been accused of diverting coupons, but few major cases have been 
proven (Dorward, Chirwa, Boughton, et al., 2008; Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). While diversion is 
probable, it is near impossible to quantify. A portion of the accusations may be due to farmers not 
knowing how much fertilizer they are entitled to in a given year (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). If they 
knew their allotted amount in advance feelings of discontentment could be avoided and they could 
make financial and agricultural plans accordingly (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). The assignment of 
coupons in open forums at the village level, followed by the distribution of coupons in village 
meetings increases the likelihood that poorer households will receive the coupons, and ensures 
fairness in the allocation process (Chirwa et al., 2011; Dorward & Chirwa, 2013).  
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Currently, most FISP recipients are targeted at the village level by traditional leaders 
(Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). While village heads are generally familiar with the economic status of 
their constituents, and making them responsible for coupon allocation does not affect the program 
budget, their targeting can be unfair (Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). Houssou and Zeller (2011) suggest 
a wealth and income proxy-based targeting system that would be more effective, in terms of both 
cost and accuracy, than the community-based targeting system. The indicator-based targeting 
would get 73% of the subsidy to the intended targets, a vast improvement on the 2006/2007 FISP 
that reached only 50%, and it would reduce leakage to the non-poor by more than half (Houssou 
& Zeller, 2011).  
Another significant criticism of the FISP is that it focuses too narrowly on fertilizer 
dissemination. In the 2008/2009 agricultural year, a FISP coupon holder could buy 50 kg of fertilizer 
at 8% of the commercial price, and could receive 2 kg of improved maize seed for free (Chibwana 
et al., 2010). That means that beneficiaries of the FISP had a 25 to 1 ratio of fertilizer to improved 
seed, while the correct usage in most regions of Malawi is 5 kg of fertilizer for every 1 kg of 
improved maize seed (Chibwana et al., 2010). Because improved seed packets are significantly 
cheaper than sacks of fertilizer, and because improved maize varieties have larger yields than 
traditional varieties, balancing the fertilizer-seed ratio of the subsidy would make the program 
more cost effective (Chibwana et al., 2010). Focus group discussions done in preparation for this 
study show that smallholder farmers are interested in inputs other than fertilizer. 
 Given the numerous flaws of Malawi’s FISP and the fact that it consumes 70% of the 
nation’s agricultural budget (Douillet, 2012), it is worth exploring alternatives, specifically a 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) program. Following the well-documented success of Mexico’s 
PROGRESA begun in 1997, and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia begun in 2003, CCTs spread across Latin 
America and much of the world and are now active in more than 29 developing countries (Baird, 
Mcintosh, & Özler, 2011; Davis, Gaarder, Handa, & Yablonski, 2012; Kapur, 2011; The World Bank, 
2009). CCTs have several advantages over subsidies: through conditionality they can be self-
targeting, they are cost effective, and they do not distort market prices (Kakwani, Soares, & Son, 
2005). The conditionality of CCTs also serves to address underinvestment in sectors that the 
market has failed, like education and health (Baird et al., 2011), or in the case of Malawi, forestry. 
Conditionality makes CCTs more attractive to non-poor stakeholders who would otherwise see the 
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intervention as a handout that would not benefit them (Baird et al., 2011; The World Bank, 2009). 
Delivering cash to the poor removes the paternalistic aspect of aid, allowing recipients to decide 
what is best for themselves, and relieving policy makers of the task of determining the most 
beneficial form of assistance (Kapur, Mukhopadhyay, & Subramanian, 2008). CCTs are set apart 
from other economic interventions because their duality allows them to have both short- and long-
term impacts (Kakwani et al., 2005). The delivery of cash affects recipients’ short-term wellbeing 
by satisfying immediate needs like food purchases, and the condition affects recipients’ mid- and 
long-term wellbeing by meeting ongoing needs like school attendance and health check-ups 
(Kakwani et al., 2005).  
 Targeting recipients and confirming that they have met the conditions can make CCTs 
expensive; both determine not only the cost of the program but also its effectiveness (Kakwani et 
al., 2005). Although CCTs can be pricey, they are not necessarily more expensive than subsidies of 
the same scope. For example, if the value of India’s budget for food, fertilizer, and fuel subsidies 
were divided equally among the country’s 70 million poor households, the monthly transfer would 
raise those households above the rural poverty line (Kapur et al., 2008). Additionally, CCT programs 
become less expensive with time. During the first year of Mexico’s PROGRESA, 1.34 USD was spent 
for every 1 USD of cash transfer, but by the third year most of the program’s fixed costs had been 
settled and only $0.05 USD was spent for every 1 USD of cash transfer (Kapur et al., 2008). 
 Unlike subsidies, whose goods may not be appealing to non-poor households, cash is 
desired by poor and non-poor, so elite capture is a threat to CCTs. To prevent elite capture, a CCT 
program should be advertised clearly to its beneficiaries to inform them of how large of a cash 
transfer to expect (Kapur et al., 2008). The use of biometrics to identify beneficiaries and confirm 
their receipt of cash is optimal when there is no reliable identification card system in place (Kapur, 
2011). When a biometric registry was begun in Andhra Pradesh, India, it was discovered that 12% 
of beneficiaries of a social transfer program did not exist, they were false identities created to steal 
the transfers (Kapur, 2011). 
 As CCT programs expand into Africa, unique challenges arise. Southern Africa has high 
HIV/AIDS prevalence, as well as unstable markets and political systems, that contribute to 
economic risk and vulnerability (Davis et al., 2012). Further, the heavy donor presence in southern 
Africa slows advancements in policy, such as the introduction of a CCT program. In 2014, Malawi 
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received over 930 million USD of official development assistance and official aid, representing 
15.8% of its GNI that year (The World Bank, 2016a, 2016b). The demands and oversight of those 
foreign donors, combined with the political belief systems and power relationships of both donors 
and the government, congests and complicates the policy making process (Aberman et al., 2012; 
Chinsinga, 2007; Davis et al., 2012). However, the documented success of domestic pilot programs 
will hopefully assuage donor fears and convince them of the merits of CCT programs. Impact 
evaluations of the Malawi Social Cash Transfer program show it has increased the investment of 
recipients in agricultural assets, reduced child labor, and sustained children’s school attendance 
(Boone, Covarrubias, Davis, & Winters, 2013; Covarrubias, Davis, & Winters, 2012; Davis et al., 
2012).  
 It is not only the preferences of policy makers that affect CCT program development, but 
also the preferences of potential beneficiaries. Focus group discussions during the inception phase 
of this study indicated that smallholder farmers were dissatisfied with the FISP and would be open 
to a CCT program. According to focus group discussions conducted in five villages in Dedza District 
in June and July of 2013, the circulated FISP coupons are insufficient. Village heads must go to a 
FISP distribution point to collect their village’s allotted coupons. When they return to the village 
the coupons are distributed among the households. A shortage of coupons was reported by all; 
some focus groups reported unfair, politically motivated coupon distribution, while others 
reported sharing coupons equally among all households. After receiving their coupons, farmers 
must travel to the nearest Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) to 
exchange their coupons for fertilizer. Those who do not use their FISP coupons reported selling 
them to other farmers. Given the problems associated with the FISP, farmers in the research area 
were open to alternatives. 
This paper elicits the preferences of smallholder farmers for a hypothetical CCT over a 
fertilizer subsidy using a choice experiment, and explores determinants of the preferences. The 
specific objectives of the study are outlined in Section 2 and the study area is described in Section 
3. Section 4 provides the methodologies of the survey, the choice experiment, and the econometric 
analysis. Section 5 gives results of the descriptive statistics, the choice experiment, the hypothetical 
expenditure question, and the regression models. Finally, results are discussed and conclusions are 
drawn in Section 6. 




With the aim of exploring alternatives to the FISP, this study determines smallholder 
farmers’ preferences for a CCT over a fertilizer coupon, both of which are hypothetical and 
conditional on the adoption of easily verifiable agroforestry activities. A choice experiment is used 
to elicit the preferences, survey questions investigate bias against the CCT as well as uses for the 
CCT, and regression models provide insight into which socio-economic characteristics influence 
the preferences. The use of these methods make this study a unique contribution to the literature. 
Four research questions are addressed:  
(1) Do farmers generally prefer the CCT or the fertilizer subsidy? 
(2) Among farmers who never prefer the CCT, why do they always prefer the fertilizer 
subsidy? 
(3) If farmers were to receive a CCT of 380 USD,7 how would they spend the money? How 
do responses differ between the main agricultural decision maker and their spouse? 
(4) Which socioeconomic factors affect preferences for the CCT or the fertilizer subsidy? 
3.3 Study Area 
Dedza District lies between Lake Nyasa, the Mozambican border, and the national capital, 
Lilongwe, in Malawi’s Central Region. The Kirk Range is a watershed plateau that runs north-south 
through Dedza and provides the district with great biophysical variety. The eastern side of the 
plateau descends into the Rift Valley, where Lake Nyasa is located at about 500 m.a.s.l. The warm 
climate of the lakeshore allows for the cultivation of paddy rice, tobacco, and cotton. The western 
side of the plateau is much higher in elevation and holds the capital of the district, Dedza Township, 
which is 1,590 m.a.s.l. The subtropical highland climate of the west is conducive to the farming of 
potatoes and groundnuts. During the dry season, usually from May to October, there is almost no 
precipitation, but several perennial rivers provide water for home consumption and irrigation. 
                                                          
7 US dollar values in this paper are converted from Malawian kwacha, and adjusted for purchasing power parity and 
inflation. Malawian kwacha, the local currency, was used during the survey. The average official exchange rate over 
the two-month period during which the survey took place (May and June, 2014) was 1 USD was equal to 387 MWK 
(OANDA, 2015). The average purchasing power parity adjusted for inflation was 1 USD was equal to 110.78 MWK 
during that same time (NSO, 2015; OANDA, 2015; The World Bank, 2015).  




3.4.1 Survey Methodology 
 The 300 smallholder farming households in Dedza District were sampled using stratification 
of randomization (Carletto, 1999). A list of Dedza District’s 2,840 villages was acquired from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Water Development. The statistical population was 242,519 
households. The eight TAs of the district were used as the strata; 30 villages were randomly 
sampled from the strata proportionate to TA population. Up-to-date lists of the sampled 
households were then obtained from the district agricultural extension office. From these lists, ten 
households were randomly selected per village. The 300 households, which were representative 
of Dedza District, were interviewed in May and June of 2014. The survey coincided with the maize 
harvest, so preference for fertilizer may have been inflated by the impending need for it during the 
upcoming planting season.   
The household survey was comprised of two parts: general survey questions and choice 
experiments. The survey questions covered demographics, livelihoods, and socioeconomic traits. 
The first choice experiment elicited preferences for improved cook stove attributes, and the 
second choice experiment, the topic of the present study, elicited preferences for a hypothetical 
CCT or a fertilizer coupon. Sections of the questionnaire that are relevant to this thesis can be 
found in Appendix E.  
3.4.2 Choice Experiment Methodology 
The subsidy choice experiment consisted of seven choice sets, each with two alternatives. 
Respondents were offered the two alternatives in one choice set after another, and asked to 
choose their preferred alternative. Table 3.1 shows the choice sets and corresponding alternatives. 
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Table 3.1:  
Subsidy Choice Experiment 
 Alternative 1: Cash Payment Alternative 2: Fertilizer Coupon 
Choice Set Cash in MWK Value in USD8 Kg of NPK Value in USD 
1 20,000 50 75 50 
2 20,000 50 100 70 
3 20,000 50 150 105 
4 28,000 70 100 70 
5 28,000 70 150 105 
6 36,000 90 100 70 
7 36,000 90 150 105 
Source: Own survey, 2014    
 
The cash payment choice alternatives were given in the local currency, Malawian kwacha (MWK). 
The fertilizer coupon choice alternatives were given in kilogram amounts, easily visualized as the 
sacks that commonly contain 50kg of fertilizer. For example, in Choice Set 1, a coupon for 75kg of 
fertilizer is offered; a respondent would readily recognize this as one and a half sacks of fertilizer. 
NPK, a three-component fertilizer consisting of nitrogen, phosphorus, and potassium, was chosen 
as the type of fertilizer for the hypothetical subsidy because it is widely used in the study area. At 
the time of the study, one 50-kg bag of NPK sold for approximately 35 USD on the free market, 
without a FISP coupon.  
The US dollar values given in Table 3.1 are for illustration purposes, they were not used 
during the execution of the choice experiments. The US dollar values show that the difference in 
monetary value between Alternative 1 and Alternative 2 varies from one choice set to the next. 
Choice Set 6 is the only choice set in which the cash payment is worth more than the fertilizer 
coupon, and despite being seemingly illogical, was included to reveal intense preference either 
against CCTs or for fertilizer coupons. Other than presenting the alternatives, during the individual 
choice experiments no guidance was given and discussion was strictly limited to brief reiterations 
of the choice experiment directions. For each choice set, respondents were simply asked, “Would 
you prefer a cash payment of ___ kwacha or a fertilizer coupon for ___ kg of NPK?” 
                                                          
8 The US dollar values in Table 1 are equivalent to the Malawian kwacha values at the time of the survey (OANDA, 
2015) and are not adjusted for purchasing power parity. 
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The subsidy choice experiment was preceded by a careful introduction. Upon arrival in each 
sampled village, the pre-selected respondents were gathered for a meeting. It was explained that 
both types of subsidy, the CCT and the fertilizer coupon, were hypothetical. The CCT could be spent 
on any item of the respondents’ choosing, including but not limited to fertilizer, other inputs, non-
agricultural goods, school fees, and medicine. It was also explained that both of the subsidies were 
conditional upon the adoption of agroforestry, then a description of agroforestry was given, 
including the costs and benefits of adoption, and how agroforestry practices would be verified in 
exchange for the subsidy. Great care was taken to emphasize that the fertilizer coupon was 
hypothetical and had nothing to do with the FISP. Because the FISP has so many issues with fair 
distribution, an untainted fertilizer program was needed for comparison with the CCT, so the 
hypothetical and conditional fertilizer coupon was created.  
3.4.3 Econometric Methods 
 To investigate socio-economic determinants of respondents’ preferences for the CCT over 
the fertilizer subsidy, logistic regression analyses were performed. Statistical analyses were done 
using statistical software, STATA Version 13. Regressions were run for all seven choice sets, using 
three independent variables: per capita household net income, elevation of the household, and 
gender of the main agricultural decision maker. Seven other independent variables were 
eliminated in the early stages of the model design because they were consistently statistically 
insignificant. These variables were social network score, per capita hectares of land cultivated, risk 
self-assessment score, access to credit score, amount of chemical fertilizer applied to plots, fertility 
management score, and eligibility for FISP (NPK coupon). The percent of household members that 
are working age males was removed from the models because although it was statistically 
significant in two of the models, it did not pass the Spearman’s correlation test or the Kendall’s tau 
correlation test (Hamilton, 2009). Following each regression analysis, diagnostic tests were run on 
the models that were statistically significant as a whole. The full models all passed the likelihood 
ratio test (Vuong, 1989) at the 10% level of probability of error, and Akaike’s Information Criterion 
(Akaike, 2011) and Bayesian Information Criterion (Posada & Buckley, 2004) results both showed 
that the models were well-fit. 
 Households with higher per capita net income are hypothesized to prefer the CCT over the 
fertilizer subsidy, because they are assumed to have graduated from reliance on crop production 
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only and be aspiring to venture into other business activities. Households located at higher 
elevations are also predicted to prefer the CCT over the fertilizer coupon more often; villages at 
high elevations in Dedza are remote and lack infrastructure and linkages to markets. Fertilizer 
coupons are assumed to be less popular in remote areas where the opportunity cost of traveling 
to a location to exchange the coupon for fertilizer would be too large. Remote households that 
receive a coupon may be unable to reach a fertilizer distribution point and would be left with the 
option of selling their coupon (likely at below its value) to a neighbor capable of incurring the 
transportation cost. Cash is expected to be preferred in high elevation villages because it can be 
spent more flexibly. Female main agricultural decision makers are hypothesized to prefer the CCT 
more often than their male counterparts because women are predicted to be more involved in 
income source diversification, as they are not traditionally the ones to apply fertilizer.  
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Given the size and the geographical range of the sample, the survey respondents can be 
considered representative of the rural population of Dedza District. The average household size of 
the sample is five and the average age of all household members is 23 years.9 Household heads 
have an average age of 47 years, most are male (72%) and have a primary occupation as crop 
production (83%). A slight majority (52%) of household heads have not completed any level of 
formal education, 27% have completed the first four years of primary school, and 15% have 
completed all eight years of primary school.  
 All respondents are smallholder farmers; on average, they operate 1.15 hectares of land. 
Farmers’ land is divided into three parcels on average with the majority (84%) dedicated to the 
cultivation of crops. Land has mostly been received as a gift or inherited (85%), though some 
respondents lease land for a fixed payment (7%) and others have been granted access to land by 
local leaders (5%).  
 Dedza District is renowned among Malawians for its production of Irish potatoes, 
groundnuts, and beans. This is reflected in the respondents’ reporting of their crop cultivation. 
                                                          
9 Unless otherwise stated, all statistical findings are for the agricultural year 2012/2013 (defined as November 2012 
to October 2013). 
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Beans are grown by 49% of respondent households, groundnuts by 46%, soy by 39%, and Irish 
potatoes by 14%. However, as in the rest of Malawi, maize is the main crop in Dedza; 98% of 
respondents grow maize. Malawians consider maize to be almost synonymous with food; a maize 
porridge called nsima dominates the national diet. Informal interviews repeatedly showed that 
Malawians without nsima would consider themselves to be food insecure, even if other food 
sources were abundant. This cultural belief has wide-reaching effects on nutrition security and 
agricultural policy. 
3.5.2 Preference for CCT or Fertilizer Coupon 
Farmers generally prefer the fertilizer coupon over the CCT. Only when the CCT value is 20 
USD higher than the fertilizer coupon’s value (Choice Set 6) do 50% of respondents prefer the CCT, 
in all other choice sets the fertilizer coupon is preferred by the majority of respondents. The results, 
shown in Table 3.2, indicate that respondents carefully considered the choice sets and selected 
logically.  
Table 3.2: 
Preference for CCT 
Choice Set Amount of NPK (kg) Value of NPK (USD) Value of CCT (USD) 
% of respondents that 
prefer the CCT over 
the fertilizer coupon 
1 75 50 50 32% 
2 100 70 50 20% 
3 150 105 50 15% 
4 100 70 70 29% 
5 150 105 70 18% 
6 100 70 90 50% 
7 150 105 90 25% 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output   
 
The NPK cash value is shown here in Table 3.2 for convenience, but was not made available 
to the respondents during the survey. It was up to the respondents alone to recognize when CCT 
values were equal to or exceeded the fertilizer coupon values and selected accordingly, and the 
results show they did that well. Of all the choice sets, Choice Set 3 has the largest value spread: 
the CCT is worth 55 USD less than the fertilizer coupon. The fact that the smallest percent of 
respondents (15%) prefer the CCT in that case, and that the largest percent of respondents (50%) 
prefer the CCT in the most favorable case (Choice Set 6), shows that farmers understood the value 
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differences and revealed their preferences accordingly. The 15% of respondents that prefer the 
CCT even though it was worth 55 USD less than the NPK coupon either had calculated the fertilizer 
value incorrectly, or have a strong bias against the fertilizer subsidy.  
 Some farmers (11%) always prefer the CCT, while a larger group (43%) always prefer the 
fertilizer coupon. These polarized groups show that biases exist against both the CCT and the 
fertilizer coupon. The number of times the CCT was preferred out of the seven choice sets is broken 
down by percentage of respondents in Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: 
Frequency of CCT Preference 









Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
 
Of the 300 respondents, 129 prefer the fertilizer coupon in every choice set. These respondents 
were asked a follow-up question to the choice experiment: “Why do you prefer a fertilizer subsidy 
over a cash transfer even when the cash transfer is worth significantly more?”. The responses are 
summarized in Table 3.4. Respondents cited up to three reasons, which is why the sum of the 
percentages exceeds 100.  
Table 3.4: 
Major Reasons for Always Preferring the Fertilizer Coupon 
Reason stated 
% of 129 respondents who never 
preferred the CCT 
Concerned cash will be spent on unnecessary items 88% 
Prefer sticking to what is already experienced 30% 
Concerned cash will be stolen 16% 
Fertilizer is best for yield/food security 4% 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output  
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Cash being spent on unnecessary items is a major concern (cited by 88% of the respondents who 
preferred the fertilizer coupon in every choice set), suggesting either that there are intra-
household budgeting issues (Handa & Peterman, 2009), or that respondents do not trust 
themselves to spend cash wisely. About one-third (30%) of the respondents who always prefer the 
fertilizer coupon did so because they are familiar with the concept of a fertilizer coupon because 
of the FISP. Theft of cash was also a concern (16%) because without banking or a secure place at 
home to store money, a CCT is risky.  
3.5.3 Hypothetical CCT Expenditures 
 After the choice experiments were completed, respondents were asked to imagine that 
they had received a CCT of 380 USD. Both the main agricultural decision maker and their spouse, 
if applicable, were then separately asked how they would spend the cash. Table 3.5 shows the 
responses, with the main agricultural decision makers distinguished by gender.  
Table 3.5: 
Uses for Hypothetical Cash Transfer 
Expense 
Percent of male main 
agricultural decision 
makers (n=215) 






Fertilizer 55% 33% 43% 
Own agricultural business*** 18% 27% 27% 
Livestock 6% 7% 3% 
Food 3% 7% 4% 
Other inputs 1% 1% 2% 
Own non-agricultural business** 8% 7% 14% 
Home improvements 6% 7% 5% 
Clothing and shoes 0% 1% 0% 
Hiring labor 0% 2% 0% 
Education* 0% 2% 2% 
Buying or renting land in 1% 1% 1% 
Processing crops 1% 4% 1% 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output   
*, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
Responses were quite similar between the male main agricultural decision makers, the female 
main agricultural decision makers and the spouses; all three groups highly value fertilizer and 
agricultural business. The Pearson’s Chi-Square test and the Fischer’s exact tests (Hamilton, 2009) 
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were run with the result that headship and hypothetical CCT spending plans are not independent 
of one another. At the 10% confidence level, the tests indicate that there is a relationship between 
whether a respondent is a male main decision maker, a female main decision maker, or a spouse 
and what the respondent plans to spend the CCT cash on. None of the respondents reported that 
they plan to spend the cash on cell phone expenses, gifts, vices, or repaying debt.  
3.5.4 Socio-Economic Determinants of CCT Preference 
 A logistic regression was run for each of the seven choice sets in the choice experiment to 
find which socioeconomic characteristics are associated with a preference for the CCT. Five of the 
seven models were statistically significant as a whole, they are shown in Tables 3.6-3.10. The two 
models that were not statistically significant as a whole can be found in Tables B1 and B2 of the 
Appendices. 
Table 3.6: Logistic Regression Results for Choice Set 1 
Logistic regression    Number of obs = 300 
    LR chi2(3) = 7.32 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.0623* 
Log likelihood: -184.4004    Pseudo R2 = 0.0195 
       
Choice Set 1 Odds Ratio St. Err. z P>|z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Net per capita income .999997 .0006387 -0.53 0.596 .99841 1.000914 
Elevation 1.001114 .0004658 2.39 0.017** 1.000202 1.002028 
Gender of decision maker .896451 .2437209 -0.40 0.688 .5261478 1.527374 
Constant .1324104 .0795649 -3.36 0.001 .0407792 .4299381 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output     
*, ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
In Choice Set 1, where 32% of respondents prefer the 50 USD CCT over the 50 USD-value fertilizer 
coupon, the preference for the CCT can be explained by the household’s elevation. For an increase 
in a household’s elevation by one meter, the odds that the household will prefer the CCT in Choice 
Set 1 are expected to increase by 0.1%.  
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Table 3.7: Logistic Regression Results for Choice Set 2 
Logistic regression    Number of obs = 300 
    LR chi2(3) = 9.71 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.0212** 
Log likelihood: -143.87003   Pseudo R2 = 0.0326 
       
Choice Set 2 
Odds 
Ratio St. Err. z P>|z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 




1.80 0.072* .9942674 1.000243 
Elevation 1.000805 
.000550
1 1.46 0.143 .9997276 1.001884 
Gender of decision maker 1.272027 
.390746





3.22 0.001 .0249175 .408073 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output     
*, ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
In Choice Set 2, where 20% of respondents prefer the 50 USD CCT over the 70 USD-value 
fertilizer coupon, the preference for the CCT can be explained by a household’s per capita net 
income. For each additional 1 USD of per capita net income, the odds that a household will select 
the CCT in Choice Set 2 decreases by 0.27%.  
Table 3.8: Logistic Regression Results for Choice Set 3 
Logistic regression    Number of obs = 300 
    LR chi2(3) = 8.31 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.0400** 
Log likelihood: -122.65599   Pseudo R2 = 0.0328 
       
Choice Set 3 
Odds 
Ratio St. Err. z P>|z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 




1.69 0.092* .992943 1.000534 
Elevation 1.000532 
.000590
6 0.90 0.368 .9993748 1.00169 
Gender of decision maker 1.440448 
.484693





3.04 0.002 .0218036 .4381384 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output     
*, ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
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In Choice Set 3, where 15% of respondents prefer the 50 USD CCT over the 105 USD-value 
fertilizer coupon, the preference for the CCT can be explained by a household’s net per capita 
income. For each additional 1 USD of per capita net income, the odds that a household will select 
the CCT in Choice Set 3 decreases by 0.33%.  
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Table 3.9: Logistic Regression Results for Choice Set 5 
Logistic regression    Number of obs = 300 
    LR chi2(3) = 8.80 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.0321** 
Log likelihood: -135.49104   Pseudo R2 = 0.0314 
       
Choice Set 5 
Odds 
Ratio St. Err. z P>|z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 




1.15 0.249 .9963096 1.000958 
Elevation 1.00117 
.000604
9 1.94 0.053** .9999852 1.002356 
Gender of decision 
maker 1.520007 
.483032





3.81 0.000 .0104278 .2320721 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output     
** indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
In Choice Set 5, where 18% of respondents prefer the 70 USD CCT over the 105 USD-value 
fertilizer coupon, the preference for the CCT can be explained by a household’s elevation. For an 
increase in a household’s elevation by one meter, the odds that the household will prefer the CCT 
in Choice Set 5 are expected to increase by 0.1%.  
Table 3.10: Logistic Regression Results for Choice Set 7 
Logistic regression    Number of obs = 300 
    LR chi2(3) = 8.05 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.0450** 
Log likelihood: -163.56721   Pseudo R2 = 0.0240 
       
Choice Set 7 
Odds 
Ratio St. Err. z P>|z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 




0.31 0.755 .9983754 1.001181 
Elevation 1.00099 
.000501
3 1.97 0.048** 1.000007 1.001973 
Gender of decision maker 1.712614 
.485686





3.79 0.000 .0233446 .3029759 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output     
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*, ** indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively. 
In Choice Set 7, where 25% of respondents prefer the 90 USD CCT over the 105 USD-value 
fertilizer coupon, the preference for the CCT can be explained by the household’s elevation and 
the gender of its main agricultural decision maker. For an increase in a household’s elevation by 
one meter, the odds that the household will prefer the CCT in Choice Set 7 are expected to increase 
by 0.1%. Those households with a female main agricultural decision maker are 1.71 times more 
likely to select the CCT in Choice Set 7. Of all the choice sets, Choice Set 7 has the slightest negative 
value difference between the CCT and the fertilizer coupon. Female agricultural decision makers 
value the CCT just slightly over the fertilizer coupon.  
3.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
Respondents were found to generally prefer the fertilizer coupon over the cash transfer, 
because of concerns about how the cash would be spent and aversion to an unfamiliar program. 
The fear of the unknown could be resolved by a thorough advertising campaign, and would 
dissipate once recipients begin to enjoy the benefits of the program. The issue of intrahousehold 
financial control can be skirted with careful program design (Benderly, 2011), but has been found 
to have no effect on the increase in food expenditure that CCTs produce (Braido, Olinto, & Perrone, 
2012). 
The regression models show that a preference for the CCT can in some cases be explained 
by a lower household net income, a higher elevation, and a female main agricultural decision 
maker. The negative impact of an increase in household income on the preference for the CCT is 
slight in the regression models, but it is indicative. Although great care was taken to distinguish the 
hypothetical fertilizer coupon of the choice experiment from the current FISP coupons in 
circulation in Malawi, it is likely that respondents were biased by their experiences with the FISP. 
Studies have shown that FISP coupons are often unfairly distributed and can land in the hands of 
wealthier, and politically better-connected, households (Chibwana et al., 2010; Chirwa et al., 2011; 
Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). Possibly aware of this, the poorer households of the study were more 
interested in the CCT. With the improved targeting that is inherent to CCTs, and the use of proxy 
income indicators, a cash transfer program could reach the poorer households. Further, the 
imbalance in the research experiment, the comparison of a hypothetical and a known, could be 
                                                                                     
58 
 
improved upon in future research. A CCT could be offered for a period of time leading up to a 
study, so that respondents may gain firsthand experience and be able to make well-informed 
decisions.  
The preference for the CCT by respondents living at high elevations was clear in the 
regression models. In Dedza District, villages in mountainous areas are remote and have limited 
market access. The transaction cost of a fertilizer coupon is markedly higher for those with poor 
infrastructure and market access than for those in a central location. Fertilizer coupons must either 
be collected at a distributor, or delivered to recipients’ villages, then they can only be used at 
certain agricultural dealers, and the heavy product must be transported home. These barriers 
make the CCT a more attractive subsidy to those in remote areas. 
The regression model for Choice Set 7, in which the fertilizer coupon is worth just 15 USD 
more than the CCT, indicates that women’s valuation of the CCT is just slightly higher than that of 
their male counterparts. As agricultural work is traditionally done by males, women are likely to 
pursue income from other avenues, for which they would need the type of untethered support 
that CCTs provide. However, the modest level of evidence suggests that female main agricultural 
decision makers take on farming responsibilities and are for the most part reliant on agriculture 
for income. 
As previously mentioned, the main flaws of the FISP are the budget burden, the unproven 
benefits, and inadequate targeting. CCTs have been shown to be cost-effective (Kakwani et al., 
2005; Kapur et al., 2008); a cash transfer program in Malawi would provide much needed budget 
relief to the government. There is well-documented success of numerous CCT programs in assisting 
the poor and beneficiaries can be effectively targeted (Baird et al., 2011; Davis et al., 2012; Kakwani 
et al., 2005; Kapur, 2011; The World Bank, 2009). The rapid deforestation from which Malawi 
suffers could be thwarted in the mid term and long term with the inclusion of agroforestry 
adoption as the conditionality in a cash transfer program. With careful planning, the replacement 
of the FISP with a well-targeted, transparent CCT program would allow Malawi to join the ranks of 
other developing countries that have reaped the rewards of shifting from price interventions to 
income interventions. 
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4. SMALLHOLDER FARMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO PAY 
FOR IMPROVED COOKSTOVES IN DEDZA, MALAWI 
Emily McNulty, Thea Nielsen and Manfred Zeller




As improved cookstove (ICS) programs increase in popularity, policy makers and 
entrepreneurs need accurate estimates of the target market’s willingness to pay (WTP) for the 
stoves. Knowing which socioeconomic factors affect WTP will allow program planners to price and 
target the stoves effectively. This study elicits the WTP of rural Malawians for two types of ICS and 
explores the determinant socioeconomic factors. 
The widespread use of biomass fuel for heating and cooking has strong negative impacts 
on human health and the environment. Biomass, mainly charcoal and wood, is the main cooking 
fuel for 2.7 billion people around the world (Bensch & Peters, 2012, 2013). In Sub-Saharan Africa, 
biomass is the primary fuel for 81% of the general population, and for close to 100% of the rural 
population (Bensch & Peters, 2012, 2013). The pollutants given off by the combustion of solid fuel 
are extremely harmful to human health, particularly when cooking is done indoors without 
adequate ventilation (Bruce, Perez-Padilla, & Albalak, 2002; Fitzgerald et al., 2012). Each year, 2 
million deaths are attributed to household air pollution, which is more than the number of deaths 
caused by malaria, and makes cooking with biomass fuels the world’s primary environmental cause 
of death (Bensch & Peters, 2012; Hanna, Duflo, & Greenstone, 2012; Martin II, Glass, Balbus, & 
Collins, 2011). The deaths occur when ailments like low birthweight, high blood pressure, acute 
lower respiratory infection, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and asthma are caused or 
worsened by the pollutants (Fitzgerald et al., 2012). Because women are generally responsible for 
preparing meals, and they tend to have their children nearby during cooking activities, women and 
children are most affected by indoor air pollution (Bensch & Peters, 2012; Fitzgerald et al., 2012; 
Jan, 2012). More than 50% of all premature deaths caused by household pollution occur in children 
under five years of age due to their vulnerability during critical growth stages (Fitzgerald et al., 
2012; Rehfuess, Mehta, & Prüss-Üstün, 2006). Cooking with biomass fuels is not only harmful to 
women’s health, but it also constitutes a heavy opportunity cost. Women in developing countries 
are commonly charged with the chore of household fuel acquisition. Collecting or purchasing 
charcoal and firewood can be very time consuming and often dangerous (Bensch & Peters, 2012). 
The inefficiency of biomass fuels also contributes greatly to deforestation through unsustainable 
firewood and charcoal production (El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003) and to global 
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climate change through its removal of carbon sinks, and the release of carbon dioxide and black 
carbon during cooking (Hanna et al., 2012).  
Widespread dissemination of ICS is seen by many to be a feasible and effective intervention 
to improve human health, promote gender equality, relieve pressure on forests, and mitigate 
climate change (Bensch & Peters, 2012; El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003; Fitzgerald 
et al., 2012; Jan, 2012). The term ICS covers a broad range of stove technologies that are all an 
improvement on the traditional three-stone stove in terms of fuel efficiency and emissions. ICS can 
be made from clay, brick, or metal, and they have a form that to varying extents encloses the 
cooking fire. The most fuel efficient ICS models are almost entirely enclosed and have a chimney 
to transport smoke and fumes outside of the home. The less fuel efficient ICS models do not have 
a chimney, but are transportable to encourage outdoor cooking during favorable weather 
conditions. The different ICS models vary greatly in cost, and higher cost is generally correlated 
with higher fuel efficiency and emission reduction. Further studies establishing the exact benefits 
of various ICS models to air pollution and health are described by Bensch and Peters (2012) and 
Fitzgerald et al. (2012). 
The first ICS dissemination programs were launched in the 1970s (Arnold et al., 2003). They 
were focused mainly on the deforestation mitigation effects of widespread adoption (García-
Frapolli et al., 2010), and received relatively little policy attention (Jan, 2012). ICS programs 
recently reemerged in the policy spotlight, this time with the focus more on human health and 
women’s empowerment (García-Frapolli et al., 2010; Ruiz-Mercado, Masera, Zamora, & Smith, 
2011). The ICS trend gained a major foothold when in 2010, Hillary Clinton, who at the time was 
the United States Secretary of State, together with the United Nations Foundation, launched the 
Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves (Bensch & Peters, 2012; Hanna et al., 2012; The Economist, 
2010). The Alliance’s goal is to have 100 million households adopt ICS by the year 2020. If ICS are 
priced appropriately and targeted effectively, production and demand may develop 
simultaneously in a way that is self-sustaining and allows the stoves to survive on the free market. 
Further, if ICS adoption can outgrow its subsidy-requiring stage, rural people in developing 
countries may not have to wait for the stoves to be on trend a third time to enjoy the benefits.  
Despite the newfound attention to ICS programs and the potential of the stoves to combat 
an array of issues, their adoption and sustained use face several challenges. The benefits of an ICS 
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are not immediately apparent to the rural poor who, because of a lack of education, may 
undervalue the fuel saving and health improving traits of the stoves (Bensch & Peters, 2012; El 
Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003; Gill, 1987; Mobarak, Dwivedi, Bailis, Hildemann, & 
Miller, 2012). Understandably, poor households struggling to meet their most basic needs are not 
interested in a technology with a relatively high price and fairly abstract benefits (Mobarak et al., 
2012).  
There is also a marketing issue slowing ICS adoption. Given the harms of kitchen pollution, 
the labor hours spent collecting biomass fuels, and the prohibitive costs of cleaner fuels, the groups 
that stand to benefit the most from ICS adoption are the most vulnerable: women, children, and 
the poor (Jan, 2012). These groups also tend to have the least bargaining power and the least 
economic autonomy. Women are the primary stove users, but they are not generally empowered 
to make large purchases (Bensch & Peters, 2012; El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003; 
Miller & Mobarak, 2011). Although the woman of a household may be interested in improving her 
respiratory health, as well as her children’s, and limiting the amount of time spent collecting 
firewood, the male head of the household may not value those changes highly enough to make 
the purchase.  
The improvements that ICS have the potential to achieve once adoption does occur are 
stunted by a common phenomenon called “stacking” (Ruiz-Mercado et al., 2011; Takama, Tsephel, 
& Johnson, 2012). Fuel stacking happens when a household adopts a new fuel source in addition 
to its current fuel source, rather than replacing the old fuel with the new, and the same can be 
done with stoves. A household with an ICS may revert to their three-stone stove when certain 
dishes require a distinct flavor, or when tradition calls for it, or simply when making multiple dishes 
at once. The maintenance required for many ICS models may cause adopters to revert entirely to 
their traditional stove (Hanna et al., 2012). A study by Hanna et al. (2012) found that ICS adopters 
did not experience any significant health or fuel use improvements in the long term, although they 
had during the first year of adoption, because they did not clean out the stoves’ chimneys or 
otherwise maintain them and they fell into disrepair. 
ICS are known as a “bridging technology” because they bridge the gap between the status 
quo of inefficient three-stone stoves and the ideal of universal clean fuel use and electricity grids 
(Bensch & Peters, 2012). ICS are a vast improvement on the three-stone stove, but because they 
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still require biomass for fuel they are not clean enough to meet the World Health Organization’s 
emissions recommendations (Concern Universal, 2012). The enormous cost and task of providing 
access to clean energy and electricity to rural households is too much to take on at once, so policy 
makers settle for the bridging technology of the ICS.  
There are few studies on the impacts of ICS adoption in Malawi, and none could be found 
on socioeconomic determinants of adoption in Malawi. One study modelled the adoption of 
institutional-scale ICS for use in school lunch programs and found that they had a net positive affect 
on the Malawian economy after ten years (Habermehl, 2008). With numerous agencies 
disseminating different ICS models throughout Malawi, there is no data on the current extent of 
ICS adoption available. The goal of Malawi’s National Cookstove Taskforce, which started in 2013, 
is to have 2 million households adopt ICS by 2020 (US Department of State, 2014). The potential 
for ICS to benefit Malawians is enormous given that 91.4% of the population uses wood for cooking 
and 13,250 people die of household air pollution each year, 5,852 of whom are children (Global 
Alliance for Clean Cookstoves, 2016). The firewood savings attributed to ICS would also be of great 
benefit to Malawi as the deforestation rate is 2.8% per year due to human activities (Food and 
Agriculture Organization, 2016). Fuel savings would also translate into increased food security as 
firewood collectors would burn fewer calories performing the arduous task.  
The two types of ICS in this study are a clay stove and a rocket stove. Figures C1-C3 of the 
Appendices show the traditional three-stone stove, the clay stove, and the rocket stove. The clay 
stove is called chitetezo mbaula in Malawi. It is made of locally-sourced fired clay and has an 
enclosed form. At the time of the survey, the clay stove was available for purchase in the research 
area at certain gas stations and supermarkets, as well as from NGOs promoting the stoves in some 
villages. The rocket stove is a gasifying metal stove made by a South African company called Rocket 
Works. The rocket stove is even more fuel efficient than the clay stove and at the time of the survey 
was unavailable in Malawi. Both stoves are more fuel efficient than the standard three-stone stove 
used throughout Dedza. The clay stove becomes hot to the touch when in use, while the rocket 
stove does not. The clay stove is heavy and will crack if dropped. When cool and not in use, the 
rocket stove can be turned on its end and used as a stool. 
This paper elicits the willingness of smallholder farmers to pay for the clay stove and the 
rocket stove, and explores socioeconomic determinants of their WTP. The specific objectives of 
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the study are outlined in Section 2 and the study area is described in Section 3. Section 4 provides 
the methodologies of the survey and the econometric analysis. Section 5 gives results of the 
descriptive statistics, the willingness to pay questions, and the regression models. Finally, results 
are discussed and conclusions are drawn in Section 6. 
4.2 Objectives 
With the aim of informing future ICS program developers, this study explores which 
socioeconomic traits influence consumers’ stated willingness to pay (WTP) for two types of ICS: a 
clay stove and a rocket stove. Findings are compared with those from studies done in other regions 
with different stoves (El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003; Jan, 2012; Mobarak et al., 
2012; Pine et al., 2011). The novelty of this study is that it is the only one to compare the 
socioeconomic determinants of WTP for the clay stove and the rocket stove in Malawi. Explanatory 
models are composed of independent variables including time spent acquiring fuel, fuel 
expenditures, household characteristics, social capital, dietary diversity, health indicators, and 
credit access. 
Given the study’s objectives, four research questions emerge:  
(1) What is the average WTP for the clay stove? 
(2) What is the average WTP for the rocket stove? 
(3) Which socioeconomic characteristics influence a households’ WTP for the clay stove? 
(4) Which socioeconomic characteristics influence a households’ WTP for the rocket stove? 
4.3 Study Area 
Dedza District lies between Lake Nyasa, the Mozambican border, and the national capital, 
Lilongwe, in Malawi’s Central Region. The Kirk Range is a watershed plateau that runs north-south 
through Dedza and provides the district with great biophysical variety. The eastern side of the 
plateau descends into the Rift Valley, where Lake Nyasa is located at about 500 m.a.s.l. The warm 
climate of the lakeshore allows for the cultivation of paddy rice, tobacco, and cotton. The western 
side of the plateau is much higher in elevation and holds the capital of the district, Dedza Township, 
which is 1,590 m.a.s.l. The subtropical highland climate of the west is conducive to the farming of 
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potatoes and groundnuts. During the dry season, usually from May to October, there is almost no 
precipitation, but several perennial rivers provide water for home consumption and irrigation. 
4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Survey Methodology 
The 300 smallholder farming households in Dedza District were sampled using stratification 
of randomization (Carletto, 1999). A list of Dedza District’s 2,840 villages was acquired from the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Water Development. The statistical population was 242,519 
households. The eight TAs of the district were used as the strata; 30 villages were randomly 
sampled from the strata proportionate to TA population. Up-to-date lists of the sampled 
households were then obtained from the district agricultural extension office. From these lists, ten 
households were randomly selected per village. The households were interviewed in May and June 
of 2014.  
Villages with access to the clay stove were purposively omitted from the sample, however, 
five households that owned a clay stove were inadvertently included in the sample. These 
households had purchased their clay stoves from a business-minded agricultural extension officer. 
This extension officer had purchased a large number of stoves and at the time of the survey had 
just begun to sell the stoves during his field visits. No villages had access to the rocket stove.  
Upon entering a village and before beginning the individual household interviews, 
respondents were gathered for a group meeting. It was emphasized that the availability of both 
ICS for purchase was purely hypothetical and that farmers’ identities would remain confidential. 
The two ICS, namely, the clay stove and the rocket stove, were presented. Respondents were 
informed about the advantages and disadvantages of the stoves and how the stoves function. 
Respondents were also given the opportunity to handle the stoves and ask questions. Later, when 
the household interviews were done in private, respondents were asked how much they would be 
willing to pay for each type of stove. Sections of the questionnaire that are relevant to this thesis 
can be found in Appendix E. All survey respondents were present at their village’s group meeting. 
The group meeting was led by the same enumerator using the same script in every village. 
 Given financial and temporal constraints, the contingent valuation methodology was used 
without the addition of “cheap talk” scripts, follow-up certainty questions, or other tools to control 
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for hypothetical bias. Findings in the literature are inconclusive on which, if any, methods can 
reliably mitigate hypothetical bias (Blumenschein, Blomquist, Johannesson, Horn, & Freeman, 
2008; Damschroder, Ubel, Riis, & Smith, 2007; Hensher, 2010; Murphy, Allen, Stevens, & 
Wheatherhead, 2005). Despite the emphasis given on the confidentiality of the survey’s results 
and the hypothetical nature of the questions, it is possible that respondents over-stated their WTP 
in the hope that their village would be chosen for an ICS program. ICS promoters should be aware 
of this possibility when determining the price at which to sell their stoves. 
4.4.2 Econometric Methods 
 Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses were performed to discover which socio-
economic characteristics influence respondents’ WTP for both types of stove. Statistical analyses 
were done using statistical software, STATA Version 13. Initially, both regression analyses 
contained 11 independent variables that were chosen based on the theoretical likelihood that they 
would impact WTP for an ICS. For both the clay stove and the rocket stove WTP models, the 
number of explanatory variables had to be greatly reduced to improve the models’ statistical 
significance. 
The original 11 independent variables were: per capita household income, credit access 
score, social network score, household size, cook’s education, cook’s age, cook’s gender, sickness 
score, dietary diversity score, amount spent buying fuel, and time spent acquiring fuel. These 
variables and their hypothesized effect on WTP for an ICS are shown in Table 4.1.  
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Table 4.1:  
Independent Variables 
Variable Name Description 
Mean 
(Median) Hypothesized Impact on WTP 
Per capita HH income (USD) Annual net household income from all sources 93 (0) Higher income, higher WTP 
Credit access score 
Ability to acquire formal and informal loans of 
varying amounts, scored 0-10 
1.3 (0) Higher score, higher WTP 
Social network score 
Organization membership and informal borrowing, 
scored 0-20 
7.7 (7) Higher score, higher WTP 
Household size Number of permanent household residents 5.1 (5) More members, higher WTP 
Cook's education 
Highest level of education completed by main person 
responsible for cooking, 0-14 years 
2.4 (0) 
More years of education, higher 
WTP 
Cook's age Age of main person responsible for cooking 40.2 (36) Older, higher WTP 
Cook's gender 
Gender of main person responsible for cooking, 
0=male, 1=female 
1 (1) Female, higher WTP 
Sickness score 
Burns, eye infections, and respiratory illness among 
household members, scored 0-8 
0.9 (0.7) Higher score, higher WTP 
HH dietary diversity score 
Sum of food groups consumed by household in 24 
hours preceding interview, scored 0-12 
5.4 (5) Higher score, higher WTP 
Amount spent buying fuel (USD) Household fuel expenditure per month 4 (0) Higher expenditure, higher WTP 
Time spent acquiring fuel (minutes) 
Time spent in week preceding interview purchasing 
or collecting fuel 
190 (120) More time spent, higher WTP 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output   
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The per capita household annual net income variable represents income from all possible 
sources, including crops sold, livestock sold, forestry, hunting, wage labor, aid, retirement 
payments, and remittances. Households with more income per capita are expected to be willing 
to pay more for an ICS, because they may have disposable income that they are willing to invest. 
The access to credit score is a composite of responses about the ability to acquire loans of different 
amounts from formal and informal sources. Because purchasing an ICS may use up savings, 
households with better access to loans are expected to be more willing to draw from their savings 
to purchase a stove. The household social network score variable is a summation of organization 
membership and informal borrowing ability, based on the concept that participation in community 
activities enriches social capital (Putnam, 1995). The higher the social network score, the higher 
the household’s social capital. Those households with strong social networks are hypothesized to 
be willing to pay more for an ICS as their social nature may make them willing to try new 
technologies. Isham (2002) found this to be true in rural Tanzania in a study on the positive 
correlation between social capital and adoption rates of a new fertilizer. Households with relatively 
more members are also expected to be willing to pay more for an ICS because they may be 
interested in increasing the amount they can cook at once by having a more efficient stove or by 
adding an additional stove to their kitchen. If the household’s main cook has completed a higher 
level of formal education, is female, or is older, the household is hypothesized to be willing to pay 
more. The sickness score is a composite of responses about cooking-related ailments, including 
burns, eye infections, and respiratory illness. Because of the health benefits associated with ICS 
adoption, households with higher sickness scores are expected to be willing to pay more to 
improve their household’s overall health. The dietary diversity score is a sum of food groups 
consumed by household members within the 24 hours preceding the survey; the score ranges from 
0 to 12. This study uses the 12 food groups set forth by the FAO’s “Guidelines for Measuring 
Household and Individual Dietary Diversity” (Kennedy, Ballard, & Dop, 2010). Households with 
higher dietary diversity scores are hypothesized to be willing to pay more for an ICS, which would 
support their well-balanced diets by making slow-cook foods, like legumes, less costly to prepare. 
Households that spend more per month on fuel purchases were expected to be willing to pay more 
for an ICS as the fuel efficiency would off-set their fuel costs. Similarly, those households that spend 
more time acquiring fuel, whether purchasing or collecting, are expected to be willing to pay more.  
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Following each regression analysis, diagnostic tests were run. The distribution of residuals 
and the variance inflation factor of each model was checked. The average variance inflation factors 
are 1.03 and 1.05 for the clay stove model and the rocket stove model, respectively, indicating that 
multicollinearity is not an issue (Chatterjee, Hadi & Price, 2000). Model specification was checked 
with the Ramsey Regression Specification Error Test. After the models failed the Breusch-Pagan 
test for heteroscedasticity, the regressions were re-run with robust standard errors (W. H. Rogers, 
1993; Williams, 2000). 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Given the size and the geographical range of the sample, the survey respondents can be 
considered representative of the rural population of Dedza District. The average household size of 
the sample is five and the average age of all household members is 23 years.10 Household heads 
have an average age of 47 years, most are male (72%) and have a primary occupation as crop 
production (83%). A slight majority (52%) of household heads have not completed any level of 
formal education, 27% have completed the first four years of primary school, and 15% have 
completed all eight years of primary school.  
 All respondents are smallholder farmers; on average, they operate 1.15 hectares of land. 
Farmers’ land is divided into three parcels on average with the majority (84%) dedicated to the 
cultivation of crops. Land has mostly been received as a gift or inherited (85%), though some 
respondents lease land for a fixed payment (7%) and others have been granted access to land by 
local leaders (5%).   
Dedza District is renowned among Malawians for its production of Irish potatoes, 
groundnuts, and beans. This is reflected in the respondents’ reporting of their crop cultivation. 
Beans are grown by 49% of respondent households, groundnuts by 46%, soy by 39%, and Irish 
potatoes by 14%. However, as in the rest of Malawi, maize is the main crop in Dedza; 98% of 
respondents grow maize. Malawians consider maize to be almost synonymous with food; a maize 
porridge called nsima dominates the national diet. Informal interviews repeatedly showed that 
                                                          
10 Unless otherwise stated, all statistical findings are for the agricultural year 2012/2013 (defined as November 
2012 to October 2013). 
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Malawians without nsima would consider themselves to be food insecure, even if other food 
sources were abundant. This cultural belief has wide-reaching effects on nutrition security and 
agricultural policy. 
4.5.2 Willingness to Pay for ICS 
 The average WTP for the clay stove is 8.02 USD.11,12 As shown in Figure 4.1, the data is 
heavily skewed towards zero. Only 25% of respondents are willing to pay more than 9.02 USD for 
the clay stove.  
Figure 4.1: WTP for Clay Stove 
 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
 
The average WTP for the rocket stove is 15.34 USD. Again, the data is skewed towards zero, as 
shown in Figure 4.2. Only 25% of respondents are willing to pay more than 18.05 USD for the rocket 
stove. 
                                                          
11 All USD values in this paper are converted from Malawian kwacha and adjusted for purchasing power parity and 
inflation. Malawian kwacha, the local currency, was used during the survey.  
12 At the time of the survey, the clay stove sold at supermarkets and gas stations for 9.02 USD (adjusted for inflation 
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Figure 4.2: WTP for Rocket Stove 
 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
Because of the negative skew in the WTP for both stove types, ICS promoters should use the 
median, rather than the mean, when making pricing decisions to avoid overestimates. The median 
WTP is 7.22 USD and 9.03 USD, for the clay stove and the rocket stove, respectively.  
 Hypothetical bias appears to be a threat, especially in the rocket stove results, as some of 
the reported WTPs may be considered unreasonably high. Thirteen respondents are willing to pay 
the equivalent of more than 12 days of hard labor wages.13 Otherwise, these high WTP results may 
be attributed to respondents being eager to adopt a new technology. 
4.5.3 Socio-Economic Determinants of Willingness to Pay 
Regressions were run on the both WTP models using estimates of robust standard errors. 
To achieve models that were as a whole statistically significant at the 10% level or better, the 
number of independent variables was reduced from 11 to three in the clay stove model and to five 
in the rocket stove model. Both of the resulting models passed the regression diagnostic test for 
                                                          
13 At the time of the survey, a person in Dedza could expect to earn 3.61 USD for a full day of hard labor (such as 
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multicollinearity, but only the clay stove model passed the diagnostic test for model specification, 
the Ramsey Regression Equation Specification Error Test (Ramsey RESET). The failure of the rocket 
stove model to pass the Ramsey RESET indicates that there are explanatory variables missing from 
the model. Both models, despite the use of robust standard error estimates, have vertically spread 
distribution of residuals indicating that there are respondents whose WTP is influenced by 
unknown factors. The distrust of, or disinterest in, new technology is suspected to be an important 
intangible variable. 
The regression results of both models are shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Both regressions 
yield low R-squared and adjusted R-squared values, indicating that the independent variables have 
limited predictive power and should be used only for explanatory purposes. There are small but 
reliable relationships between the independent and dependent variables.  




Clay Stove Regression Results 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 273 
    F( 3, 269) = 2.08 
    Prob > F = 0.1038 
    R-squared = 0.0246 
    Root MSE = 5.6283 
    Adjusted R-squared = 0.0138 
       
  Robust     
WTP for Clay Stove Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Social Network Score -.0715312 .0569251 -1.26 0.210  -.0721934 
Household Dietary Diversity Score .3645998 .1934134 1.89 0.060  .1370554 
Amount Spent on Fuel (USD per month) -.0499961 .0303674 -1.65 0.101  -.0813125 
Constant 6.833105 1105005 6.18 0.000  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output      
* Indicates statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
  




Rocket Stove Regression Results 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 271 
    F( 5, 265) = 3.09 
    Prob > F = 0.0099 
    R-squared = 0.0934 
    Root MSE = 13.13 
    Adjusted R-squared = 0.0763 
       
  Robust     
WTP for Rocket Stove Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Social Network Score -.1147545 .1341294 -0.86 0.393  -.0481666 
Household Net Income (USD per capita) .0114854 .0054435 2.11 0.036  .1949898 
Household Dietary Diversity Score 1.291833 .5682548 2.27 0.024  .2054453 
Sickness Score -1.450235 .7768815 -1.87 0.063  -.0957259 
Amount Spent on Fuel (USD per month) -.1158185 .0791707 -1.46 0.145  -.0778656 
Constant 10.03332 2.696223 3.72 0.000  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output      
*, ** Indicate statistical significance at the 10% and 5% level, respectively. 
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The WTP for a clay stove model is statistically significant at the 10% level. The model shows 
household dietary diversity to be positively correlated with WTP, as hypothesized. Ceteris paribus, 
an increase in the WTP for a clay stove by 0.36 USD can be explained by a household’s consumption 
of one additional food group. It is interesting that those households with more balanced diets 
exhibit a need for improved cooking technology to facilitate the preparation of multiple food 
groups, while those households with less balanced diets do not, or because of their circumstances 
are unable to. Wealthier households in the sample have higher dietary diversity scores, shown by 
a pairwise correlation coefficient of 0.188 that is statistically significantly different from zero at the 
1% level of error probability.  
 Counterintuitively, the model shows a negative correlation between the amount spent on 
fuel per month with the WTP for a clay stove. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in the WTP for a clay 
stove by 0.05 USD can be explained by the increase in monthly fuel expenditure by 1 USD. This 
finding may be due to illegal acquisition of fuel sources. If a household is acquiring the fuel 
illegally, for example from forest reserves, their fuel expenditure would be low or zero. They 
would likely be interested in reducing their fuel consumption through the purchase of an ICS, to 
reduce the risks associated with illegal fuel acquisition.14  
 The WTP for a rocket stove model as a whole is statistically significant at the 1% level. As 
predicted there is a positive correlation between net household income per capita and WTP. 
Ceteris paribus, an increase in the WTP for a rocket stove by 0.10 USD can be explained by a 10 
USD increase in annual net income per capita. A greater effect was expected; this shows the need 
for stove demonstrations and other marketing efforts.  
 Household dietary diversity is an even stronger explanatory variable in the WTP for a 
rocket stove model than in the clay stove model. This is likely because the fuel efficiency of a 
rocket stove is even greater than that of a clay stove, meaning that households could cook more 
types of food with even less fuel. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the WTP for a rocket stove by 
1.29 USD can be explained by the consumption of one additional food group by a household.  
                                                          
14 Illegal fuel acquisition in Malawi is punishable by fines and prison time. Women and girls are traditionally 
responsible for fuelwood collection; those who collect firewood illegally are particularly at risk of sexual abuse by 
forest reserve guards and thus HIV contraction (White, 2010). 
                                                                                     
80 
 
 It was hypothesized that households with higher (worse) sickness scores would recognize 
the health benefits of ICS and therefore report a higher WTP, however, the opposite was 
revealed in the regression results. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in the WTP for a rocket stove by 
1.45 USD can be explained by one additional cooking-related ailment within the household. This 
finding may be due to illnesses affecting households’ ability to generate income, and thus their 
willingness to purchase new technologies. Or, it is possible that the sickness score variable is 
flawed, causing the regression results to be erroneous. Several studies have explored the 
reliability of health self-assessment variables (Bound, 1989; Dunning et al., 2004; Martikainen et 
al., 2003); results are mixed but the subjectivity of health is unanimously accepted. The 
relationship between wealth and self-rated health scores are of particular interest in developing 
countries where the poorest may score themselves as healthy because of illiteracy and lack of 
disease awareness, while the better-off may score themselves as ill because of their improved 
ability to identify illness (King et al., 2004; Salomon et al., 2004; Sen, 1993; Sen, 2002). On the 
other hand, a study by Subramanian et al. (2009) finds the inverse to be true: that self-reported 
morbidity is more likely among the disadvantaged and least educated.  
 Of the seven independent variables that were not found to have explanatory power in 
either of the WTP models, credit access score and household size were most expected to be 
statistically significant. Credit access likely did not have an impact on WTP because respondents 
would not be willing to go into debt to purchase a stove. Larger households were hypothesized to 
be willing to pay more for ICS, because speed of food preparation and fuel savings would have 
the greatest relative returns for them. It is probable, however, since household size is largely 
accepted as a predictor of poverty (Lanjouw, 1995), that larger households have more thinly 
spread income and so are unable to invest in a new stove. Or, it is possible, that the larger 
households have more available labor to devote to collecting firewood, and therefore, the fuel 
efficiency of the ICS is not as attractive as it is to labor constrained households.  
4.6 Discussion and Conclusions 
 This study finds four socioeconomic indicators that explain WTP for clay stoves and rocket 
stoves. Household dietary diversity is positively correlated with WTP for both the clay stove and 
the rocket stove. Fuel expenditures are negatively correlated with WTP for the clay stove. Annual 
                                                                                     
81 
 
net income per capita is positively correlated with WTP for the rocket stove. Cooking-related 
ailments are negatively correlated with WTP for the rocket stove.  
 The household dietary diversity score in the WTP for a rocket stove model had the greatest 
impact on WTP. Households that consume more food groups, either because they are better-off 
and can afford to, or because they are knowledgeable about nutrition and make it a priority, are 
keen to reduce the fuel costs associated with their diverse diets by purchasing an efficient stove. 
ICS promoters would do well to target those households first as early adopters who can influence 
their neighbors’ perceptions informally (Rogers & Scott, 1997). Households that do not consume 
varied foods, either because they cannot afford to, or they are unaware of the benefits of a 
balanced diet, would then witness the fuel saving attributes of the ICS and become later adopters. 
This could potentially occur without further intervention from ICS promoters, resulting in program 
savings. 
The negative correlation between fuel expenditure and WTP for a clay stove, most likely 
due to respondents looking to decrease their risky, illegal firewood collecting activities, is yet 
another reason for intensive ICS promotion. Greater fuel efficiency not only decreases pressure on 
forest resources, but it also relieves the burden of illegal activity from those who have no other 
options. A lower demand for firewood would alleviate some of the government’s cost of patrolling 
forest reserves and slow deforestation.  
Two groups that would benefit most from ICS adoption, large households and households 
with cooking-related ailments, are willing to pay less. Larger households have a lower WTP for ICS 
because their resources are spread more thinly across members, but they would reap the greatest 
relative returns to fuel savings. Households with cooking-related ailments may have lower income 
generating abilities and are unable to afford the very stoves that would improve their health 
situation. These two groups should be targeted with lower pricing by ICS promoters. 
Household net income per capita, health indicators, dietary diversity, and fuel expenditure 
are useful explanatory variables in the WTP for ICS, but, as shown by the model specification tests 
and R-squared values, there are predictive variables that could not be revealed by this study. These 
could be uncovered by using a larger sample size, performing cooking demonstrations before the 
survey, and assessing exhibited WTP, rather than stated WTP. 
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Comparing these results with those of other studies, the major similarity is in the positive 
effect of income (El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003; Jan, 2012; Pine et al., 2011; 
Takama et al., 2012). The overall low WTP for ICS can be explained by the fact that the sampled 
households are all poor and as such face difficult challenges in meeting their basic needs. The 
purchase of a stove with rather abstract benefits cannot be expected to be high on their priority 
list (Mobarak et al., 2012). Other socioeconomic factors that were hypothesized in this study to 
have an effect but were insignificant, were found to be significant in other studies. This may be 
indicative of the difference between eliciting stated WTP and recording exhibited WTP or observing 
adoption. As hypothesized in this study, being relatively more educated increases the likelihood of 
ICS adoption in the literature (El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003; Jan, 2012). This study 
anticipated that households suffering from cooking related ailments would be eager to purchase a 
stove and improve their health, and this is confirmed by Pine et al. (2011) who show that sufferers 
of eye irritation were twice as likely to be early adopters. An interesting and valuable study 
objective would be to determine to what extent observed adoption is a more reliable variable than 
stated WTP, as the latter is less costly and easier to collect in a household survey. 
 A weakness of this study is that respondents were shown the ICS models in a group 
meeting, but no cooking demonstration was done. Had the respondents experienced the fuel 
efficiency firsthand they may have reported higher WTP. In the literature, understanding of the 
advantages of ICS models and exposure to ICS promotional materials are found to be a strong 
positive factor in stove adoption (El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003; Jan, 2012). ICS 
programs should heed this and be sure to give demonstrations in areas where stove sales are 
planned.  
 Because of the discrepancy between short-term and long-term impacts of ICS adoption, the 
focus of ICS programs should be sustained, proper stove use by adopters, not just dissemination 
(Pine et al., 2011; Ruiz-Mercado et al., 2011). Positive impact estimates are inflated when only 
short-term adoption data and laboratory fuel test results are used; more long-term impact 
evaluations are needed (Bensch & Peters, 2013; Hanna et al., 2012; Pine et al., 2011; Ruiz-Mercado 
et al., 2011). Further, the study of socioeconomic determinants of ICS adoption alone is inadequate 
for a self-sustaining, unsubsidized ICS market. Choice elicitation experiment studies on product-
specific attributes, that is stove characteristics, should complement socioeconomic findings to 
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determine what is most desired by the target market. Knowing which type of ICS should be sold at 
what price to maximize sustained adoption by rural populations in developing countries may 
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5. GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The studies in this thesis sought to provide microeconomic modelling results for the use of 
policy makers in the three overlapping food, energy and water (FEW) nexus sectors. Numerous 
factors contribute to Malawi’s stifling poverty levels. This thesis concentrated on three: the limited 
use of efficient irrigation technologies by smallholder farmers, the exhaustion of the agricultural 
budget by a poorly executed maize subsidy, and the rapid destruction of forest resources as a result 
of inefficient fuel use. Respectively, three policy interventions were explored in this thesis: the 
expansion of irrigation management transfer programs, the replacement of Malawi’s current 
fertilizer subsidy program with a conditional cash transfer program, and the promotion of 
sustained adoption of improved cookstoves. These three policy interventions are interrelated 
when viewed from the FEW nexus perspective. 
This final section summarizes the results of the studies, discusses the limitations of the 
studies, gives suggestions for future research, and provides policy recommendations.   
5.1 Summary of Results 
 Chapter 2 of this thesis was a study on the willingness of smallholder farmers to invest in 
community owned irrigation schemes. The hypothetical investments were contributions of both 
money and volunteer labor, for four different irrigation technologies. The study is well-suited to 
the FEW nexus perspective as the promotion of irrigation management transfer (IMT) programs 
has effects on all three nodes of the nexus. The expansion of irrigation may make a negative impact 
on water supply in the water sector, and the potential for hydropower in the energy sector (Rasul, 
2014). However, irrigation expansion can be expected to improve yields and thus security in the 
food sector (Bazilian et al., 2011). 
The uniqueness of this study is the main finding, that farmers are willing to contribute 
unpaid labor in addition to, or instead of, capital. IMT planners may use this information to develop 
individually tailored investment packages for IMT stakeholders. Additionally, household 
characteristics that were associated with a willingness to invest relatively more unpaid labor and 
money were a larger household labor endowment, a more educated main decision maker, a lesser 
amount of land under operation, a stronger social network, a higher perceived importance of 
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irrigation, and the location of the household at a higher elevation. These findings are important to 
future targeting and implementation of IMT programs. In producing models with only limited 
predictive value, this study confirmed that the best path to having water resources effectively 
managed at the local level is through an open and inclusive dialogue. The success of IMT, and thus 
the positive impacts on the nexus sectors, depends on clear communication of expectations among 
stakeholders. 
 Chapter 3 of this thesis was a study on the preferences of smallholder farmers for a 
conditional cash transfer (CCT) over a fertilizer subsidy coupon. The dominance of Malawi’s Farm 
Input Subsidy Program (FISP) over the agricultural budget means that a less costly, more efficient 
alternative, like a CCT program, would have wide-reaching effects in all three of the FEW nexus 
sectors. The FISP’s intense focus on maize cultivation crowds out opportunities for biofuel growth 
in the energy sector, and the contested success of the FISP has effects food stocks and security in 
the food sector (Dorward, Chirwa, Boughton, et al., 2008; Dorward, Chirwa, Kelly, et al., 2008). The 
conditionality of CCTs can be used to directly target certain sectors. In the case of this hypothetical 
CCT the cash would be provided on the condition of adoption of agroforestry techniques, providing 
benefits to the food sector through crop diversity, as well as indirect effects on the water and 
energy sectors. Because CCT recipients are free to spend the cash any way they choose, the CCT 
would impact all three sectors.  
 The FISP has been found in the literature to benefit the relatively better-off and politically 
connected households, rather than the economically and socially most vulnerable households 
(Chibwana, Fisher, Jumbe, Masters, & Shively, 2010; Chibwana, Fisher, & Shively, 2012; Dorward, 
Chirwa, Kelly, et al., 2008; Holden & Lunduka, 2012), and the results of this study support that. 
Although great care was taken to distinguish the hypothetical fertilizer coupon of the choice 
experiment from the current FISP coupons in circulation in Malawi, it is likely that respondents 
were biased by their experiences with the FISP. The regression models show that a preference for 
the CCT can in some cases be explained by a lower household net income, a higher elevation, and 
a female main agricultural decision maker. If a CCT is properly targeted and reaches the most 
vulnerable beneficiaries, the benefits to the nexus sectors can be fully realized.  
 Chapter 4 of this thesis was a study on the willingness of smallholder farmers to pay for two 
types of improved cookstove (ICS) and the socioeconomic traits that determine their willingness 
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to pay (WTP), to assist ICS program planners with targeting and pricing. The promotion of sustained 
ICS adoption is an excellent example of a FEW nexus intervention, given the strong effects on each 
of the nexus nodes. The fuel efficiency of ICS decreases the amount of biomass used for cooking, 
which slows deforestation and thus erosion, which has a positive effect on the energy and water 
sectors (García-Frapolli et al., 2010). The fuel efficiency means dietary diversity can improve with 
the inclusion of slow-cooking, protein-rich legumes (Nielsen et al., 2015). The high morbidity rates 
caused by reliance on biomass fuels for cooking will decline with sustained ICS adoption and proper 
use, resulting in human health improvements that will affect all three nodes of the nexus (Bensch 
& Peters, 2012; Hanna, Duflo, & Greenstone, 2012; Martin II, Glass, Balbus, & Collins, 2011). There 
will be further effects on all three sectors resulting from advancements in gender equality and 
climate change mitigation (Bensch & Peters, 2012; Hanna et al., 2012).    
 The study found four socioeconomic indicators to have explanatory power in models of 
WTP for the two types of ICS. Household dietary diversity is positively correlated with WTP for both 
the clay stove and the rocket stove. Fuel expenditures are negatively correlated with WTP for the 
clay stove. Annual net income per capita is positively correlated with WTP for the rocket stove. 
Cooking-related ailments are negatively correlated with WTP for the rocket stove. The WTP for an 
ICS of either type was generally low, as the respondents’ income levels were low and they have 
difficulty meeting their basic needs. The purchase of a stove with rather abstract benefits cannot 
be expected to be high on their priority list, which is why ICS promotion must be well planned and 
effective for all nexus outcomes of widespread ICS adoption to be achieved (Mobarak, Dwivedi, 
Bailis, Hildemann, & Miller, 2012).  
5.2 Study Limitations and Research Recommendations 
 Considering the nexus context, the main limitations of the studies contained in this thesis 
are that the analyses were performed at the microeconomic level. Macroeconomic modelling is 
needed to evaluate the synergies and trade-offs of nexus interventions, something that cannot be 
done with microeconomic modelling. For example, the findings in Chapter 2 indicate the extent to 
which smallholder farmers are interested in new irrigation schemes, but the microeconomic results 
cannot tell what effects irrigation expansion could have on the nexus. Irrigation expansion would 
almost certainly improve yields and food security for the smallholder farmers, but it cannot be 
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determined at the microeconomic level if the resulting increase in water use would have other 
consequences. Nor can it predict if those consequences would outweigh the benefits derived from 
higher yields. The microeconomic data could, however, be extrapolated to the national level and 
used in water models as estimates for irrigation expansion, and then used in an economy-wide 
model to determine effects on the food, water, and energy sectors. Microeconomic research can 
provide data and empirical evidence for use in macroeconomic frameworks, but without the wider 
perspective, household data can do little to evaluate impacts on all nexus sectors. It is therefore 
recommended that future studies be collaborative efforts between microeconomic and 
macroeconomic researchers, so that each may gain insight from the other, and provide more 
holistic study results to policy makers. 
The regression models in Chapter 2 could be improved with a larger sample size. Ideally, 
the expanded sample would include enough respondents in lowland areas, where bound basin 
schemes are feasible, for the models of willingness to invest in bound basin schemes to become 
statistically significant. Because the irrigation schemes were hypothetical, actual investments could 
not be observed, so the study was limited to the use of stated willingness to invest. Stated 
willingness to invest is not entirely reliable given the threat of hypothetical bias. However, the data 
shows reasonable and conservative willingness to invest levels. The investment levels reported in 
the study may also be inflated by the fact that the survey was conducted during the period 
immediately after harvest. Farmers had finished the majority of their hard labor for the season, 
had full grain stores, and had cash on hand from crop sales. Future research conducted during at 
different times throughout the year would account for this bias.  
 As in Chapter 2, the regression models in Chapter 3 would likely benefit from a larger 
sample size. The addition of observations could increase the predictive power of the models. 
Although great care was taken to highlight the hypothetical nature of both the CCT and the 
fertilizer coupon, it is likely that respondents were biased by their experience with the FISP. That 
created an imbalance in the experiment: comparing a hypothetical intervention with a known 
intervention. Future research may improve on this by actually offering a CCT for a period of time 
prior to the survey, so that respondents may gain firsthand experience and be better informed in 
their decision making.   
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The predictive power of the regression models in Chapter 4 could be improved by a larger 
sample size and the use of observed ICS adoption, rather than just stated WTP. Two important 
independent variables, education level and suffering from cooking related ailments, were 
hypothesized to be impact respondents’ WTP, but were statistically insignificant in the regression 
models. Other studies that observed ICS adoption found those same variables to be strong 
predictors (El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003; Jan, 2012; Pine et al., 2011). An 
interesting and valuable study objective would be to determine to what extent exactly observed 
adoption is a more reliable variable than stated WTP, as the latter is less costly and easier to collect 
in a household survey. Another weakness of the study is that respondents were not given the 
opportunity to experience the benefits of the ICS models firsthand, but rather based their stated 
WTPs on the presentation of the stoves in a group meeting. This likely lowered the reported WTP. 
In the literature, understanding of the advantages of ICS models and exposure to ICS promotional 
materials are found to be a strong positive factor in stove adoption (El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar 
Mohamed, 2003; Jan, 2012). Further, the study of socioeconomic determinants of ICS adoption 
alone is inadequate for a self-sustaining, unsubsidized ICS market. Choice elicitation experiment 
studies on product-specific attributes, that is stove characteristics, should complement 
socioeconomic findings to determine what is most desired by the target market. 
5.3 Policy Recommendations 
 Given the findings of the study in Chapter 2, IMT planners are encouraged to develop 
individually tailored investment packages for IMT stakeholders. Realistic investment agreements 
make IMT programs run smoothly, and allowing smallholder farmers to invest labor when capital 
is scarce would likely be an effective way of ensuring that investment promises are honored. 
Farmers that viewed irrigation to be important to crop yields, and those with strong social networks 
were generally willing to invest more in irrigation schemes. Both of those traits imply a vested 
interest and dedication to the running of a communal scheme, so IMT program planners would 
likely have long-term success engaging with such farmers. Regardless of the explanatory variables, 
IMT managers must err on the conservative side when devising a project’s financial plans as 
subsistence farmers cannot be expected to be reliable investors. Poor smallholder farmers often 
must take the short-term view of the future, deferring long-term goals to meet immediate needs. 
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Even the smallest investment in an irrigation scheme could be a hardship for a household. Further, 
their cash flows and labor availability are subject to the agricultural season. 
 The findings in Chapter 3 suggest that a CCT would be a good alternative to the FISP, 
especially from the FEW nexus perspective. The FISP has been found to benefit better-off, 
politically connected households more so than its intended targets (Chibwana et al., 2010; Chirwa, 
Matita, & Dorward, 2011; Dorward & Chirwa, 2013). The study in Chapter 3 confirmed this to a 
degree by showing that vulnerable households, including those with female main decision makers, 
those with the lowest incomes, and those that are geographically remote, were most interested in 
a CCT. Further, the conditionality of a CCT could be used to ameliorate deforestation, one of 
Malawi’s biggest challenges. It is recommended that policy makers consider replacing all of part of 
the FISP with a CCT. A well-targeted, transparent CCT program could place Malawi among other 
developing countries that have reaped the benefits of progressing from price interventions to 
income interventions. 
Several recommendations to policy makers can be made based on the findings from the 
study in Chapter 4. First, in order to maximize sustained ICS adoption rates, the stoves should be 
promoted heavily. As found in the literature, cooking demonstrations and promotional materials 
are crucial to ICS adoption rates (El Tayeb Muneer & Mukhtar Mohamed, 2003; Jan, 2012). Given 
the economic situation of subsistence farmers, the purchase of a stove with rather abstract 
benefits cannot be expected to be high on their priority list (Mobarak et al., 2012). Second, ICS 
adoption could become self-driven if ICS promoters identify and target early adopters and social 
leaders who can informally influence the perceptions of their community members (Rogers & 
Scott, 1997). Further, policy makers should not be misled by over-stated impact estimates based 
only on short-term adoption data and laboratory fuel tests, instead planning should be done with 
the aid of long-run impact evaluations (Bensch & Peters, 2013; Hanna et al., 2012; Pine et al., 2011; 
Ruiz-Mercado, Masera, Zamora, & Smith, 2011). The goal of ICS promotion should be sustained, 
proper stove use, not just dissemination (Pine et al., 2011; Ruiz-Mercado et al., 2011). 
 The evaluation of economic interventions from a nexus perspective is becoming 
increasingly common in the literature. It is time now for the nexus perspective to cross-over into 
the policy making realm and become the new framework standard through which development 
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decisions are made. With the paradigm shift will hopefully come alleviation of the pressure that 
the Earth’s resources are currently under.     
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Appendices A, B, and C pertain to Chapters 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Appendix D provides maps of 
the survey area, and Appendix E presents sections of the household questionnaire that are 
relevant to this thesis. 




Figure A1: Treadle pump 
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Figure A2: Motorized pump 
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Figure A3: Canal irrigation 
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Figure A4: Bound basin flooding 
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Table A1: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in construction of treadle pump 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 294 
    F( 12,   281) = 1.39 
    Prob > F = 0.1675 
    R-squared = 0.0423 
    Root MSE = 5422.8 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0013 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Construction of Treadle Pump Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 56.34989 135.5123 0.42 0.678  .0241391 
Percent male labor 2216.94 1694.535 1.31 0.192  .1105948 
Social network score 57.31926 47.09796 1.22 0.225  .0603789 
Net per capita income .0070706 .0106468 0.66 0.507  .0328832 
Per capita number of parcels 1471.479 653.0987 2.25 0.025  .1566062 
Per capita hectares of land -1113.409 582.6371 -1.91 0.057  -.1154993 
Average distance to market .6758012 4.524594 0.15 0.881  .0078159 
Elevation .4779094 1.189053 0.40 0.688  .0271189 
Gender of decision maker -8.400278 556.0754 -0.02 0.988  -.000731 
Education level of decision maker -206.5559 331.8154 -0.62 0.534  -.0354661 
Risk self-assessment score 109.038 78.68072 1.39 0.167  .073846 
Importance of irrigation 63.31441 178.6208 0.35 0.723  .0166603 
Constant -441.2838 1585.142 -0.28 0.781  . 
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Table A2: Regression results for willingness to invest unpaid labor in maintenance of treadle pump 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 292 
    F( 12,   279) = 1.95 
    Prob > F = 0.0291 
    R-squared = 0.0821 
    Root MSE = 197.67 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0426 
       
  Robust     
Unpaid Labor for Maintenance of Treadle Pump Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 4.591588 5.215409 0.88 0.379  .052962 
Percent male labor 129.9744 53.08557 2.45 0.015  .1730477 
Social network score -.5855461 2.022927 -0.29 0.772  -.016558 
Net per capita income .000653 .0006412 1.02 0.309  .0816777 
Per capita number of parcels 18.484 23.88894 0.77 0.440  .0529752 
Per capita hectares of land -53.11008 21.7234 -2.44 0.015  -.1483344 
Average distance to market -.1530552 .1735459 -0.88 0.379  -.0476201 
Elevation .0742865 .0294754 2.52 0.012  .1125664 
Gender of decision maker 48.48785 35.20289 1.38 0.169  .1135317 
Education level of decision maker 25.36929 16.41785 1.55 0.123  .1161052 
Risk self-assessment score 1.699674 3.414291 0.50 0.619  .0309772 
Importance of irrigation 9.527933 9.009247 1.06 0.291  .0675323 
Constant -66.01142 57.5998 -1.15 0.253  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A3: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in maintenance of treadle pump 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 294 
    F( 12,   281) = 1.92 
    Prob > F = 0.0319 
    R-squared = 0.0733 
    Root MSE = 5110.6 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0338 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Maintenance of Treadle Pump Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 20.29525 127.8225 0.16 0.874  .0090743 
Percent male labor 2118.267 1193.581 1.77 0.077  .1102946 
Social network score 126.5376 59.36793 2.13 0.034  .1391224 
Net per capita income .0147006 .0195462 0.75 0.453  .0713585 
Per capita number of parcels 847.7984 592.5908 1.43 0.154  .094176 
Per capita hectares of land -515.6546 498.0384 -1.04 0.301  -.0558311 
Average distance to market 3.091876 4.605171 0.67 0.503  .0373226 
Elevation -1.834005 1.534731 -1.20 0.233  -.1086226 
Gender of decision maker 402.4691 765.6019 0.53 0.600  .0365542 
Education level of decision maker 115.7188 309.2356 0.37 0.709  .0207382 
Risk self-assessment score -55.45927 71.24524 -0.78 0.437  -.0392027 
Importance of irrigation 408.917 215.1247 1.90 0.058  .112307 
Constant 1126.736 1871.988 0.60 0.548  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A4: Regression results for willingness to invest unpaid labor in management of treadle pump 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 294 
    F( 12,   281) = 1.36 
    Prob > F = 0.1873 
    R-squared = 0.0815 
    Root MSE = 168.02 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0423 
       
  Robust     
Unpaid Labor for Management of Treadle Pump Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 14.59723 9.028616 1.62 0.107  .1976409 
Percent male labor 7.96639 43.61834 0.18 0.855  .0125609 
Social network score -.2099661 1.657817 -0.13 0.899  -.0069906 
Net per capita income .0002484 .0003837 0.65 0.518  .0365085 
Per capita number of parcels 65.00531 41.55091 1.56 0.119  .2186668 
Per capita hectares of land -83.16281 41.79475 -1.99 0.048  -.272667 
Average distance to market .1268933 .1918229 0.66 0.509  .0463848 
Elevation .0483269 .0305947 1.58 0.115  .0866752 
Gender of decision maker -14.28477 23.3243 -0.61 0.541  -.0392884 
Education level of decision maker -4.58583 11.20296 -0.41 0.683  -.024887 
Risk self-assessment score 1.124894 2.945794 0.38 0.703  .0240791 
Importance of irrigation 2.657761 6.931481 0.38 0.702  .0221042 
Constant -3.392389 48.65759 -0.07 0.944  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A5: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in management of treadle pump 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 294 
    F( 12,   281) = 1.69 
    Prob > F = 0.0675 
    R-squared = 0.1083 
    Root MSE = 4921.2 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0702 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Management of Treadle Pump Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 54.39376 115.8782 0.47 0.639  .0247757 
Percent male labor 852.9671 845.1179 1.01 0.314  .0452442 
Social network score 39.5458 58.15286 0.68 0.497  .044293 
Net per capita income .051265 .0441513 1.16 0.247  .2535063 
Per capita number of parcels 650.7811 455.5343 1.43 0.154  .0736444 
Per capita hectares of land -948.6892 408.7901 -2.32 0.021  -.1046401 
Average distance to market 5.448552 4.394231 1.24 0.216  .0670022 
Elevation -1.500303 1.525248 -0.98 0.326  -.0905223 
Gender of decision maker -457.6377 630.0411 -0.73 0.468  -.0423432 
Education level of decision maker -257.8109 347.9267 -0.74 0.459  -.0470681 
Risk self-assessment score -68.57416 62.71635 -1.09 0.275  -.049381 
Importance of irrigation 236.7725 200.9504 1.18 0.240  .0662461 
Constant 2251.766 1877.546 1.20 0.231  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A6: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in construction of motor pump 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 296 
    F( 12,   283) = 1.65 
    Prob > F = 0.0768 
    R-squared = 0.0455 
    Root MSE = 7664.1 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0051 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Construction of Motorized Pump Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 72.06404 198.3338 0.36 0.717  .0217606 
Percent male labor 1243.741 1314.486 0.95 0.345  .0440139 
Social network score 70.34656 69.88028 1.01 0.315  .052543 
Net per capita income .0202475 .019019 1.06 0.288  .0644708 
Per capita number of parcels 1933.359 835.5662 2.31 0.021  .1444672 
Per capita hectares of land -1406.935 589.4891 -2.39 0.018  -.1027555 
Average distance to market 2.696614 6.742533 0.40 0.690  .021964 
Elevation -.2859998 1.530249 -0.19 0.852  -.011364 
Gender of decision maker -1278.143 820.7511 -1.56 0.121  -.0784164 
Education level of decision maker -311.496 581.3464 -0.54 0.593  -.0377637 
Risk self-assessment score 193.3152 114.1541 1.69 0.091  .0925521 
Importance of irrigation 25.55178 277.6523 0.09 0.927  .0047374 
Constant 1251.737 1974.94 0.63 0.527  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A7: Regression results for willingness to invest unpaid labor in maintenance of motor pump 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 294 
    F( 12,   281) = 1.63 
    Prob > F = 0.0841 
    R-squared = 0.0793 
    Root MSE = 221.3 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0400 
       
  Robust     
Unpaid Labor for Maintenance of Motorized Pump Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 14.65616 8.470287 1.73 0.085  .1509102 
Percent male labor 62.2489 61.97409 1.00 0.316  .0750067 
Social network score 1.344733 2.726317 0.49 0.622  .0340756 
Net per capita income .0007783 .0009354 0.83 0.406  .0845591 
Per capita number of parcels -24.00721 28.20837 -0.85 0.395  -.0610656 
Per capita hectares of land 4.103243 26.71276 0.15 0.878  .0102103 
Average distance to market -.2697977 .149869 -1.80 0.073  -.0748795 
Elevation .1068116 .0356389 3.00 0.003  .1437741 
Gender of decision maker 45.57091 27.86194 1.64 0.103  .0950254 
Education level of decision maker 12.15452 14.0882 0.86 0.389  .0497431 
Risk self-assessment score -5.149421 3.75715 -1.37 0.172  -.0840744 
Importance of irrigation -7.194971 8.689444 -0.83 0.408  -.0453613 
Constant -2.659764 60.23705 -0.04 0.965  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A8: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in maintenance of motor pump 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 296 
    F( 12,   283) = 1.43 
    Prob > F = 0.1496 
    R-squared = 0.0770 
    Root MSE = 6230.6 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0378 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Maintenance of Motorized Pump Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score -56.4454 141.3927 -0.40 0.690  -.0206175 
Percent male labor 1554.908 1583.072 0.98 0.327  .0665608 
Social network score 120.8672 66.64854 1.81 0.071  .1092031 
Net per capita income .0326301 .0245495 1.33 0.185  .1256798 
Per capita number of parcels 1659.853 1130.402 1.47 0.143  .150031 
Per capita hectares of land -1296.407 791.2756 -1.64 0.102  -.114532 
Average distance to market 10.41687 6.343375 1.64 0.102  .1026322 
Elevation -1.340819 1.562638 -0.86 0.392  -.0644451 
Gender of decision maker -456.2589 751.5758 -0.61 0.544  -.0338605 
Education level of decision maker 277.0109 443.6388 0.62 0.533  .0406231 
Risk self-assessment score 33.0848 84.66682 0.39 0.696  .0191604 
Importance of irrigation 400.7809 241.9708 1.66 0.099  .0898835 
Constant -60.25604 2023.477 -0.03 0.976  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A9: Regression results for willingness to invest unpaid labor in management of motor pump 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 296 
    F( 12,   283) = 1.94 
    Prob > F = 0.0300 
    R-squared = 0.0381 
    Root MSE = 226.28 
    Adjusted R-squared = -.0027 
       
  Robust     
Unpaid Labor for Management of Motorized Pump Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 3.719297 5.094277 0.73 0.466  .0381871 
Percent male labor 14.15709 43.68381 0.32 0.746  .0170348 
Social network score 2.675626 2.427304 1.10 0.271  .0679517 
Net per capita income .00082 .0006965 1.18 0.240  .0887815 
Per capita number of parcels 7.363125 26.11739 0.28 0.778  .0187078 
Per capita hectares of land -13.3448 21.09684 -0.63 0.528  -.0331395 
Average distance to market -.20405 .1481504 -1.38 0.170  -.0565108 
Elevation .0919735 .0360984 2.55 0.011  .1242597 
Gender of decision maker 20.56571 27.37984 0.75 0.453  .0429016 
Education level of decision maker -10.51361 14.67056 -0.72 0.474  -.0433387 
Risk self-assessment score -1.321935 3.689401 -0.36 0.720  -.0215196 
Importance of irrigation -3.408899 10.56418 -0.32 0.747  -.02149 
Constant -1.134133 64.79923 -0.02 0.986  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A10: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in management of motor pump 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 296 
    F( 12,   283) = 1.63 
    Prob > F = 0.0819 
    R-squared = 0.0710 
    Root MSE = 4694.6 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0316 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Management of Motorized Pump Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 29.68803 119.5209 0.25 0.804  .0144384 
Percent male labor 206.5779 797.7878 0.26 0.796  .0117741 
Social network score 80.35402 49.91244 1.61 0.109  .0966641 
Net per capita income .0214118 .0193822 1.10 0.270  .1098075 
Per capita number of parcels 230.2693 464.2723 0.50 0.620  .0277127 
Per capita hectares of land -665.4509 439.8355 -1.51 0.131  -.0782766 
Average distance to market 10.55237 5.172306 2.04 0.042  .1384289 
Elevation -1.62252 1.442142 -1.13 0.262  -.1038342 
Gender of decision maker -1055.881 611.0073 -1.73 0.085  -.1043344 
Education level of decision maker -186.5267 283.48 -0.66 0.511  -.0364207 
Risk self-assessment score -5.805982 65.54577 -0.09 0.929  -.0044769 
Importance of irrigation 250.2294 205.1111 1.22 0.223  .0747209 
Constant 2216.688 1635.798 1.36 0.176  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A11: Regression results for willingness to invest unpaid labor in construction of canal 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 210 
    F( 12,   197) = 2.83 
    Prob > F = 0.0013 
    R-squared = 0.0920 
    Root MSE = 8.9019 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0367 
       
  Robust     
Unpaid Labor for Construction of Canal Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score -.1663843 .248203 -0.67 0.503  -.0420731 
Percent male labor -1.045196 2.624132 -0.40 0.691  -.0310462 
Social network score -.0002594 .1045912 -0.00 0.998  -.000162 
Net per capita income -.0000291 .000018 -1.62 0.107  -.0773856 
Per capita number of parcels .5538338 1.630432 0.34 0.734  .0338661 
Per capita hectares of land -2.572869 1.281347 -2.01 0.046  -.1515848 
Average distance to market -.0035402 .00805 -0.44 0.661  -.025649 
Elevation .0010813 .0020097 0.54 0.591  .0393889 
Gender of decision maker -3.141405 1.447108 -2.17 0.031  -.1624614 
Education level of decision maker 1.372544 .6077691 2.26 0.025  .142801 
Risk self-assessment score -.1670616 .1738284 -0.96 0.338  -.0663802 
Importance of irrigation .8483898 .4815595 1.76 0.080  .1303175 
Constant 7.971355 3.207257 2.49 0.014  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A12: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in construction of canal 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 210 
    F( 12,   197) = 1.77 
    Prob > F = 0.0555 
    R-squared = 0.1084 
    Root MSE = 3340.4 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0541 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Construction of Canal Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 14.1865 104.6587 0.14 0.892  .0094731 
Percent male labor 1448.814 834.5698 1.74 0.084  .1136453 
Social network score 40.20776 43.59094 0.92 0.357  .0663262 
Net per capita income .0290422 .0251991 1.15 0.251  .203894 
Per capita number of parcels 452.7193 537.9424 0.84 0.401  .0731041 
Per capita hectares of land -153.6563 352.2457 -0.44 0.663  -.0239065 
Average distance to market .2329872 3.261911 0.07 0.943  .0044577 
Elevation -.0115748 .6458372 -0.02 0.986  -.0011135 
Gender of decision maker -587.1035 352.0299 -1.67 0.097  -.0801804 
Education level of decision maker 160.3155 240.7311 0.67 0.506  .0440461 
Risk self-assessment score 1.710131 58.67083 0.03 0.977  .0017944 
Importance of irrigation 2.069051 142.291 0.01 0.988  .0008393 
Constant 374.232 946.3583 0.40 0.693  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A13: Regression results for willingness to invest unpaid labor in maintenance of canal 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 210 
    F( 12,   197) = 2.31 
    Prob > F = 0.0087 
    R-squared = 0.1598 
    Root MSE = 225.88 
    Adjusted R-squared = .1086 
       
  Robust     
Unpaid Labor for Maintenance of Canal Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score -3.413569 5.420023 -0.63 0.530  -.0327228 
Percent male labor 134.7502 77.75156 1.73 0.085  .1517368 
Social network score 1.843416 3.528224 0.52 0.602  .0436537 
Net per capita income .0002072 .0005894 0.35 0.726  .0208799 
Per capita number of parcels 11.75526 28.83565 0.41 0.684  .0272501 
Per capita hectares of land -40.63048 23.02197 -1.76 0.079  -.0907487 
Average distance to market -.1267637 .2049075 -0.62 0.537  -.0348172 
Elevation .0371508 .0684055 0.54 0.588  .0513057 
Gender of decision maker 62.44826 35.29032 1.77 0.078  .1224326 
Education level of decision maker 85.91831 27.01439 3.18 0.002  .3388762 
Risk self-assessment score -1.360154 4.695945 -0.29 0.772  -.020488 
Importance of irrigation 8.160114 10.36099 0.79 0.432  .0475175 
Constant -57.16681 99.75083 -0.57 0.567  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A14: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in maintenance of canal 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 210 
    F( 12,   197) = 2.31 
    Prob > F = 0.0088 
    R-squared = 0.1905 
    Root MSE = 4232.8 
    Adjusted R-squared = .1412 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Maintenance of Canal Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score -156.4264 116.908 -1.34 0.182  -.0785455 
Percent male labor 3145.577 1512.549 2.08 0.039  .1855371 
Social network score 133.3535 59.78674 2.23 0.027  .1654136 
Net per capita income .0312723 .0237356 1.32 0.189  .1650921 
Per capita number of parcels 1044.609 1037.345 1.01 0.315  .1268406 
Per capita hectares of land -234.3916 719.3383 -0.33 0.745  -.027422 
Average distance to market 2.524929 3.665524 0.69 0.492  .036326 
Elevation 1.031895 .8426715 1.22 0.222  .0746453 
Gender of decision maker 674.5637 666.0704 1.01 0.312  .0692737 
Education level of decision maker 1001.969 413.1862 2.42 0.016  .2070039 
Risk self-assessment score -72.47086 75.92854 -0.95 0.341  -.0571801 
Importance of irrigation 393.6027 195.9753 2.01 0.046  .1200562 
Constant -3846.187 1737.245 -2.21 0.028  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A15: Regression results for willingness to invest unpaid labor in management of canal  
Linear regression    Number of obs = 210 
    F( 12,   197) = 2.12 
    Prob > F = 0.0171 
    R-squared = 0.0944 
    Root MSE = 172.3 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0392 
       
  Robust     
Unpaid Labor for Management of Canal Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 4.975154 6.374136 0.78 0.436  .0649111 
Percent male labor 19.99588 52.27916 0.38 0.703  .0306459 
Social network score 5.474921 2.695045 2.03 0.044  .17646 
Net per capita income -8.29e-06 .0003898 -0.02 0.983  -.0011375 
Per capita number of parcels 15.3011 23.55754 0.65 0.517  .0482757 
Per capita hectares of land -37.62951 19.22488 -1.96 0.052  -.1143898 
Average distance to market -.3116577 .1412701 -2.21 0.029  -.1165058 
Elevation .0608471 .0371402 1.64 0.103  .114369 
Gender of decision maker 16.46496 23.52597 0.70 0.485  .0439347 
Education level of decision maker 34.81138 14.92026 2.33 0.021  .1868732 
Risk self-assessment score -2.087272 3.455223 -0.60 0.546  -.0427919 
Importance of irrigation -.295826 9.614887 -0.03 0.975  -.0023446 
Constant -15.0841 69.32259 -0.22 0.828  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A16: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in management of canal 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 210 
    F( 12,   197) = 2.30 
    Prob > F = 0.0092 
    R-squared = 0.1776 
    Root MSE = 2795.1 
    Adjusted R-squared = .1275 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Management of Canal Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score -168.3248 92.69032 -1.82 0.071  -.1290066 
Percent male labor 1392.076 814.779 1.71 0.089  .1253275 
Social network score 152.0105 42.20354 3.60 0.000  .2878016 
Net per capita income .0106876 .0089055 1.20 0.232  .086119 
Per capita number of parcels -9.395553 332.6411 -0.03 0.977  -.0017413 
Per capita hectares of land 220.3746 372.6664 0.59 0.555  .0393524 
Average distance to market 3.746218 2.964625 1.26 0.208  .0822649 
Elevation .3154716 .5159968 0.61 0.542  .0348321 
Gender of decision maker -176.2002 406.7324 -0.43 0.665  -.0276188 
Education level of decision maker 537.5102 204.8925 2.62 0.009  .1694977 
Risk self-assessment score -33.52706 59.28152 -0.57 0.572  -.0403766 
Importance of irrigation 237.1858 145.1692 1.63 0.104  .1104252 
Constant -1644.489 1054.811 -1.56 0.121  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A17: Regression results for willingness to invest unpaid labor in construction of bound basin 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 189 
    F( 12,   176) = 1.50 
    Prob > F = 0.1291 
    R-squared = 0.0672 
    Root MSE = 7.0861 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0036 
       
  Robust     
Unpaid Labor for Construction of Bound Basin Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score -.0152438 .2431237 -0.06 0.950  -.0047277 
Percent male labor -1.477669 1.835042 -0.81 0.422  -.0556831 
Social network score .012757 .0915086 0.14 0.889  .0104878 
Net per capita income -.0000157 .0000159 -0.99 0.325  -.0569559 
Per capita number of parcels 1.338432 1.700374 0.79 0.432  .1011638 
Per capita hectares of land -1.684563 1.227463 -1.37 0.172  -.1272377 
Average distance to market -.0031418 .0065164 -0.48 0.630  -.0294068 
Elevation -.0013376 .0017494 -0.76 0.446  -.061404 
Gender of decision maker .0458331 1.115398 0.04 0.967  .002956 
Education level of decision maker .6714647 .5682373 1.18 0.239  .0902932 
Risk self-assessment score -.1089719 .1522731 -0.72 0.475  -.0545717 
Importance of irrigation .9378896 .4000972 2.34 0.020  .1793134 
Constant 4.950282 2.747947 1.80 0.073  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A18: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in construction of bound basin 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 189 
    F( 12,   176) = 0.66 
    Prob > F = 0.7922 
    R-squared = 0.0412 
    Root MSE = 2900.8 
    Adjusted R-squared = -.0242 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Construction of Bound Basin Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 100.8337 133.2947 0.76 0.450  .0774464 
Percent male labor 598.5957 643.0078 0.93 0.353  .0558627 
Social network score -.0987615 44.27096 -0.00 0.998  -.0002011 
Net per capita income .0032996 .0111605 0.30 0.768  .0297126 
Per capita number of parcels 88.77772 401.4543 0.22 0.825  .0166178 
Per capita hectares of land -91.28287 301.1713 -0.30 0.762  -.017075 
Average distance to market 2.66456 2.99322 0.89 0.375  .0617635 
Elevation -.7639462 .8429395 -0.91 0.366  -.0868501 
Gender of decision maker -404.8802 310.3875 -1.30 0.194  -.0646688 
Education level of decision maker 146.656 193.5516 0.76 0.450  .0488398 
Risk self-assessment score 30.73526 60.03093 0.51 0.609  .0381182 
Importance of irrigation -23.97641 145.9377 -0.16 0.870  -.0113524 
Constant 1467.978 1290.904 1.14 0.257  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A19: Regression results for willingness to invest unpaid labor in maintenance of bound basin 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 189 
    F( 12,   176) = 0.77 
    Prob > F = 0.6828 
    R-squared = 0.0727 
    Root MSE = 266.07 
    Adjusted R-squared = .0094 
       
  Robust     
Unpaid Labor for Maintenance of Bound Basin Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score -.4446352 6.950686 -0.06 0.949  -.0036617 
Percent male labor 58.03683 46.30807 1.25 0.212  .0580736 
Social network score -3.766554 3.055993 -1.23 0.219  -.0822257 
Net per capita income .0004133 .000732 0.56 0.573  .0399029 
Per capita number of parcels 44.07038 44.71246 0.99 0.326  .0884513 
Per capita hectares of land -81.64153 43.12433 -1.89 0.060  -.1637451 
Average distance to market -.1590125 .3009259 -0.53 0.598  -.0395207 
Elevation -.0433432 .082632 -0.52 0.601  -.0528342 
Gender of decision maker -13.97676 34.36036 -0.41 0.685  -.0239366 
Education level of decision maker 38.19766 24.14566 1.58 0.115  .1363947 
Risk self-assessment score -4.713115 5.875835 -0.80 0.424  -.0626744 
Importance of irrigation 7.558906 13.93863 0.54 0.588  .038375 
Constant 156.7251 112.9751 1.39 0.167  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A20: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in maintenance of bound basin 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 189 
    F( 12,   176) = 0.79 
    Prob > F = 0.6557 
    R-squared = 0.0617 
    Root MSE = 3880.8 
    Adjusted R-squared = -.0022 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Maintenance of Bound Basin Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 115.6573 182.5366 0.63 0.527  .0656866 
Percent male labor 818.2537 1439.358 0.57 0.570  .0564656 
Social network score 40.80491 49.18381 0.83 0.408  .0614323 
Net per capita income .0127722 .0175052 0.73 0.467  .0850464 
Per capita number of parcels 815.9171 970.8929 0.84 0.402  .112934 
Per capita hectares of land -283.2288 643.7044 -0.44 0.660  -.0391756 
Average distance to market 3.958126 3.036443 1.30 0.194  .0678429 
Elevation -.9306602 1.12228 -0.83 0.408  -.078236 
Gender of decision maker 288.9749 622.9953 0.46 0.643  .03413 
Education level of decision maker 344.6073 333.3283 1.03 0.303  .0848606 
Risk self-assessment score -93.4669 83.01127 -1.13 0.262  -.0857158 
Importance of irrigation 17.34108 162.2843 0.11 0.915  .0060714 
Constant 935.5619 2152.068 0.43 0.664  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A21: Regression results for willingness to invest unpaid labor in management of bound basin 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 189 
    F( 12,   176) = 0.39 
    Prob > F = 0.9655 
    R-squared = 0.0303 
    Root MSE = 199.08 
    Adjusted R-squared = -.0358 
       
  Robust     
Unpaid Labor for Management of Bound Basin Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 4.594046 5.575786 0.82 0.411  .0517064 
Percent male labor 21.20129 33.59356 0.63 0.529  .0289937 
Social network score -1.83656 2.624161 -0.70 0.485  -.0547942 
Net per capita income -.0000641 .0004007 -0.16 0.873  -.0084612 
Per capita number of parcels 40.01006 37.17111 1.08 0.283  .1097471 
Per capita hectares of land -48.83125 28.65924 -1.70 0.090  -.1338509 
Average distance to market -.2783776 .2643351 -1.05 0.294  -.0945571 
Elevation .0003778 .0458656 0.01 0.993  .0006294 
Gender of decision maker -5.6046 27.19813 -0.21 0.837  -.013118 
Education level of decision maker 9.177859 15.54042 0.59 0.556  .0447887 
Risk self-assessment score -.7756902 4.097247 -0.19 0.850  -.0140973 
Importance of irrigation 3.134249 11.25019 0.28 0.781  .0217465 
Constant 86.70935 80.13626 1.08 0.281  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 
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Table A22: Regression results for willingness to invest capital in management of bound basin 
Linear regression    Number of obs = 189 
    F( 12,   176) = 1.20 
    Prob > F = 0.2859 
    R-squared = 0.0520 
    Root MSE = 1995.8 
    Adjusted R-squared = -.0126 
       
  Robust     
Capital for Management of Bound Basin Coefficient Std. Err. t P>t  Beta 
Credit access score 45.8969 77.28518 0.59 0.553  .0509474 
Percent male labor 341.4745 431.018 0.79 0.429  .0460563 
Social network score 44.68074 35.6816 1.25 0.212  .1314738 
Net per capita income .0047322 .0056297 0.84 0.402  .0615871 
Per capita number of parcels 209.7132 284.5581 0.74 0.462  .0567334 
Per capita hectares of land -264.9078 213.1769 -1.24 0.216  -.0716156 
Average distance to market 2.843845 2.373149 1.20 0.232  .0952698 
Elevation -.1009511 .4782684 -0.21 0.833  -.0165868 
Gender of decision maker -155.9567 345.851 -0.45 0.653  -.0360011 
Education level of decision maker 78.54601 135.1736 0.58 0.562  .0378042 
Risk self-assessment score -14.05217 43.43119 -0.32 0.747  -.0251873 
Importance of irrigation -33.03485 114.7209 -0.29 0.774  -.0226057 
Constant 437.0539 988.5372 0.44 0.659  . 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output 




Table B1: Logistic Regression Results for Choice Set 4 
Logistic regression    Number of obs = 300 
    LR chi2(3) = 4.33 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.2282 
Log likelihood = -177.57819   Pseudo R2 = 0.0120 
       
Choice Set 4 Odds Ratio St. Err. z P>|z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Net per capita income 1.000173 .000593 0.29 0.770 .9990116 1.001336 
Elevation 1.000737 .0004551 1.62 0.105 .9998453 1.001629 
Gender of decision maker 1.452345 .3960071 1.37 0.171 .8510892 2.478362 
Constant .1447721 .0853718 -3.28 0.001 .0455757 .4598716 
Source: Own survey, 2014, Stata output     
 
Table B2: Logistic Regression Results for Choice Set 6 
Logistic regression    Number of obs = 300 
    LR chi2(3) = 1.30 
    Prob > chi2 = 0.7296 
Log likelihood = -207.28841   Pseudo R2 = 0.0031 
       
Choice Set 6 Odds Ratio St. Err. z P>|z| 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Net per capita income .9998764 .0005303 -0.23 0.816 .9988376 1.000916 
Elevation 1.00041 .000386 1.06 0.288 .9996535 1.001167 
Gender of decision maker .9947646 .248815 -0.02 0.983 .6092759 1.624152 
Constant .6173254 .3042734 -0.98 0.328 .2349446 1.622044 











Figure C1: Traditional Three-Stone Stove 
 
Photo by: Ripple Africa 
 
Figure C2: Clay Stove (Chitetezo Mbaula) 
Photo by: Stefan Meyer 
 
Figure C3: Rocket Stove 
 








Figure D1: Dedza District, geographical context 
 
Source: Google Earth 
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Figure D2: Dedza District, political map 
(following page) 
Source: G.A. Naliya, NSO Zomba 
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Figure D3: Dedza District, satellite image with sampled villages (grey line is district boundary) 
 
Source: Google Earth 




E1: The Cook Stove Choice Experiment (Mayesero osankha Mbaula) 
This morning during the group meeting, we discussed two types of improved cook stoves: the 
chitetezo mbaula (made of clay), and the rocket stove (made of metal).  Please assume that you 
have access to both types of stoves and answer the following questions about your stove 
preferences.  For each question there are only two alternatives, if you do not like either 
alternative, please choose the one that you dislike least.   Pa msonkhano wathu kummawa kuja, 
tinakambiranako za mitundu iwiri ya mbaula zamakono: mbaula ya chitetezo (yadothi) ndi 
mbaula ya roketi (yachitsulo). Pano, ndikufuna ndikufunsenkoni zamakonda anu pa mbaula 
zamakonozi, titati tiyerekeze kuti inu muli ndi mwayi oti mutha kupeza mbaulazi. Pa chisankho 
chilichonse, pali njira ziwiri zoti musankhepo koma ngati simungazikonde njira zonsezi, 
mundiuzebe chisankho chimene mutha kuchikondako pang’ono. 
Choice Set 
(Zisankho) 
Alternative 1 (Njira 
yoyamba) (0=did not 
select, 1=selected) 
Alternative 2 (Njira 
yachiwiri) (0=did not 
select, 1=selected)           
Block 1 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
8     
9     
Block 2 
10     
11     
12     
13     
14     
15     
16   
Block 3 
17     
18     
19     
20     
21     
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22   
23   
24   
 
E2: The Subsidy Policy Preference CE 
This morning during the group meeting, we discussed two hypothetical types of subsidy: a cash payment 
(which your HH may spend on any items that it chooses), and a fertilizer subsidy (in the form of NPK 
coupons).  Both of these are conditional upon adoption of agroforestry practices, for example planting 
tephrosia or msangu among your crops.  Please answer the following questions about your subsidy 
preferences.  For each question there are only two alternatives, if you do not like either alternative, 
please choose the one that you dislike least.  Pa msonkhano wathu kummawa kuja, tinakambiranakonso 
za mitundu iwiri ya sabuside koma yongoganizira; sabuside ya kulandira ndalama (zomwe banja lanu 
litha kugwiritsa ntchito pa china chilichonse chomwe mungakonde) ndi sabuside ya feteleza (yolandira 
ma kuponi a feteleza wa chitowe). Kumbukirani kuti ma sabuside onsewa ndi otheka pokhapokha 
mutadzala ndi kusamalira mitengo yobwerezeretsa chonde m’nthaka, monga tephrosia, kesha ndi 
msangu, mmunda mwanu. Pano ndikufuna ndikufunsenkoni za zisankho zomwe mngapange pa ma 
sabuside amenewa. Pa funso lililonse, pali njira ziwiri zoti musankhepo koma ngati simungazikonde 




yoyamba) (0=did not 
select, 1=selected) 
Alternative 2 (Njira 
yachiwiri) (0=did not 
select, 1=selected) 
1     
2     
3     
4     
5     
6     
7     
 
If the respondent preferred Alternative 2 (fertilizer) in every choice set, ask the following (ngati omwe 
mukucheza nawo asankha njira yachiwiri (feteleza) pa mafunso onse, afunseni funso lotsatirali: 
8 Why do you prefer a fertilizer subsidy over a cash transfer even when 
the cash transfer is worth significantly more?8 (list reasons in order, 
most important first) Nchifukwa ninji inu mwasankha sabuside ya 
feteleza osati kulandira ndalama ingakhale mu mafunso amene 
ndalama zinali zochulukirapo?8 (perekani zifukwa mwandondomeko, 
kuyambira chofunikira kwambiri) 
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E3: Land Use and Ownership (Kagwiritsidwe ntchito ka malo ndi umwini wa malowo) 
I will now ask about your land parcels from agricultural year 2012/2013 (which is defined as November 2012 to October 2013) and ownership status.  
(Mugawo ili ndikufuna tichezeko zokhuzana ndi malo amene munagwiritsa ntchito mu chaka cha ulimi cha 2012/2013 (kuyambira Novembala, 2012 
kufikira Okotobala, 2013) komanso zaumwini wamalowo). 
A parcel is a contiguous piece of land that has a common owner, land rights and tenure status.   
 

















1 Parcel Name (Dzina la malo)               
2 What is the area of the parcel (Malowo ndi akulu bwanji)? (acres)        
3 What is this parcel used for?3 (cropland, forest land, etc. If it is 
used by another household please code accordingly: leased out, 
share cropped out, etc.) (Kodi malowa munawagwiritsa 
ntchito yanji?) 
     
  
4 How was this parcel acquired (Kodi malowa munawapeza 
bwanji)?4  
          
    
5 What year will this agreement end (Mgwirizano wamalowa 
uzatha chaka chanji)? (years) (-777=I don’t know, -999=will 
have forever) (if -999>>7) 
          
    
6 If not forever, why not (Nchifukwa ninji mgwirizanowu 
siwamuyaya)?6 
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Parcel #1 Parcel #2 Parcel #3 Parcel #4 Parcel #5 Parcel #6 
Parcel 
#7 
 What was the distance in walking minutes from the parcel 
to (Munkayenda nthawi yaitali bwanji (min) kuchokera ku 
malowa kufika ku ________: 
     
  
7 Nearest all-weather road (passable by vehicle all year 
round) Msewu omwe umadutsika ndi galimoto munyengo 
zonse? 
          
    
8 Nearest seasonal road (passable by vehicle part of the year) 
Msewu omwe sumadutsika ndi galimoto munyengo ina 
yapachaka? 
     
  
9 Nearest Market (where you could sell any crops) Msika 
wapafupi (omwe munakatha kukagulitsako mbewu zina 
zilizonse)? 
          
    
10 The closest natural water source for irrigation/ watering 
that you apply to this parcel during the dry season (river, 
lake, well, natural spring, NOT water pump or canal or bore 
hole or other man-made water source)? Malo apafupi 
achilengedwe omwe mumakapezako  madzi ogwiritsa 
ntchito paulimi othilira pamalowa munyengo yachilimwe 
(monga nyanja, m’tsinje, chitsime, kasupe koma osati 
pampu, m’jigo kapena njira zina zopangidwa ndi munthu) 
          
    
11 The closest natural water source for irrigation that you 
apply to this parcel during the rainy season (river, lake, 
well, natural spring, NOT water pump or canal or bore hole 
or other man-made water source)?  Malo apafupi 
achilengedwe omwe mumakapezako  madzi ogwiritsa 
ntchito paulimi othilira pamalowa munyengo yadzinja 
(monga nyanja, m’tsinje, chitsime, kasupe koma osati 
pampu, m’jigo kapena njira zina zopangidwa ndi munthu) 
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E4: Cropland Management Practices (Njira zogwiritsa ntchito ndi kusamalira malo olima) 
A plot is a contiguous piece of land in a parcel that has the same cropping system or land use. This means a parcel could also be a plot if it has the 
same cropping system or land use throughout.  
E4.1: Plot Level Land Management and Labor Input 
The following questions refer to your plots in the 2012/2013 agricultural year.  (Mafunso otsatirawa akutengera zigawo zomwe zinalimidwa mu 
chaka cha ulimi cha 2012/2013) 







Which crops were grown 
on this plot 
(Munadzalapo mbewu 
zanji pachigawochi)?1 
(one crop per row) 
How much of this crop was 
harvested from this plot in 
2012/2013 (Munakolorapo 
mbewu yochuluka bwanji 






How much of this crop from 
this plot was sold in 
2012/2013? (Pa zomwe 
munakolora pa chigawochi, 
ndi mbeu yochuluka bwanji 
yomwe munagulitsa mu chaka 





How much money did you 
receive for the amount of 
crop that was sold (Pazomwe 
munagulitsazo, munapezapo 
ndalama zochuluka bwanji)? 
(kwacha) 
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What was the total area 
of the plot (Chigawochi 
chinali chachikulu 
bwanji)? (acres) 
How many labor days were hired in total in 2012/2013 for 
work on this plot? (prompt respondent with land 
preparation, planting, weeding, fertilizer application, harvest 
activities) (Ndi masiku ochuluka bwanji omwe aganyu 
anagwirapo ntchito pa chigawochimu chaka cha 2012/2013? 
(if “0”>>10) 
How much did you pay in total per year for 
hired labor for this plot (Munawalipira 
ndalama zingati (zonse pa chaka) aganyu 
amene anagwira ntchito pachigawochi)? 
kwacha In-kind (kwacha value) 
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
            




E4.2: Seeds, Irrigation and Agrochemicals (Mbewu, Ulimi wamthilira ndi Mankhwala a mbewu) 







How important is 
access to irrigation 
technology for 
obtaining output 





mupeze zokolora pa 
chigawochi? 
What share (%) of the 
plot was irrigated? (if 
0>>17) 
(Ndi malo aakulu 




Which irrigation technologies 
were used on this plot? 12 (list 
top three, most important 




How many times per month was 
this plot irrigated by each 
technology during the dry 
season (Munyengo yachilimwe, 
munathiririra kangati pamwezi 
pogwiritsa ntchito njira [iyi] ya 
ulimi wamthilira)? 
How many times per 
month was this plot 
irrigated by each 





ntchito njira [iyi] ya 
ulimi wamthilira)? 
 
1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 
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  15 16 17 
Parcel # Plot # 
If canal irrigation is used (if not>>17), what is 
the distance in walking minutes from the plot to 
the part of the canal that you use during the 
dry season (Ngati amagwiritsa ntchito 
ngalande), mumayenda mphindi zingati 
kuchoka kuchigawochi kukafika pa ngalande 
yomwe mumagwiritsa ntchito pa ulimi othilira 
mu nyengo ya chilimwe? 
If canal irrigation is used, what is the distance 
in walking minutes from the plot to the part of 
the canal that you use during the rainy season 
(Ngati amagwiritsa ntchito ngalande), 
mumayenda mphindi zingati kuchoka 
kuchigawochi kukafika pa ngalande yomwe 
mumagwiritsa ntchito pa ulimi othilira mu 
nyengo ya dzinja? 
Which type of chemical 
fertilizer did you apply to 
this plot (if more than one, 
separate by comma) 
(Munathira feteleza wanji 
pa chigawochi?)17 
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How much chemical fertilizer 
did you apply to this plot? 
(Munathirapo feteleza wochuluka 
bwanji pa chigawochi)? 
What is the total cost of all purchased 
agrochemicals (excluding fertilizer) that you 
applied to this plot? (kwacha)  
Munaononga ndalama zochuluka bwanji 
(zonse pamodzi) kugulira mankhwala ena 
(kupatula feteleza) omwe munathira pa 
chigawochi? 
What is the total cost of all purchased other 
inputs that you applied to this plot? (kwacha) 
Munaononga ndalama zochuluka bwanji 
(zonse pamodzi) kugulira zipangizo zina 
zaulimi zomwe munagwiritsa ntchito pa 
chigawochi? 
Amount Unit3 
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E4.3: Agroforestry, Soil Fertility Management, Conservation Agriculture (Kudzala mitengo yobwezeretsa chonde m’nthaka, kasamalidwe 
ka chonde m'nthaka, ulimi wa mtaya khasu) 
  
Did you practice ___ on this plot in 2012/2013? (0=no, 1=yes) (Kodi munadzalako/munathirako ______ mu chaka chaulimi 
cha 2012/2013? 
































































                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          
                          




Did you practice ___ on this plot in 2012/2013? (kodi munadzalako/munapangako ______ mu chaka chaulimi cha 2012/2013?) 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
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E4.4: Cultivation, Harvest and Transport Tools/Machinery (Zida zogwiritsa ntchito; polima, pokolola ndi kunyamula zokolola) 
  42 43 
Parcel (Malo) # Plot (Chigawo) # 
What was the total cost per season to hire tools 
used for cultivation and harvest (Munalipira 
ndalama zochuluka bwanji popanga hayala 
chipangizochi pachaka)? (kwacha) 
What was the total cost per season to hire tools used for 
transport (from field to home or storage area to market) 
these (Munalipira ndalama zochuluka bwanji popanga 
hayala chipangizochi pachaka)? (kwacha) 
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E5: Input Access (Kupezeka kwa zipangizo zina ndi zina zogwiritsa ntchito paulimi) 
Please tell me about your access to inputs (Mu gawo ili, ndikufuna tichezeko zokhudzana ndi mmene mumapezera zipangizo zina ndi zina zogwiritsa 
ntchito paulimi). 
 
  FISP inputs (Zipangizo zaulimi za sabuside (zotsika mtengo) 
 





(urea) ( Feteleza 
wa sabuside wa  
yureya) 
FISP maize seeds 
(Mbewu ya chimanga 
ya sabuside)  
 





1 Which FISP coupons were you eligible for in agricultural 
year 2012/2013 (Kodi inu munali ndi zokuyenerezani 
kulandira nawo ma kuponi a feteleza ndi mbewu mu 
chaka cha 2012/2013)? (0=not eligible, 1=eligible, 2=not 
sure)  
    
2 How much subsidized input did you get with your share 
of the coupon (Munakwanitsa kupeza feteleza/mbewu za 
sabuside zochuluka bwanji pogwiritsa ntchito kuponi 
yanu)? (kg) 
    
3 Did you get the subsidized input in the full amount 
allowed by your share of the coupon (Kodi munapeza 
feteleza/ mbewu yokwanira monga mwa mlingo umene 
mumayenera kuti mupeze pogwiritsa ntchito kuponi 
yanu)? (0=no (I got less than expected)? (0=no (I got less 
than expected), 1=yes) 
    
4 Did you pay anyone, either in cash or in-kind, to obtain 
an input coupon for this input (Kodi munalipirako 
aliyense kuti mupeze kuponi ya chipangizo cha ulimichi)? 
(0=no, 1=yes) (if “0”>>6) 
    
  FISP NPK FISP urea FISP maize seed FISP legume seed 
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5 If yes, how much did you pay (Ngati munalipira, 
munalipira ndalama zingati)? (kwacha and/or in-kind 
kwacha value) 
    
6 Did you use a coupon to buy the full amount of the input 
that you needed (Kodi munakwanitsa kupeza mlingo wa 
feteleza/mbewu imene imafunika pa ulimi wanu 
pogwiritsa ntchito kuponi yanu)? (0=no, 1=yes, 2=both 
with and without coupon)               
    
7 What price per kg did you pay with the subsidy coupon 
(Kodi munalipira ndalama zingati pa kilogalamu pogula 
feteleza/mbewu zotsika mtengo)? (kwacha) (-999=not 
sure) 
    
8 If you hadn’t used the coupon, what would have been 
the price per kg at the time when you used the coupon 
(Mukanakhala kuti simunagwiritse kuponi, mtengo wa 
feteleza/mbewuyi pa kilogalamu pamsika unali ndalama 
zingati)? (kwacha per kg) (-777=don’t know) 
    
9 What did you do with the subsidized input? (1=used on 
own farm, 2=shared with other farmer(s) for free, 3=sold 
it) (Kodi munapanga nacho chani chipangizo cha ulimi 
chotsika mtengo chomwe munapeza) 
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E6: Non-Crop Income (Ndalama zopezeka kuchokera ku ulimi wa ziweto) 
Now I will ask you about livestock and livestock products that you sold in agricultural year 2012/2013. Pano tichezako za ziweto ndi zinthu zochokera 
ku ziweto zomwe munagulitsa mu chaka cha ulimi cha 2012/2013. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 











mu chaka cha 
2012/2013? 
Did your HH sell 
products (meat, 
milk, eggs, skins, 
etc.) from (these 
animals) in 
2012/2013? (0=no, 
1=yes, if no>>4) 
(Kodi munagulitsa 
zinthu izi (nyama, 
mkaka, mazira, 
zikumba ndi zina 
zilizonse zochokera 
ku ziwetozi) mu 
chaka cha 
2012/2013? 
What was the total 
revenue (not 
accounting for costs 
incurred) that your HH 
received for sales of 
products from (these 
animals) in 2012/2013? 
(kwacha) (Kodi 
munapeza ndalama 




zinthu zochokera ku 
ziwetozi mu chaka cha 
2012/2013? 
How many of 
(these live 
animals) did 








What was the total 
revenue (not 
accounting for costs 
incurred) that your HH 
received for sales of 




bwanji zonse pamodzi 
(osawerengara zimene 
munaononga) 
pogulitsa ziwetozi mu 
chaka cha 2012/2013? 










bwanji zonse pamodzi 
(pogulira; ziwetozi, 
katemera, chakudya 
ndikumanga khola la 




      
Goats  
(mbuzi) 
      
Sheep 
(nkhosa) 
      





       
Pigs 
(nkhumba) 
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  7 8 9 
  
Did your HH earn 
income (cash or in-
kind) from (source) 
in 2012/2013? 
(0=no, 1=yes, if 





zina kuchokera ku 
______ mu chaka 
cha 2012/2013? 
What was the total 
revenue (not 












mu chaka cha 
2012/2013? 












______ mu chaka 
cha 2012/2013)? 
Forest/agroforestry products (like 
wood, charcoal, medicinal plants, 
etc.) (Nkhalango ndi zinthu zina 
zochokera ku mitengo yobwezeretsa 
chonde mthaka) (monga: nkhuni, 
matabwa, makala, mankhwala a 
zitsamba ndi zina zotero)       
Fishery/acquaculture products 
(Nsomba ndi zinthu zina za mmadzi)       
Wildlife products (mice, bush meat, 
wild skins, etc.) (nyama za mtchire 
monga mbewa, insa, gwape, ndi 
zikumba za nyam za mtchire)       
Agricultural wage (maganyu a 
kumunda)       
Non-agricultural wage (maganyu 
ena osakhala a kumunda)       
Non-agricultural business (shops, 
handicrafts, etc.)  (Bizinesi osakhala 
ya ulimi (monga mashopu, ntchito 
zamanja)       
Government aid (Chithandizo 
chochokera ku boma)       
Non-governmental aid (Chithandizo 
china chosakhala chochokera ku 
boma)       
Retirement payment  (Malipiro 
opumira pantchito)       
Remittances/gifts (Mphatso)       
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Mutual support groups (local 
community) (Magulu ena 
othandizana a mmudzi) 
Other source of income, please 
specify (Njira zina zopezera 
ndalama) 
__________________________       
Other source of income, please 
specify (Njira zina zopezera 
ndalama) 
__________________________       
 
E7: Hypothetical Cash Transfer Program (Pologalamu yongoganizira yolandira ndalama kuchokera ku 
boma) 
Now we ask for your thoughts on a different hypothetical cash payment from the government. If your 
HH were to receive a one-time cash transfer of 42,000.00 Kwacha from the government next week, what 
would you do with this money? (Pano ndikufuna ndimveko maganizo anu pa nkhani inanso 
yongoganizira yolandira ndalama kuchoka ku boma. Mongoganizira, atati khomo lanu lilandire ndalama 
yokwana 42, 000 Kwacha mwa kamodzi kuchokera ku boma, inu ndalama imeneyi mungapangire chani?) 
(Enumerator note: let the respondent tell you what they would spend, do not prompt them with the 
categories, then once they have told you the items, categorize them yourself) 
 
1 Please list in order (most important first) the top 
three things you would spend this money on:1 
   




E8: Irrigation (Ulimi othilira) 
Please tell me about the irrigation that you do and do not use, and answer some questions about your irrigation preferences (Mu gawo ili, ndikufuna 
tichezeko za njira za ulimi wothilira zomwe mumagwiritsa ntchito kapena simugwiritsa ntchito. Komanso, ndikufuna ndidziweko za maganizo anu pa 
njira ndi zipangizo zimene zimagwiritsidwa ntchito pa ulimi othilira). 
 



















Using the responses from Section 3-B, #9, mark 
which irrigation technologies were used in 
agricultural year 2012/2013 (Kugwiritsa ntchito 
mayankho amu Section 3-B, #9, lembani njira 
zomwe khomoli/banjali linagwiritsa ntchito pa 
ulimi othilira muchaka cha ulimi cha 2012/2013) 
 (0=not used, 1=used)               
1 For those that were not used, why didn't your 
HH use them (if multiple reasons, list in order, 
most important first, separated by commas) 
(Panjira zomwe sizinagwiritsidwe ntchito, 
nchifukwa ninji inu simunazigwiritse ntchito)?1 
              
2 
For those that were used, where did your HH 
obtain them (Pa njira zomwe zinagwiritsidwa 
ntchito, munazipeza kuti/bwanji)?2 
              
3 
When was (this technology) obtained (Kodi njira 
imeneyi munaipeza chaka chanji)? (year) 
























How much was the purchase price (or your HH’s 
contribution to the purchase price) (Ngati inagulidwa, 
munagula ndalama zingati (Kapena inu munasokhako 
ndalama zingati pogulira njira imeneyi)? (kwacha) 
       
5 
How much did your HH pay in total in agricultural 
year 2012/2013 to maintain the technology (Mu 
chaka cha ulimi cha 2012/2013 munaonongako 
ndalama zokwana zingati posamalira njira imeneyi)? 
(kwacha) 
       
6 
Does your HH have sole use of this technology or is it 
shared (Kodi njirayi imagwiritsidwa ntchito ndi 
khomo lanu lokha kapena ndi yogawana ndi 
anthu ena)? (0=not shared, 1=shared) 
       
7 
Who manages this irrigation technology in your 
village (Mudzi mwanu muno amayang’anira njira 
imeneyi ndi ndani)?7 
              
8 
Do you think the distribution of water among 
members of the community was managed fairly 
(Mukuganiza kuti kagawidwe kamadzi othilirira 
pakati pa anthu a m’mudzi mwanu muno 
kanachitika mwachilungamo)?8 
              
9 
How often did you experience a shortage of irrigation 
water (Kodi mavuto amadzi othilirira 
munakumana nawo kochuluka bwanji)?9 
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For this next segment, I would like to ask about your willingness to contribute to a hypothetical new 
irrigation scheme for your village.  In this case, all contributions of time, labor and management would 
be unpaid.  Maintenance would need to be done to keep the scheme in working condition; maintenance 
activities may include: cleaning equipment to prevent water blockage and repairing damaged 
equipment.  Management of the scheme would include voting to elect water committee members, 
attending meetings, deciding on fair distribution schedules, and distributing the water.  (Mu gawo ili, 
ndikufuna tichezeko zokhudzana ndi kukonzekera kwanu kuperekako zofunikira zina ndi zina za sikimu ya 
ulimi othilirira yongoganizira yatsopano ya mudzi mwanu. Apa, ndikufuna ndidziweko za kukonzeka 
kwanu kuperekako; nthawi, mphanvu zanu ndi kusamalira sikimuyi mwaulere. Dziwani kuti muli oyenera 
kukonza sikimuyi kuti ikhale yogwira ntchito ndipo kusamala kwake ndi kupanga zinthu monga: kutsuka 
zipangizo zogwiritsa ntchito kuopetsa kutsekeka kwa njira yodutsamo madzi ndi kukonza zipangizo 
zomwe zaonongeka. Kuyendetsa sikimuyi ndi kupanga zinthu monga: kuvotera a komiti, kukhala nawo 
pa misonkhano, kupanga ziganizo za magawidwe a madzi ndi kugawana madzi othilirira). 
  
If, hypothetically, the government 
were planning to develop an 
irrigation scheme for communal use 
in your village… (Mongoganizira, 
boma likuganizira zomanga 
sikimu ya ulimi othilira 
yogwiritsidwa ntchito ndi anthu 
onse a m’mudzi mwanu…) 














Which technologies would you 
prefer? (Ndi njira ziti za ulimi 
othilira zomwe mungakonde?) 
(Rank all technologies listed in order, 
1=most preferred, 2=next 
preferred…) (-999=not applicable to 
this village) 
            
11 
On average, how much time per 
week would you be willing to work 
on the construction of the scheme 
of this irrigation type? (Mungalore 
kupereka nthawi yochuluka 
bwanji pomanga sikimuyi pa 
sabata)?  (hours per week) 
            
12 
In total, how much money would 
you be willing to contribute to the 
construction/purchase of the 
scheme of this irrigation type? 
(Mungalore kuperekako ndalama 
zochuluka bwanji zothandizira 
kumanga/kugula 
sikimuyi/kapena njira ya ulimi 
othilirayi)? (kwacha) 
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Once this (scheme) were built… 




















On average, how much time per year 
would you be willing to work as a 
volunteer (unpaid) on the 
maintenance of the scheme of this 
irrigation type? (mungakhale 
okonzeka kumaononga nthawi 
yochuluka bwanji pachaka 
posamalira sikimuyi mwaulere) 
(hours per year) 
            
14 
How much money would you be 
willing to contribute annually to the 
maintenance of the scheme of this 
irrigation type? (Mungakhale 
okonzeka kumaononga ndalama 
zochuluka bwanji pachaka 
posamalira sikimuyi)? (kwacha) 
            
15 
On average, how much time per year 
would you be willing to volunteer 
(unpaid) to contribute to the 
management of the scheme of this 
irrigation type? (Mungakhale 
okonzeka kumaononga nthawi 
yochuluka bwanji pachaka 
poyendetsa sikimuyi mwaulere)? 
(hours per year) 
            
16 
How much money would you be 
willing to contribute per year to the 
management of the scheme of this 
irrigation type? (Mungakhale 
okonzeka kumaononga ndalama 
zochuluka bwanji pachaka 
poyendetsa sikimuyi)? (kwacha) 
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E9: Risk Taking  
Note to enumerators: It is very important in this section to NOT give examples.  Just explain as stated below and allow the respondent to interpret 
the question in their own way.    
  Show scale from Code Sheet and 
have respondent point anywhere 
along the scale, record number: 
1 How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to 
avoid taking risks? Please rank yourself from a scale of 0 to 9 with 0 as fully avoiding risks and 9 as fully 
prepared to take risks.  (Mumadziona bwanji: Kodi ndinu munthu wokonzeka kukumana ndi chiopsezo 
kapena mumapewa kutenga ziopsezo? Ndikufuna mundionetse pamene pali mulingo wanu wachiopsezo 
pa sikelo yoyambira 0 kulekeza 9, pamene pa 0 ndipopewa ziopsezo kwambiri ndipo pa 9 ndipokonzeka 
kutenga  chiopsezo) 
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E10: Household Dietary Diversity (Zakudya zakasinthasintha) 
For this section about your household’s eating habits, I need to please ask the questions to the member 
of your household who regularly prepares the food. (Mugawo ili ndikufuna ndicheze nanu zamadyedwe a 
panyumba panu.)  
 
  PID 
1 
Who is most responsible for food preparation in your household? (Kodi amakonza 
chakudya pakhomo pano ndi ndani nthawi zambiri? (person answering this section) 
  
Enumerator: if the main agricultural decision maker is NOT the person who regularly prepares food, 
skip this section.   
 
In the last 24 hours, have you or any member of your household eaten the following 
foods (this includes food eaten outside the house, for example lunch in the field or 
dinner at a friend’s house) (if there was a special event in the last 24 hours, likea 
wedding or big party, then recall for the preceding day): (Kodi mumaola 24 apitawa, 




Any nsima, bread, noodles, biscuits, or any other foods made from millet, sorghum, 
maize, rice or wheat (Nsima, buledi, nudozi, bisiketi, kapena Zakudya zilizonse 
zochokera kumapira, mawere, chimanga, mpunga kapena tirigu)?  
  
3 
Any potatoes, yams, cassava, or other foods made from roots or tubers (Mbatata, 
mbatatesi, chinangwa, kapena chakudya chochokera ku mizu)? 
  
4 Any vegetables (zamasamba)?    
5 Any fruits (zipatso)?   
6 
Any goat, chicken, beef, pork, duck, other birds, game, mice, monkey, liver, kidney, 
heart or other meats (Nyama ya mbuzi, nkhuku, ng’ombe, nkhumba, bakha, mbalame, 
nyama zakutchire, mbewa, anyani, ndi nyama zamitundu ina)?  
  
7 Any eggs (mazira)?   
8 Any fresh or dried fish or shellfish (Nsomba zouma kapena zafuleshi)?   
9 
Any foods made from beans, soy beans, peas, lentils or nuts? (Zakudya zopangidwa 
kuchokera kunyembe, soya, sawawa, kalongonda kapena mtedza) 
  
10 
Any cheese, yoghurt, milk, or other milk products (mkaka, chakudya chochokera ku 
mkaka monga yogati, chambiko) 
  
11 Any foods made with oil, fat or butter (Zakudya zochokera kumafuta)?   
12 Any sugar or honey (shuga kapena uchi)?   
13 
Any other foods, such as condiments, coffee, tea (Zakudya zina monga zokometsera 
ndiwo, khofi, tiyi? 
  




 14 15 
  
Last week, how many times did the following people in your HH have beans, 
peas, soy beans or lentils with a main meal (mu sabata yapitayi, anthu awa 
amadya kangati nyemba, sawawa, soya ndi ndiwo zina zamgulu lanyemba 
pamodzi ndi nsima)? 
What was the average size of one of these 
bean/pea/lentil portions (Kodi chakudyachi 





Male adults     
Male children     
Female adults     
Female children     
 
16 
In the previous year, how frequently did you experience food shortages ( Ndikangati 




E11: Fuel Use and Access (Kagwiritsidwe ntchito ndi kapezedwe ka zokolezera moto) 
This part of the questionnaire is about the types of fuel your household uses and the access you have to them, (Gawo lino ndiyokhudzana ndi zinthu 
zomwe mumagwiritsa ntchito pokolezera moto pakhomo panu and kapezekedwe kake). 
       PID 
1 
Which member of your HH is most knowledgeable about fuel use and access 
(Ndi ndani nyumbamu amadziwa kwambiri zakagwiritsidwe ntchito ndi 
kapezedwe ka zinthu zokolezera moto)?   
 
Enumerator: if the main agricultural decision maker is NOT the person who regularly uses and collects fuel, skip this section.   
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 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
What were your main 
energy sources for 
cooking and heating 
in the last 12 months 
(Kodi mumagwiritsa 















kuti) 3? (if 
separate 
locations are 
used for a 
significant 
amount of a fuel 
source then 
write info in a 
separate row) 
How far away 
(one-way trip) is 
this location 













Did you buy or 
collect (this energy 









purchase and collect, 
if 2>>8) 
What quantity was 
purchased per month 
(Pamwezi mumagula 
zambiri bwanji)? 
If the energy 
source was 
purchased, how 






(kwacha)?  Amount Fuel Unit Code
6 
Rainy Season (nyengo ya dzinja) 
Main 
Source               
Second 
Main 
Source               
Dry Season (nyengo yachilimwe) 
Main 
Source               
Second 
Main 
Source               
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8 9 10 11 
  
In the past week how many trips 
did (PID) spend in total 
gathering (this energy source) 
(Musabata yapitayi (ujeni) 
anayenda maulendo angati 
kukatolera ndi kunyamula 
zokolezera motozi)? 
In the past week how much time 
did (PID) spend acquiring (this 
energy source) from the location? 
(include time spent going to the 
location, acquiring the source, 
returning home) (Musabata 
yapitayi (ujeni) anatenga nthawi 
yochuluka bwanji potolera zinthu 
zokolezera motozi (kuphatikizapo 
popita, kutolera ndi pobwerera 
kunyumba) 
In the past week, how much of (this energy 
source) was acquired per trip by (PID) (Musabata 
yapitayi, ndizokolezera moto zochuluka bwanji 







































































































Source 1                                               
Source 2                                               
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E12: Cookstoves and Health (Mbaula ndi Umoyo) 
For this section, I need to please ask the question to the household member who is mainly responsible 
for cooking. Mu gawo lino, ndikufuna ndichezeko ndi munthu yemwe ali ndi udindo ophika chakudya 
pakhomo panu. 
  PID 
1 Which HH member is mainly responsible for cooking? Ndi 
ndani pakhomo panu yemwe ali ndi udindo ophika chakudya? 
 
Enumerator: if the main agricultural decision maker is NOT the person who regularly prepares food, 
skip this section.   
I will now ask you about improved cook stoves.  During the meeting this morning we presented two 
types of cookstoves: the Chitetezo mbaula and the rocket stove.  Remember that if the stoves are used 
correctly they can reduce fuel consumption, smoke inhalation (and respiratory diseases), eye infections 
and the frequency of burns.  (Mugawo ili ndikufuna tichezeko za mbaula zamakono. Pamsonkhano 
wathu kummawa kuja, tinafotokoza za mitundu iwiri ya mbaula: Chitetezo mbaula ndi mbaula ya loketi. 
Kumbukirani kuti mbaulazi zikazigwiritsidwa ntchito moyenera zimatha: kuchepetsa kuchuluka kwa 
zinthu zokolezera moto zomwe mumagwiritsa ntchito pophika, kuchepetsa kupuma utsi (ndi matenda a 
m’mapapo), kuchepetsa matenda a maso komanso kuchepetsa kupsa ndi moto.)  
  Chitetezo Mbaula 
Rocket stove 
(Mbaula ya loketi) 




Do you own an improved cookstove 
(Inu muli ndi mbaula yamakono 
[iyi])? (0=no, 1=yes, if no>>7)       
3 
When did you acquire this improved 
cookstove (Munaigula liti mbaula 
yamakonoyi)? (mm, yy)       
4 
How did you acquire this improved 
cookstove (Mbaula imeneyi 
munaipeza bwanji)?4  (if not 
purchased>>5)      
5 
How much did you pay for this 
improved cookstove? (Munalipira 
ndalama zingati kugulira mbaulayi?) 
(kwacha)    
6 
If this improved cookstove were to 
break, how much would you be 
willing to pay to replace it Mbaulayi 
itati iwonongeke, mungalole 
kuononga ndalama zingati kuti 
mugule ina)? (kwacha)       








If not owned, why don't you own 
this improved cookstove 
(N’chifukwa ninji inu mulibe mbaula 
yamakonoyi)?7 (rank in order, most 
important first, separated by 
commas)       
8 
How much would you be willing to 
pay for each of these improved 
cookstoves (Mungalole kulipira 
ndalama zingati kuti mugule mbaula 
iyi)? (kwacha)  
(-999=unwilling to buy one)       
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I will now ask you about the frequency of different stove-related health problems that members of your 
household experienced in the last 12 months (Pano ndikufuna ndidziwe ngati anthu okhala pakhomo 
panu anakumanako ndi mavuto a zaumoyo obwera kamba ka mbaula yomwe mumagwiritsa ntchito mu 
miyezi khumi ndi iwiri (12) yapitayi komanso kuwirikiza kwa mavuto amenewa). 
 
 PID PID PID PID PID PID PID PID PID PID 
 
                     
9 
In a typical day, is this person present 
in the same room as the stove while 
the fire is active (0= no, 1=yes, 
2=cooking is done outdoors) (Mu tsiku 
longa lililonse [munthu uyu] 
amakhalako mu chipinda chomwe 
mwaikamo mbaula yoti ikuyaka)? 
         
 
10 
Has this person had an illness with a 
cough at any time in the last six 
months? (kodi [munthu uyu] 
anadwalako chifuwa mu miyezi isanu 
ndi umodzi yapitayi) (0=no, 1=yes, if 
no>>13) 
         
 
11 
When this person had the illness with 
the cough, did they breathe faster 
than usual, with short rapid breaths, 
or have difficulty breathing?  (Pa 
nthawi yomwe munthuyu amadwala, 
ankapumako mwabefu, mobanika 
kapena movutikira? (0=no, 1=yes, if 
no>>14) 
         
 
12 
Did their coughing illness affect this 
person’s ability to work? (Kodi 
nthenda yachifuwayi inamupangitsa 
munthuyu kuti asinthe magwiridwe 
ake antchito? (0=no, 1=yes) 
         
 
13 
Over the last six months, how many 
times has this person been burned by 
the stove, the hot pot, or the fire (Mu 
miyezi isanu ndi umodzi yapitayi, 
[munthu uyu] wapsako ndi mbaula, 
poto otentha kapena ndi moto 
kangati)?  
                  
  
14 
Over the last six months how many 
times did this person have an eye 
infection (Mu miyezi isanu ndi umodzi 
yapitayi, ndikangati komwe [munthu 
uyu] anadwalako nthenda yamaso)? 
                  
  












How much of (fuel type) 
does your HH use in an 
average week on your 3-
stone stove?  
(-999=do not have this 
stove) kodi mumaononga 
(zokolezera moto izi) 
zochuluka bwanji pa 
sabata, pa khomo panu, 
mukaphikira pa mafuwa? 
How much of (fuel type) 
does your HH use in an 
average week on your 
chitetezo mbaula?  
(-999=do not have this 
stove) kodi mumaononga 
(zokolezera moto izi) 
zochuluka bwanji pa 
sabata, pa khomo panu, 
mukamaphikira mbaula ya 
chitetezo? 
How much of (fuel type) does 
your HH use in an average 
week on your rocket stove?  
(-999=do not have this stove) 
kodi mumaononga 
(zokolezera moto izi) 
zochuluka bwanji pa sabata, 
pa khomo panu, 
mukamaphikira mbaula ya 
roketi? 
How much of (fuel 
type) does your HH use 
in an average week on 
your _______ stove 
(please specify stove 
type)? Kodi 
mumaononga 
(zokolezera moto izi) 
zochuluka bwanji pa 
sabata, pa khomo 
panu, mukamaphikira 
mbaula ya________? 
(nenani mtundu wa 
mbaula) 
 Fuel Type Code15 Amount 
Fuel Code Unit6 
from Section 12 Amount 
Fuel Code 
Unit6 from 
Section 12 Amount 
Fuel Code Unit6 
from Section 12 Amount 
Fuel Code Unit6 
from Section 12 
Fuel Type 1                 
Fuel Type 2                 
E13: Social Capital 
I will now ask you about the organizations and social networks that your household is part of (Pano 
ndikufuna tichezeko nanu za mabungwe amene khomo lanuli limatengapo nawo mbali komanso 
maubale omwe muli nawo).   
E13.1: Organizations 
1 2 
Which household members are members of 
organization(s) and groups, including religious ones? 
(Kodi ndi anthu ati a pakhomo panu ali mamembala a 
mabungwe)? (PID) 
Which organizations are they a member of 
([munthu uyu]  ndi membala wa bungwe 
liti)?2 (please use one row for each 
organization) 
     
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    












E13.2: Social Network 
 
If you or another HH member asked, would 
it be easy or not easy to [problem] from 
[person from your network] (Kodi ndichithu 
chophweka kwa inu kapena wina 
wanyumba mwanu ku [chinthu] kuchokera 
[kwa munthu wa maubale anu])? (1=easy, 
2=not easy) 
First degree relatives of HH head or 
spouse (siblings, parents, sons, 
daughters, grandparents) (Achibale 
apafupi akuchimuna kapena 
kuchikazi monga alongo kapena 
abale, makolo, ana, agogo) 
Other relatives of HH head or 
spouse (cousins, aunts, 
uncles) (Achibale chapatali 
akuchimuna kapena kuchikazi 















3 Borrow money for health expenses 
(kubwereka ndalama zogwiritsa ntchito 
pa umoyo)           
4 Borrow money for any event, such as a 
wedding or funeral           
5 Borrow money for food (kubwereka 
ndalama zogwiritsa ntchito pa 
chakudya)      
6 Borrow agricultural inputs (seeds, 
fertilizer, etc.) (Kubwereka zipangizo 
zakumunda monga mbewu, feteleza)      
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E14: Credit Access (Kapezedwe ka ngongole) 
I will now ask you about your household’s access to credit. (Pano ndikufuna ndicheze nanu zokhudzana 
ndi mene mumapezera ngongole) 
1 
If you needed a loan for 25,000 kwacha, would you be able to obtain one from an 
informal source in the next two weeks (Mutakhala kuti mukufuna kutenga ngongole 
ya 25,000 Kwacha, kuchokera kwamunthu mukhoza kuipeza masabata awiri 
akubwelawa? (0=no, 1=yes)     
2 
If you needed a loan for 25,000 kwacha, would you be able to obtain one from a 
formal source in the next two weeks (Mutakhala kuti mukufuna kutenga ngongole 
ya 25,000 Kwacha kubanki ndi kumabungwe mukhoza kuipeza masabata awiri 
akubwelawa? (0=no, 1=yes)     
3 
If you needed a loan for 100,000 kwacha, would you be able to obtain one from an 
informal source in the next two weeks (Mutakhala kuti mukufuna kutenga ngongole 
ya 100,000 Kwacha, kwina kulikokonse osati kubanki ndi kumabungwe mukhoza 
kuipeza masabata awiri akubwelawa? (0=no, 1=yes)     
4 
If you needed a loan for 100,000 kwacha, would you be able to obtain one from a 
formal source in the next two weeks (Mutakhala kuti mukufuna kutenga ngongole 
ya 100,000 Kwacha kubanki ndi kumabungwe mukhoza kuipeza masabata awiri 
akubwelawa?? (0=no, 1=yes)     
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